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THE LOST ‘‘ART’’ OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 
Sean M. O’Connor* 
Patent systems emerged in the early modern period of the West 
to incentivize development and dissemination of skills-based artisanal 
innovations. This approach appears to have been adopted by the 
Framers in drafting the Intellectual Property Clause. Only later, in the 
Industrial Revolution, did ‘‘science’’ and ‘‘technology’’ begin to dis-
place ‘‘art’’ as the perceived object of the U.S. patent system. This was 
in large part because of the emergence of the concept of ‘‘technology’’ 
itself as science-based innovation in artisanal and mechanized pro-
duction. The loss of an ‘‘art’’-based concept of the patent system is ar-
guably causing some of the confusion over the proper scope and na-
ture of the patent system, especially with regard to upstream 
patenting. I argue that this loss is leading to over- and underinclusive 
senses of patent eligible subject matter as well as amnesia as to the 
long-standing importance of method patents. I offer suggestions on 
how to reorient the patent system back to a focus on (useful) ‘‘art.’’ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many modern commentators assume that the patent system origi-
nated to incentivize progress in science and technology. In the United 
States, this is often mistakenly attributed to the preamble of the  
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution (‘‘IP Clause’’):  
‘‘Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’’1 Today it 
seems natural to infer that promoting the progress of science would be 
done through exclusive rights for inventors’ discoveries, while promoting 
the progress of ‘‘useful Arts’’ would be left to exclusive rights to authors 
for their writings (and somehow the other fine and entertainment arts as 
well). This raises some questions as to the latter rights-----why ‘‘useful’’ 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added to show preamble). 
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arts and why only authors and writings? But the patents-for-science part 
seems straightforward enough. At the same time, fundamental art-based 
terminology of the patent system-----prior art, person having ordinary skill 
in the art, state of the art-----continues to this day, only to be shrugged off 
or ignored as a mere curiosity or vestige.2 
The intellectual worldview in the West long distinguished the me-
chanical arts from both sciences and liberal arts (and later the fine arts). 
Patent systems emerged during the Renaissance to incentivize invention, 
disclosure, and commercialization of advances in the ‘‘useful’’ (i.e., prac-
tical, mechanical) arts. In the United States, Madison and the Framers 
likely relied in substantial part on the famous French Encyclopédie con-
struction of ‘‘art’’ as artisanal skill to authorize Congress to grant exclu-
sive rights to promote the progress of such skills.3 Similar to Hamilton’s 
views expressed in his Report on Manufactures, the Framers seemed to 
have viewed artisanal manufacture and commerce as an important area 
of development for the new U.S. economy.4 
But the concept of ‘‘technology’’ as science-based artisanal innova-
tion that emerged in the nineteenth century led Congress, courts, and 
commentators to focus on science-based inventions.5 While not asserting 
these as the only patent eligible inventions, the various cases and com-
mentary coincided with a constriction of the term ‘‘art’’ to mean only the 
fine arts in popular usage.6 Thus, by the twentieth century the term ‘‘art’’ 
became complicated as a descriptor for patent eligible invention. Fur-
ther, a sense that such inventions needed to be based in ‘‘technology’’ 
spread throughout the patent community. But this attitude may have 
contributed to the misplaced views among some mid-century Supreme 
Court justices that inventions had to not only be technology based but 
also represent significant advances in the sciences to be patent eligible.7 
While this was an extreme position rejected by other justices, Congress, 
and commentators, the notion that patent eligible inventions must be 
technology based has become quite resilient, resulting in the supposed 
‘‘technological arts’’ test that is sometimes still cited as a measure of pa-
tent eligibility.8 
The problem is that a science or technology based patent system is 
both under and over inclusive for the sorts of inventions targeted quite 
                                                                                                                                         
 2. The United States Patent and Trademark Office itself has long organized its patent examina-
tion corps into different ‘‘art units’’ representing categories of patentable subject matter. See Patent 
Classification: Classes Arranged by Art Unit, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www. 
uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-search/understanding-patent-classifications/patent-
classification.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 3. Sean M. O’Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 803--807 (2015) [hereinafter O’Connor, Overlooked French Influence]. 
 4. Id. at 819--20. 
 5. See SEAN M. O’CONNOR, METHOD+OLOGY AND THE MEANS OF INNOVATION ch. 6 (forth-
coming 2016). 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., Ex parte Carl A. Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 6--7 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20 2004). 
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usefully by traditional patent systems. Innovations in the useful arts can 
occur serendipitously or through nonscientific trial and error. They re-
quire no knowledge or training in the natural sciences (although that can 
be helpful). At the same time, much innovation and discovery in the sci-
ences was never viewed as patent eligible. In particular, ‘‘laws of nature’’ 
have long been held as a specific category judicially excluded from patent 
eligibility.9 Further, the emphasis on ‘‘arts’’ as human skills or methods 
was lost as industrialization turned the focus of manufacture from manu-
al to machine.10 The resulting emphasis on machines, as well as on the 
manufactured artifacts and new compositions of matter themselves, ac-
centuated the sense that patents were about incentivizing the progress of 
science and technology. I contend that the shift from ‘‘art’’ to ‘‘technolo-
gy’’ (and, even worse, ‘‘science’’) loses sight of critical parts of a well 
functioning patent system and blurs boundaries than can result in both a 
temptation for problematic ‘‘upstream’’ patenting of basic science re-
search results and an improper bias against ‘‘nonscientific’’ artisanal in-
novation. Instead, I argue for a system that focuses once again on ad-
vances in the ‘‘useful arts.’’ 
Part II of this Article examines the radical-----but often over-
looked-----transformation of the term ‘‘art’’ in Western culture during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Part III shows the central role of the 
older skills concept of ‘‘art’’ in the development of patent systems from 
Renaissance Venice to early modern Britain and then to the IP Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. Part IV then argues that the later recharacteriza-
tion of patent systems as solely concerned with scientific and technologi-
cal progress confused the scope and nature of patents. Part V suggests 
how to reorient the U.S. patent system to promote the progress of the 
‘‘useful arts.’’ Part VI concludes. 
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF ‘‘ART’’ IN WESTERN CULTURE11 
When someone mentions art or the arts today, they usually mean 
the Fine Arts.12 This is an impoverished usage that obscures the central 
role that art(ifice)-----any manipulation of physical or mental objects for 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (citing Assoc. for Molecular Pa-
thology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). 
 10. Note the roots of manufacture as ‘‘manu’’ + ‘‘factor,’’ revealing its origins as a descriptor of 
manual human production. The term arose long before the Industrial Revolution and was used by  
Adam Smith and others to describe human production. It is one of the many linguistic ironies I ex-
plore here and elsewhere that this descriptor of human production flipped after the Industrial Revolu-
tion to primarily signify machine production in popular usage. Manufacture, N., OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/113769?isAdvanced=false&result=1&rskey 
=hszxol& (last visited July 29, 2015). 
 11. O’CONNOR, supra note 5, at ch. 4. 
 12. The traditional fine arts------as established by the late eighteenth century------include music, po-
etry, painting, sculpture, and architecture. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A 
Study in the History of Aesthetics (I), 12 J. HIST. IDEAS 496, 497 (1951). Today, however, the popular 
sense of ‘‘art’’------and even the ‘‘fine arts’’------often seems to include ‘‘minor’’ or ‘‘entertainment’’ arts 
such as film, photography, dance, and others. 
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practical ends-----has played in Western history. The notion of the fine arts 
as a set of prestigious intuition-based activities related by aesthetics and 
creative self-expression did not even emerge until the eighteenth centu-
ry.13 Before this, the visual fine arts (painting, sculpture, and architecture) 
were part of the mechanical arts which also included craft skills such as 
carpentry, masonry, and metallurgy, while music and poetry were part of 
the liberal arts. From the eighteenth until the twentieth century, these 
‘‘fine arts’’ were referred to alternately as Art (with a capital A), the Fine 
Arts, or the Beaux Arts. The generic art signified any ‘‘artifice’’ produced 
by humans and thus not naturally occurring. The current popular notion 
of art as a fuzzy, mysterious, or intuitive talent is quite recent, and con-
trary to two millennia of usage in which art was only rational, rules-based 
methods for practical ends.14 
A. The Roots of ‘‘Art’’ in ‘‘Techné’’ 
The Latin arti or ars is the origin of the modern English ‘‘art’’ and its 
cognates in other European languages.15 Ars itself was a translation of the 
Greek techné,16 which had been in use since the presocratics (c. 500 
B.C.).17 Each techné focused on a particular expertise and goal (telos), 
although these could be broad and abstract, such as the production of 
food (the techné of geōrgia). Techné allowed man to control his environ-
ment and was mythologized in Greek stories such as Prometheus 
Bound.18 
Each techné must demonstrate five characteristics that focused on 
objective, rational, rule-based systems.19 Exactitude flowed from the 
preeminence the Greeks gave to ‘‘numbering’’ as one of the mythical 
gifts Prometheus gave to humans.20 Control also flowed from the  
Promethean myth and reflected the importance of human capabilities to 
order the natural environment for human survival.21 Reliability meant 
that the trained artisan would achieve more consistent results than the 
amateur.22 Teachability recognized that a test of mastery was whether the 
artisan could train others in the techné, as well as the obvious need for 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. See id. at 498. 
 14. For example, transforming wood into useful objects like furniture or manipulating mental 
objects like numbers to perform calculations. 
 15. O’CONNOR, supra note 5, at ch. 4 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2014)). 
 16. Which, in turn, may have descended from the Indo-European root ‘‘tek,’’ meaning ‘‘to fit 
together the woodwork of a . . . house.’’ DAVID ROOCHNIK, OF ART AND WISDOM: PLATO’S 
UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNE 19 (1996). 
 17. Id. at 1--12; G.E.R. Lloyd, The Definition, Status and Methods of Τεχνη in the Fifth and 
Fourth Centuries, in SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN CLASSICAL GREECE 249--56 (Alan C. Bowen ed., 
1991). 
 18. ROOCHNIK, supra note 16, at 24, 33--34. 
 19. Id. at 19--56. 
 20. Id. at 39. 
 21. Id. at 33--34. 
 22. Id. at 45. 
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the techné to be transmitted to each new generation.23 Certifiability meant 
that the artisan must be able to document or demonstrate mastery of the 
techné.24 
While techné were valued over other craft skills that were nonra-
tional or based on intuition only, they were still often relegated to low 
status individuals including slaves.25 To be in command of a techné was to 
not only have practical control of natural elements but to also possess a 
form of wisdom (sophos).26 The Latin form of techné-----arti-----serves as the 
root for many English words denoting human agency: artificial, artifice, 
artifact, artist, artisan, and artisanal.27 These contrasted with others, such 
as nature or natural, which denote actions in the world that occur without 
human intervention.28 
Plato adopted the presocratic techné, sharply contrasting it with the 
fuzzy, intuition-based activities we think of as the heart of the Fine Arts 
today.29 In fact, any such fuzziness and lack of rigorous rules were the an-
tithesis of techné: the inspired poet has succumbed to ‘‘divine madness’’ 
and ‘‘goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer with him’’ as he 
channels spirits or muses.30 But at times Plato seemed to conflate techné 
(as practical methods or ‘‘know-how’’) with epistemé (as theoretical 
knowledge about the world or ‘‘knowledge that’’).31 
Aristotle followed most of Plato’s version of techné.32 He clarified 
the determinate end, or telos, that a techné must have by distinguishing 
those where the means itself is the end (e.g., flute playing) from ‘‘produc-
                                                                                                                                         
 23. This criterion especially contrasts with the modern Romantic notion of art as largely un-
teachable. See, e.g., Kristeller, supra note 12, at 498 (‘‘[W]hereas modern aesthetics stresses the fact 
that Art cannot be learned, and thus often becomes involved in the curious endeavor to teach the un-
teachable, the ancients always understood by Art something that can be taught and learned.’’). 
 24. ROOCHNIK, supra note 16, at 52. 
 25. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 502--03; Lloyd, supra note 17, at 259. For example, Plutarch 
states that Archimedes would not write about his significant mechanical inventions because he regard-
ed the ‘‘work of an engineer and every art that ministers to the needs of life as ignoble or vulgar.’’ 5 
PLUTARCH’S LIVES § 17.4, at 479 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., G.P. Putnam’s Sons ed., 1917). 
 26. See TOM ANGIER, TECHNÉ IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS: CRAFTING THE MORAL LIFE 13--19 
(2010); O’CONNOR, supra note 5, at ch. 4. 
 27. O’CONNOR, supra note 5, at ch. 4. 
 28. Id.; ANGIER, supra note 26, at 4. 
 29. See ANGIER, supra note 26, at 13--19. 
 30. Id. at 16--17. 
 31. Epistemé is often misleadingly translated as ‘‘science’’ or ‘‘scientific knowledge.’’ It is not 
synonymous with the modern sense of ‘‘Science.’’ Is it rather ‘‘knowledge’’ as opposed to ‘‘belief’’ or 
‘‘opinion.’’ There are weak and strong versions of epistemé. See, e.g., Richard Parry, Episteme and 
Techne, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., June 22, 2014), http://plato.stanford. 
edu/entries/episteme-techne/. The strong version includes only statements that can be demonstrated to 
be necessarily true (such as logical or mathematical propositions deducible from axioms) or that we 
believe to be invariably true (such as ‘‘laws of nature’’). The weak version can include contingently 
true statements based on inductive probabilities. 
 32. See ANGIER, supra note 26, at 36--41. 
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tive’’ arts where the means produce something else (e.g., brick making).33 
Almost anything, including the practice of economics, could be a techné.34 
Three aspects of Aristotle’s ethics outside of techné are relevant to 
the development of art. First, his ‘‘practical wisdom’’ (phrónésis) was di-
rected to all contingent things in the world. This is the province of art.35 
By contrast, theoretical wisdom (sophia) is directed to the strictly neces-
sary, eternal, and unchanging aspects of the world. While one can only 
change contingent things, this requires knowledge of the necessary and 
eternal (to know what is unchangeable).36 Second, and in part because of 
the preceding, Aristotle believed the contemplative life seeking sophia to 
be the highest calling.37 For better or worse, this emphasis on sophia over 
both phrónésis and the production or poiesis of technai set a trajectory in 
the West that arguably slowed artisanal innovation by privileging liberal 
arts as activities fit for the free (libere) mind of high-status citizens over 
‘‘illiberal’’ mechanical arts (banausiki technai, the vulgar, or visceral 
arts).38 Third, Aristotle’s doctrine of ‘‘habituation’’ for training ethical in-
dividuals was his ‘‘learn by doing’’ approach adapted from the appren-
ticeships of craftsmen: ‘‘[V]irtues we get by first exercising them . . . for 
the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing.’’39 
Cicero provided the transition for the notion of techné art between 
the Ancient Greeks and the Middle Ages.40 As part of his mission to in-
troduce his fellow Romans to Greek philosophy by translating major 
works into Latin, he used artes in place of techné.41 He also contributed 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS I.i.1--3, eds. n.a (H. Rackham trans., Loeb Classical 
Library, Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1934). 
 34. ANGIER, supra note 26, at 37 (‘‘[A]s there are many . . . technai . . . their ends are also many; 
the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of eco-
nomics wealth.’’). Some translations of Aristotle appear to improperly read in modern notions of 
‘‘arts’’ and ‘‘sciences.’’ For example, the Loeb Classical Library adds the terms ‘‘science’’ for medicine 
and ‘‘art’’ for shipbuilding in the preceding quote even though the original Greek has only the prefato-
ry term technai as in Angier’s translation above, and does not include the terms techné or epistemé in 
any of the list items. ARISTOTLE, supra note 33, at I.i.3 (‘‘[T]he end of the science of medicine is health, 
that of the art of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of domestic economy wealth.’’). 
 35. ANGIER, supra note 26, at 41. 
 36. ARISTOTLE, supra note 33, at VI.v.3--4. In modern times, this is captured in Reinhold Nie-
buhr’s Serenity Prayer: ‘‘God give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, 
courage to change the things that should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the 
other.’’ THE ESSENTIAL REINHOLD NIEBUHR: SELECTED ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES xxiv (Robert 
MacAfee Brown ed., 1986). 
 37. See ANGIER, supra note 26, at 66--78. While happiness (eudaimonia) results from individuals 
performing their appointed functions (ergon), Aristotle may only have been speaking of craftsmen qua 
craftsmen, not as fully flourishing humans. Notwithstanding, this sense of satisfaction in fulfilling one’s 
function was given a modern gloss in the concept of flow. See generally MIHÁLY CSÍKSZENTMIHÁLYI, 
FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE (1990). 
 38. Kristeller, supra note 12, at 505; Parry, supra note 31. This debate continues in the tension 
between ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘applied’’ science from the nineteenth century to the present. See Peter Dear, 
What is the History of Science the History of?, 96 ISIS 390, 401--02 (2005) . 
 39. ANGIER, supra note 26, at 106. 
 40. Parry, supra note 31. 
 41. See id.; Julia Annas, Introduction to MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON MORAL ENDS ix (Julia 
Annas ed., Raphael Woolf trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (c. 45 B.C.E.) [hereinafter CICERO]. 
Artes was conveyed to both Modern English and Modern French from the Anglo-Norman, Old 
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an insight central to distinguishing the subject and the object of a field: 
‘‘no [discipline can] be based on itself. There is always something  
external to it that it comprehends. . . . Thus, medicine is the art of health, 
navigation the art of steering a ship.’’42 
B. Classifications of the arts (and sciences) 
The formal five Fine Arts of today-----music, poetry, painting, sculp-
ture, and architecture-----were not linked in antiquity.43 Music and poetry 
were part of the liberal arts, while the visual arts of painting, sculpture, 
and architecture were part of the mechanical arts.44 At the same time, 
painting and sculpture were sometimes classed within the imitative arts. 
The Muses were said to inspire poetry, music, and dance, along the lines 
of Plato’s divine madness.45 But much of poetry was also closely associat-
ed with rhetoric and logic.46 Pythagorean mathematical music theory was 
considered epistemé. Aristotle had also distinguished the arts of necessity 
and the arts of pleasure, but the latter did not map onto the modern Fine 
Arts.47 Our modern sense of ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘beauty’’ are quite different from 
those of the ancients, who had practical fields in mind for the former and 
a concept of moral good (not aesthetic value) for the latter. Modern 
writers commit the presentist error when their writings make it appear 
that the aesthetics-based Fine Arts concept existed in classical times.48 
A definitive set of seven liberal arts that formed the core of elemen-
tary learning arose in the late antiquity, consisting of grammar, rhetoric, 
dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music.49 Medicine and ar-
                                                                                                                                         
French, and Middle French art meaning ‘‘means, method, or knowledge employed to gain a certain 
result, technique (c1000).’’ It remained as arte in Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian. 
 42. CICERO, supra note 41, at 123. While this translation uses ‘‘branch of knowledge,’’ I have 
replaced it with ‘‘discipline’’ to minimize the influence of the modern sensibility that will likely conflate 
‘‘branch of knowledge’’ with ‘‘science.’’ Further, Cicero clearly is signifying ‘‘arts’’ here because his 
examples come from them. In Episteme and Techne, Parry goes even further by summarizing one point 
of this passage as ‘‘the art is different from its object.’’ Parry, supra note 31.  
 43. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 489--506. 
 44. Id. at 507--08. 
 45. This included the improvisational or purely creative composition functions. Music is actually 
originally derived from the Greek μονσικη and the Muses, and is originally a much broader term en-
compassing poetry and dance as well. Interestingly, there were no Muses for the visual arts in ancient 
times. These now-familiar visual arts Muses were instead created by the allegorists of the early  
Modern period. Id. at 501. 
 46. Poetry, as a variant on the Greek poiesis, was not limited to rhyming or other verse as it is 
today. Poiesis was the much broader concept of producing any entirely new thing in the world, closer 
to the broad definition of invention that includes the creation of new devices in language, logic, or 
mathematics (as well as of new machines or objects). 
 47. Kristeller, supra note 12, at 504. 
 48. The term ‘‘beauty’’ centered on moral good for the ancients, as in ‘‘beautiful habits of the 
soul and of beautiful cognitions.’’ Think of terms like beatify and beatific, related to saintly behavior. 
See id. at 499. 
 49. Martianus Capella’s florid fifth century book, The Marriage of Philology and Mercury, be-
came the standard text for teaching the liberal arts through the Middle Ages. See WILLIAM HARRIS 
STAHL, I MARTIANUS CAPELLA AND THE SEVEN LIBERAL ARTS (Columbia Univ. Press 1971).  
Capella’s system was based in part on earlier work by Marcus Terentius Varro------especially the Nine 
Books of Disciplines that included all seven liberal arts plus medicine and architecture. Id. 
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chitecture straddled the line between liberal arts and mechanical arts, but 
increasingly were left out of the formal liberal arts because they were of-
ten practiced by slaves or low status men.50 In the tumultuous times after 
the fall of Rome, the liberal arts became the sole curriculum for the re-
maining monastic schools, where they were sometimes referred to as sci-
ences as well.51 This does not mean that ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘science’’ were inter-
changeable in the medieval period, but rather signaled the emergence of 
a consensus on the complementary nature of the two concepts as be-
tween when a field was studied as subject or object. When practiced to 
achieve practical ends, it was a subject and an art. When contemplated as 
part of systematic study, it was an object and a science.52 
The Middle Ages brought about marked changes in the study and 
classification of arts and sciences. After Charlemagne consolidated pow-
er in significant parts of Western Europe, relative order and stability 
were restored and basic education became more widespread again as ca-
thedral schools were established in major towns and cities. The liberal 
arts were split into the Trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic) and  
Quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music).53 Reinvigor-
ating higher studies, Aristotle’s writings and important Islamic commen-
taries on them were reintroduced to the West from the Byzantine and  
Islamic East in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This also led scholars 
to revise the liberal arts to accommodate Aristotle’s philosophy (logic, 
ethics, and physics) and divisions of knowledge.54 This in turn coincided 
with the emergence of universities as an entirely new kind of educational 
structure, where natural philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence, and theol-
ogy were studied and taught beyond the basic liberal arts (which then re-
turned to their earlier status as elementary studies).55 Hugo of St. Victor 
introduced a scheme of seven mechanical arts, corresponding to the sev-
en liberal arts, that consisted of lanificium (the working and weaving of 
wool); armatura (making arms and armor); navigatio (navigation);  
agricultura (agriculture); venatio (hunting); medicina (medicine); and 
theatrica (theatre or drama).56 However, these were not taught within the 
universities.57 Architecture, sculpture, and painting were listed as subdivi-
                                                                                                                                         
 50. Kristeller, supra note 12, at 504. 
 51. Id. at 507. 
 52. This mapped the pre-Scientific Revolution sense of science as any kind of systematic study of 
human activity or natural phenomena. 
 53. See EDWARD GRANT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 33--
49 (1996); JAMES HANNAM, GOD’S PHILOSOPHERS: HOW THE MEDIEVAL WORLD LAID THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE 23--24 (2009); Kristeller, supra note 12, at 507--10. Some histori-
ans of science refer to the Quadrivium as the ‘‘mathematical’’ or ‘‘exact’’ arts/sciences. See Kristeller, 
supra note 12, at 507--10. 
 54. GRANT, supra note 53, at 43. 
 55. See id. at 42--49; HANNAM, supra note 53, at 75. In fact the first university, at Bologna, was 
exclusively a school of law. See HANNAM, supra note 53, at 74--75.  
 56. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 507. 
 57. This is curious because the origin of the universities was as an adaptation of the universitas 
(the ‘‘whole’’ or ‘‘entirety’’) denoting the collection of all artisans practicing a certain art/trade within a 
free city for academics. See GRANT, supra note 53, at 34--36. 
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sions, or lesser arts (alternately minor arts), within the mechanical art of 
armatura.58 
Traditionally illiterate artisans began receiving basic education such 
that they could write descriptive accounts of their art.59 The rise of the 
monastic traditions and their emphasis on artisanal activities provided 
another source of literate artisans. An example of this was the twelfth 
century Benedictine monk Theophilus. His treatise On Divers Arts gave 
a comprehensive treatment of the manner of preparing materials and 
working them into various artifacts.60 Theophilus did not provide a set of 
principles for each art that might qualify it as a techné, however, but in-
stead related only the practical techniques to be used (similar to the an-
cient Greek technémata).61 In the English translation of this work,  
Theophilus refers to these mechanical arts as ‘‘useful arts,’’ while empha-
sizing the virtue that could come from their skillful practice.62 
By the end of the Middle Ages, art lost its techné sense and denoted 
any skills or techniques used to manipulate mental or physical objects, 
essentially just signifying any human artifice.63 The term artista come into 
use to designate any craftsman or the student of liberal arts.64 Thomas 
Aquinas and other major thinkers were interested in the arts but focused 
mainly on theology and philosophy instead.65 ‘‘Beauty’’ continued to sig-
nify moral worth as there was no independent or secular aesthetic theory 
for objects of processes that were simply pleasing to humans.66 
Yet even as art reduced to mere craft-----the ability to ‘‘do’’ even in 
the absence of a theoretical framework-----the medieval guild system 
emerged to introduce some degree of rigor and control.67 The guilds em-
ployed a version of Aristotle’s ‘‘practice-then-theory’’ education model. 
Their origins are murky, and they had a complicated relationship with 
the city in which they operated.68 In some cases they were part of the  
                                                                                                                                         
 58. The visual arts remained in the artisan’s guilds. Painters were often associated with druggists 
who prepared the paints; sculptors with goldsmiths, and architects with masons and carpenters. See 
Kristeller, supra note 12, at 507--08. 
 59. See PAMELA O. LONG, OPENNESS, SECRECY, AUTHORSHIP: TECHNICAL ARTS AND THE 
CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 78--88 (2001). 
 60. THEOPHILUS, ON DIVERS ARTS: THE TREATISE OF THEOPHILUS (John G. Hawthorne & 
Cyril Stanley Smith trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1963). 
 61. Twentieth century translators/editors of the Treatise interchangeably refer to the work as 
describing art and technology. Id. at xxvii--xxxv. But neither the term nor concept technology existed 
during the period in which Theophilus wrote. More importantly, there was no hint of our modern 
sense of a scientific approach or knowledge in Theophilus’ treatise. However, he was very much en-
gaged in the older sense of ‘‘science’’ as systematic study (often codified in treatises). 
 62. It is rewarding ‘‘to give one’s attention to the practice of the various useful arts.’’ Id. at 47; see 
also LONG, supra note 59, at 86. 
 63. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 508. 
 64. See id. 
 65. For Aquinas, a wide range of activities were included in the arts, such as shoemaking, cook-
ing, and juggling. See id. at 508--09. 
 66. See id. at 499. 
 67. See LONG, supra note 59, at 87--88. 
 68. See SATYA DATTA, WOMEN AND MEN IN EARLY MODERN VENICE: REASSESSING HISTORY 
45 (2003); RICHARD J. GOY, VENETIAN VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE: TRADITIONAL HOUSING IN 
THE VENETIAN LAGOON 91--99 (1989); Francesca Trivellato, Guilds, Technology, and Economic 
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local government, and in others they were the corporation that constitut-
ed the government.69 They were clearly tied to the rise of urbanism in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries and, in this regard, may have been a 
mechanism for self-preservation of artisans liberated from feudal man-
ors.70 
To the extent guilds controlled artisanal know-how and innovation, 
they could provide members a kind of collective bargaining mechanism 
against feudal lords.71 Acting in tandem with the rising merchant class to 
create new communities and governance structures, the guilds created 
‘‘free cities’’ that could exist outside of the feudal system.72 But the im-
portance of controlling know-how led to obsessive levels of secrecy.73 The 
guilds’ power in local government also allowed them to enact positive 
law codifying their de facto monopolies of the various arts and use the 
police powers of the state for enforcement.74 
A prime example of this was the Venetian glassmakers.75 Their guild 
was an administrative unit of the government structured as a corporate 
entity.76 This gave it some rights of legal personhood, such as the right to 
hold property and appear in court.77 But the corporate form also required 
shared governance by its members. At the same time, the guild was un-
der the control of a magistracy chosen by, and representative of, the 
commune of Venice.78 It included the guild proper (the arte) and a reli-
gious or educational component (the scuola).79 Guild members were re-
quired to hear governing regulations every year that controlled a wide 
range of glassmaking aspects from what wood could be used in the fur-
                                                                                                                                         
Change in Early Modern Venice, in GUILDS, INNOVATION, AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY, 1400--
1800, at 199, 223 (S.R. Epstein & Maarten Prak eds., 2008); Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, 
‘‘Intellectual Property,’’ and the Origin of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & 
CULTURE 846, 861--65 (1991); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: In-
formal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Nov. 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543.  
 69. The emergence of the corporation as a metaphysical entity into which individuals subsumed 
some of their rights in exchange for benefits and protections of the collective entity was a powerful 
development in human ordering. See ELLEN GOODMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION: FROM THALES TO THE TUDORS 202 (1995). Originally it had nothing to with business. See 
id. The new universities generally organized as corporations. See GRANT, supra note 53, at 34--39; 
HANNAM, supra note 53, at 74--75. They often dominated the town in which they were established. 
Similar to modern business corporations, they sometimes used their significant economic clout to lev-
erage favorable treatment from local government under threat of decamping to another town. See 
HANNAM, supra note 53, at 74--75. 
 70. See GRANT, supra note 53, at 33; Long, supra note 68, at 862. 
 71. LONG, supra note 59, at 88--91. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Some artisans, such as Theophilus, resisted this urge to secrecy and sought to disseminate 
know-how through publication. See id. 
 74. See Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Ori-
gins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2012). 
 75. See Long, supra note 68, at 870--71. 
 76. Id. 
 77. GOODMAN, supra note 69, at 202. 
 78. Long, supra note 68, at 871. 
 79. Id. at 870--71. 
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naces to which days were legal workdays.80 The power of this system lay 
in the fact that only guild members could make glass in Venice.81 
The Venetian glass guild also showed that at least some arts were 
returning to true techné arts. The glassmakers possessed multiple kinds 
of valuable information that contributed to the production of glass con-
sidered to be the finest in Europe.82 These included recipes and ingredi-
ent lists that could be written down; know-how that consisted of process-
es, observations, and handling of materials that might be beyond 
codification; and plans and know-how for constructing important related 
devices such as furnaces.83 Thus the master glassmakers possessed sys-
tematic and rigorous knowledge (both codified and non-codifiable know-
how) that elevated craft to techné art. 
C. Renaissance ‘‘Ingeniators’’ and the Roots of Innovative Design and 
Engineering 
The late Middle Ages and early Italian Renaissance produced a new 
kind of ‘‘architect-engineer’’: the literate ingeniator who combined ‘‘geni-
us’’ and technical skill to invent and reduce to practice amazing new 
buildings, machines, and public works projects.84 This development in-
volved three aspects. First, an environment was created by wealthy 
princes, patrons, and Church leaders in which educated, generalist arti-
sans were given authority over massive, complex building projects such 
as elaborate palaces, fortresses, and Gothic cathedrals.85 Second, ‘‘divine 
madness’’ was secularized away from its troubled roots in supernatural 
spirits and demons into ‘‘genius’’ (meaning visionary inspiration and not 
our modern usage as synonymous with intelligence).86 And third, the re-
surgent techné arts were modified to allow this ‘‘irrational’’ genius into 
what was otherwise a strictly rule-based design and production process.87 
Combined, these set the stage for the ‘‘ingenious’’ artisanal and technical 
innovation that we prize today. 
This new concept of ‘‘genius’’ then became a hallmark of these new 
architect-engineers that enabled them to invent entirely new kinds of 
machines and techniques.88 ‘‘Genius’’ was a form of poiesis that was for-
eign to traditional techné art. The terms used-----ingeniator, ingénieurs, 
                                                                                                                                         
 80. Id. at 871--72. 
 81. Even ‘‘free cities’’ in the Middle Ages often had completely regulated economies, meaning 
that no activity could be done without express permission (as license or privilege) of the sovereign. See 
Edward S. Irons & Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention------The Touchstone for 
Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653, 679; Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 
1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711, 714 (1944); Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 74, at 1268--69. 
 82. Long, supra note 68, at 872--73. 
 83. Id. 
 84. SUNNY Y. AUYANG, ENGINEERING: AN ENDLESS FRONTIER 14 (2004); BERTRAND GILLE, 
ENGINEERS OF THE RENAISSANCE (M.I.T. Press 1966) (1964); Long, supra note 68, at 881--83. 
 85. AUYANG, supra note 84, at 13--14. 
 86. Long, supra note 68, at 849. 
 87. AUYANG, supra note 84, at 10--16. 
 88. Long, supra note 68, at 881--83. 
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ingegnere, and genius-----all derived from the root geni that also gives us     
genie.89 From ancient times, genies or daemons could influence people by 
putting ideas into their head, demonstrated by Plato’s divine madness or 
the origins of the term inspiration as literally ‘‘taking in spirits.’’90 The  
ingeniator could be inspired with visions of entirely new machines, build-
ings, or processes.91 During the secularizing Italian Renaissance, the term 
lost most of its supernatural aspect.92 This legitimized it beyond earlier 
suspect linkages with those possessed by demons or otherwise insane. 
Genius became the mysterious-----but not necessarily supernatural-----font 
of creative imagination. It seemed to be a native talent, and thus un-
teachable, which put it at odds with the traditional model of techné. Yet, 
its value for innovation in all manner of arts was clear. 
While the ingeniators were prized for their genius, they could not be 
mere dreamers. They also had to have the technical skill to reduce their 
fanciful inventions to practice. Leonardo da Vinci is the prime example 
of this successful hybrid of inspired dreamer, rational thinker, and skilled 
maker. The demonstrated success of the ingeniator to imagine and exe-
cute innovative machines and objects-----especially in the field of military 
hardware and fortifications-----brought a level of respect, wealth, and au-
tonomy previously unheard of for artisans.93 Equally important, the suc-
cessful ingeniator was educated such that he could communicate and 
promote his works through writings and direct conversations with power-
ful patrons. This was particularly advantageous in a Europe divided into 
many principalities such that a successful free architect-engineer could 
seek the best deal from different potential patrons. Da Vinci ultimately 
received the title Ingegnere Generale.94 Later, in seventeenth century 
France, ingeniator would become ingénieur and signify educated tech-
nical officers. It was ultimately adopted as engineer in English.95 
Another example of the ingeniator was the Florentine Filippo  
Brunelleschi. Famous for his design and construction of the Duomo on 
Florence’s cathedral, his original training was as a goldsmith.96 Because 
                                                                                                                                         
 89. AUYANG, supra note 84, at 14--15. 
 90 The image of the angel and devil sitting on a person’s two shoulders and whispering conflict-
ing advice is still part of popular culture. When Descartes later undertook his mission to put 
knowledge on sure footing by first doubting everything, he postulated an evil daemon who created an 
illusion of the world for a being that is nothing but pure thought. 
 91. Ingeniator was in use at least since Vitruvius’ De Architectura in Ancient Rome and was ap-
plied to the new architect-engineers as early as the twelfth century. See AUYANG, supra note 84, at 14. 
For example, Ailnoth (fl. 1157--1190), who worked on the Tower of London, was called an ingeniator. 
 92. Martha Woodmansee makes this point for authors, but not explicitly for inventors. See  
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emer-
gence of the ‘‘Author’’, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426--27 (1984). 
 93. Further details on the European engineers of the medieval and Renaissance periods can be 
found in GILLE, supra note 84. 
 94. See AUYANG, supra note 84, at 14. 
 95. See id. The related term engine originally meant genius and ingenuity before becoming con-
fused as the name for certain products or processes of ingenuity, such as the external and internal 
combustion ‘‘engines.’’ This is a bit like the term ‘‘Frankenstein’’ becoming used for Dr. Frankenstein’s 
creation during the twentieth century. Id. 
 96. See LONG, supra note 59, at 96. 
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that trade was part of the silk guild, he became a member of the Seta de 
Arte (silk guild).97 But he later became proficient in a number of other 
fields. This cross-training allowed him to act as general contractor, archi-
tect, engineer, and/or inventor, as the job required.98 During his career, 
he invented new hoisting devices, boats, and, allegedly, linear perspective 
in visual arts (also credited to da Vinci). At the same time, being a  
Renaissance man in the guild era was not without risks: as director of the 
Duomo project he was expected to join both the woodworkers and 
stoneworkers guilds; he refused and was jailed for eleven days.99 
Just as the reintroduction of Aristotle’s writings and Islamic comen-
taries in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had provided a jolt to  
Western thought, the retransmission of Plato’s writings in the second half 
of the fifteenth century arguably triggered the humanistic movement of 
the Renaissance, which in turn elevated and liberated the visual arts.100 
One effect of this was to further legitimize the newly secularized ‘‘geni-
us’’ across the arts as Platonic mysticism embraced non-rational inspira-
tion. Humanism also promoted a new individualism, while was in part re-
flected through the flowering of arts in which individual genius was 
expressed. For example, poetry shifted from a position of prestige below 
grammar and rhetoric in the liberal arts to a higher one with some inde-
pendence outside the liberal arts because of the role that genius played in 
it. By the sixteenth century, contemporary vernacular poetry was as pres-
tigious as classical Latin literature and a number of ‘‘Academies’’ for its 
pursuit opened in Italy. The capacity for expressive genius in the visual 
arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture separated them from the oth-
er mechanical arts. They were still not as prestigious as the liberal arts, 
but they now occupied their own class between the liberal and mechani-
cal arts.101 
Despite the ascendancy of neo-Platonic thought during the late six-
teenth century, Aristotle’s notions of imitative arts and arts of pleasure 
were revived. The new art of opera recombined music and poetry (as 
they had been linked in antiquity), with dance also considered part of 
music.102 A new generation of courtiers, gentlemen, and princes sought to 
develop ‘‘refined’’ tastes and pursuits, leading to expanded liberal arts 
education and the ‘‘amateur’’ tradition.103 ‘‘Taste’’ and ‘‘sentiment’’ were 
                                                                                                                                         
 97. This underscores some of the convoluted nature of the development of guilds. 
 98. Brunelleschi benefited from a well-placed family and a political system in which power was 
being expressed through visual and constructive arts. He engaged with the Florentine elite in a way 
that the average illiterate artisan could not. His social status required and enabled him to take posi-
tions and commissions that were viewed as superior to that of an ordinary craftsman. See LONG, supra 
note 59, at 99--100.  
 99. Id. at 96. 
 100. See HANNAM, supra note 53, at 214; Kristeller, supra note 12, 510--21. While excluding logic, 
the new humanities system added history, Greek, and moral philosophy to the established Trivium. 
 101. This was memorialized in fresco on the Campanile of Florence, where painting, sculpture, 
and architecture are grouped by themselves between representations of liberal arts, on the one hand, 
and mechanical arts, on the other.  
 102. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 511. 
 103. See id. 
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seen as things not strictly rational, yet not entirely arbitrary. Good taste 
was distinguished from bad, and one could improve his own through 
training. 
The broader reach of literacy helped advance the visual arts, just as 
it helped the rise of the ingeniator. In fact, many ingeniators like da Vinci 
were superb, innovative visual artists or writers as well.104 Many of them 
engaged in natural philosophy too, advancing epistemé. A few of the new 
journalists argued for including the visual arts in the liberal arts and  
Vasari coined the phrase Arti del disegno.105 Visual artists began leaving 
their craft guilds in Florence to join the new Accademia del Disegno 
(‘‘Academy of Drawing/Design’’), patterned on the longstanding literary 
Academies.106 Visual artists in other cities soon followed suit. 
D. New Arts and New Sciences of the Early Modern Period 
The new printing press also helped elevate the literary and visual 
arts.107 Gutenberg’s moveable type press, developed in the mid-fifteenth 
century, was itself quite an artisanal innovation.108 While it was primarily 
intended for books and pamphlets, it also worked well for illustrations 
and engravings. Printers initially used it to publish affordable copies of 
existing ‘‘classic’’ books, such as the Bible. But they soon discovered a 
demand for new works (‘‘novels’’) and developed a system to procure 
new works, resulting in the new role of ‘‘publisher.’’109 ‘‘Printer patents’’ 
or ‘‘printer privileges’’ were issued by sovereigns to incentivize the first 
printers to set up local commercial operations. Perhaps the best way to 
think of these new sovereign grants is as rights and incentives to engage 
in the semi-automated manufacture of books and other print-based cop-
ies of what were formerly only handwritten manuscripts. Thus the rights 
were not so much about the content as about the right to manufacture 
these entirely new kinds of copies of content. Exclusive ‘‘copy rights’’ 
soon followed to incentivize the publication of new works by existing 
publishers.110 The explosion in the number of households owning books, 
                                                                                                                                         
 104. See LONG, supra note 59, at 122--29. Of note are Leon Battista Alberti, Roberto Valturio, 
and da Vinci. Some of them also linked the mechanical arts and political praxis, because the well-
designed city needed architects to design it. 
 105. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 514. 
 106. The Academy curriculum replaced the guild workshop tradition with more systematic,  
 epistemé-based education that included geometry and anatomy. 
 107. Grammar, rhetoric, and poetry were liberal arts, but the writing of books was not itself a lib-
eral art.  
 108. Trained as a goldsmith, Gutenberg’s core innovations were twofold: first, he developed the 
‘‘matrix’’ device that allowed metalworkers to make metal letter type blocks much more quickly than 
by other methods; and second, he successfully modified and combined the components of traditional 
agricultural presses, new oil-based inks, and typesetting frames to allow for ‘‘moveable type’’ (that is, 
type that could be quickly reset or re-ordered in the frame). See LONG, supra note 59, at 144. 
 109. In the earliest days, a ‘‘novel’’ could be any work printed for the first time in a region. Thus, 
the work itself could have been quite old. Only later did the modern sense of the ‘‘novel’’ as exclusive-
ly a work of fiction emerge. 
 110. The term and concept of ‘‘copyright’’ appears to have originated in Venice, where the first 
known copyright was granted to Marcus Antonius Sabellicus for his history of Venice in 1486. See 
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and the perceived selectivity of quality publishers for new works, result-
ed in enhanced prestige for ‘‘published’’ works and their authors.111 In 
some cases, artisans became their own publisher-printer. Albrecht Dürer, 
for example, set up his own print operations to distribute affordable cop-
ies of his popular secular images, expanding his fame far and wide.112 
The shifting sense of the visual arts and the sui generis status of the 
ingeniators brought a new dimension to debates over what constituted art 
versus science. The perceived prestige of a field was as important as 
where it was classified and systems categorizing them proliferated.113 
Theology was the ‘‘queen of the sciences’’ with natural philosophy as her 
‘‘handmaiden.’’ Math and other parts of the Quadrivium were increasing-
ly classified as ‘‘sciences.’’114 The mechanical arts occupied the lowest lev-
els, while medicine and jurisprudence occupied widely varying positions. 
Historian Heikki Mikkeli describes a leading view on distinguishing arts 
and sciences at the time, from Jacob Zabarella, professor at Padua and 
instructor of Galileo:115 
[For Zabarella,] [s]cience deals with what already exists, but 
art is concerned with creation. The subject-matter of a science is 
immutable, but the subject-matter of an art is the formation of 
things as yet non-existent, but which can be made by human be-
ing[s]. The contemplative philosopher is not interested in initiating 
anything, but rather wants to comprehend and arrange the forms of 
existing, eternal things. Moreover, the ultimate purpose of the con-
templative science is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, but 
in the productive arts the end-result is an actual product.116 
                                                                                                                                         
LONG, supra note 59, at 11. However, many copyright histories focus more on the development of a 
private ordering system of ‘‘copy rights’’ within the Stationers Company as the exclusive chartered 
group of publishers under the British Crown from the sixteenth century until the Statute of Anne in 
1710. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1968). 
 111. See Albrecht Durer: Portrait of the Artist as an Entrepreneur, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541710. 
 112. See id. Similar to Brunelleschi and da Vinci, he had broken free from the guild system and so 
could develop his own reputation. He realized that he could make more money through prints rather 
than commissioned pieces. While the initial work for a print was as laborious as that to complete a 
commissioned work, he could produce and sell hundreds of copies of prints at marginal extra effort. 
The high volume of his output------all prominently adorned with his ‘‘AD’’ mark------multiplied his fame 
amongst the emerging middle class and wealthy or royal art patrons. Benefiting from the humanist 
movement, he was able to create images of nature, topical scenes, and even portraits (including him-
self), rather than only religious scenes, which proved enormously popular. 
 113. Kristeller, supra note 12, at 519--21 & nn.123--30. A fascinating project would be to collect 
these systems into one resource for reference and comparison. 
 114. ‘‘Science’’ simply meant ‘‘scientia’’ as systematic studies or collections of usually codifiable 
knowledge. 
 115. Many scholars attribute the initial development of the hypothetico-deductive ‘‘scientific 
method’’ made famous by Galileo to Zabarella. The latter had described it in the difficult Latin scho-
lastic Aristotelian terminology of the universities, whereas Galileo was able to reframe it in reasonably 
accessible vernacular terminology. See Sean Martin O'Connor, Regressus and the Scientific Revolu-
tion: A Defense of Zabarella's Contribution to Scientific Methodology (May 1995) (unpublished M.A. 
Thesis, Arizona State University) (on file with Arizona State University Library system). 
 116. Heikki Mikkeli, The Foundation of an Autonomous Natural Philosophy: Zabarella on the 
Classifications of Arts and Sciences, in DANIEL A. DI LISCIA ET AL., METHOD AND ORDER IN 
RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: THE ARISTOTLE COMMENTARY TRADITION 211, 212--13 
(1997). 
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While the classification of individual fields was a matter of hot debate, 
the basic ideas of art and science had not changed much in nearly 2000 
years. 
The epistemé sense of science was oriented towards the comprehen-
sion of necessary truths and the unchangeable aspects of the world.117 
Thus it did not, and could not, seek to ‘‘do,’’ ‘‘make,’’ or ‘‘change’’ any-
thing. But the broader sense of science as simply the ‘‘systematic study’’ 
of anything continued. The linking theme between them was the  
contemplative nature of the activities.118 To ‘‘make a science’’ of some-
thing was to step back and observe, collect all available information 
about, and then synthesize into principles the subject matter. 
Art, by contrast, was oriented towards manipulating the changeable 
aspects of the world. In many cases it produced something other than it-
self, such as bricks, boats, or buildings. In other cases, its ‘‘doing’’ was the 
end itself, such as in performing music or dance. It also existed in the 
manipulation of mental concepts, such as numbers, for practical ends. 
Another challenge for the distinction between arts and sciences was 
the continuing belief that a field had to be one or the other. No one 
seemed to acknowledge that fields could have art and science compo-
nents. For example, one can ‘‘make a science’’ of mathematics by study-
ing it as an object of contemplation, or one can use mathematics to per-
form the calculations needed to design and build a house. 119 
As the cultural leadership of Europe passed from Italy to France in 
the seventeenth century, the terms beaux arts and belle lettres captured 
visual arts and writing that were primarily focused on style rather than 
function.120 The arts had traditionally been mediums for practical objects, 
or for conveying moral or religious themes. But in the secular age, the 
medium itself became the focus. How innovative or talented was the art-
ist? How pleasing was the work’s style? This complicated debates over 
the place and functions of the visual arts. 
The mechanical arts were also transformed in this century as edu-
cated intellectuals became intrigued by the potential of new machines 
and processes developed by the ingeniators. While primarily known to-
day as the fathers of the Scientific Revolution, Francis Bacon in England, 
Galileo Galilei in Italy, and René Descartes in France, also sought to re-
vive the rigor of techné arts. Bacon and Galileo led efforts to explain the 
workings of nature with mathematical precision through carefully de-
signed experimental inquiry,121 but they needed to become artisans to de-
                                                                                                                                         
 117. Parry, supra note 31. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Robert. I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part III, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 718, 
735 (1952) [hereinafter Field of the Statutory Useful Arts III]. 
 120. Beaux arts first encompassed only the visual arts, but soon included poetry and music as well. 
See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 521--25. 
 121. See PETER DEAR, REVOLUTIONIZING THE SCIENCES: EUROPEAN KNOWLEDGE AND ITS 
AMBITIONS, 1500-1700, 131 (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2009); Dear, supra note 38, at 394--96. 
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sign and build new ‘‘scientific’’ instruments such as the telescope.122 In 
contrast to the Aristotelian natural philosophy focus on sophia, Bacon 
and Galileo sought to elevate the prestige of the mechanical arts.123 They 
also introduced a ‘‘practical application’’ goal for the new sciences, be-
cause the ability to develop such applications would demonstrate the cor-
rectness of the scientific principles they discovered.124 
E. The Beginnings of a European ‘‘Progress Project’’: the ‘‘Querelle’’ 
and the ‘‘Encyclopédie’’ 
The success of the new sciences that Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes 
developed generated a critical distinction between quantitative and qual-
itative measurements of ‘‘progress’’ in the Querelle des Anciens et  
Modernes (Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns).125 Taking place in 
England and France during the late seventeenth century, it pitted the 
‘‘Moderns,’’ who believed that contemporary arts and sciences had ad-
vanced beyond those of the Classical period, against the ‘‘Ancients,’’ who 
believed that classical arts and sciences still dominated.126 A central in-
sight of the debate was that the output of some fields could be quantified 
and compared over time, while that of others could only be assessed on a 
qualitative basis. Progress in the former could be demonstrated because 
an attribute of a produced artifact was measurably stronger, faster, etc. 
Progress could not be demonstrated in the latter because its artifacts 
were valued subjectively based on ‘‘taste’’ or ‘‘sentiment.’’ 
The Querelle has its limitations as a model for thinking about arts 
and sciences. First, it continued the paradigm of classifying entire fields 
as either quantitative or qualitative, when most have elements of each.127 
Second, the quantitative/qualitative distinction should not be equated 
                                                                                                                                         
 122. See PAMELA O. LONG, ARTISAN/PRACTITIONERS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW  
SCIENCES, 1400-1600, 3 (2011); Albert van Helden, Preface to GALILEO GALILEI, SIDEREUS NUNCIUS 
OR THE SIDEREAL MESSENGER vii, vii (Albert van Helden trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1989). Gali-
leo was awarded tenure at the University of Padua for his telescope. He also was awarded a Venetian 
patent for his invention of a water pump. See P.J. Federico, Galileo’s Patent, 8 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 576, 
578--80 (1926) (reprinting patent document). 
 123. See, e.g., JEAN LE ROND D’ALEMBERT, PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE TO THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF DIDEROT (Richard N. Schwab trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1995) (1751), available at http:// 
quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0001.083?view=text;rgn=main (‘‘[Bacon] invites scholars to study 
and perfect the arts, which he regards as the most exalted and most essential part of human science’’). 
 124. See id. (‘‘Hostile to systems, [Bacon] conceives of philosophy as being only that part of our 
knowledge which should contribute to making us better or happier, thus apparently confining it within 
the limits of the science of useful things, and everywhere he recommends the study of Nature.’’); Dear, 
supra note 38, at 394--96. 
 125. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 525--27. 
 126. Galileo participated in the debates over the nature and relative status of emerging beaux arts. 
See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 516. Bacon contemplated the role of imagination in poetry. See id. at 
520. Hannam argues that the humanists were not progressive, as is often held today, but rather regres-
sive in that they believed in the supremacy of the ancients. HANNAM, supra note 53, at 211--21. He also 
argues that Galileo is actually targeting humanists, with their truly slavish attitude toward the ancients, 
in the character of Simplicio in the Dialogue Concerning the Two World Systems, rather than targeting 
Scholastic Aristotelians as normally presumed. Id. at 218--19. 
 127. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 526. 
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with the art/science distinction.128 While this may be tempting given the 
popular modern senses of ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘science,’’129 it is not how those in-
volved in the Querelle would have used the terms. Such modern uses also 
carry counterproductive and misleading semantic baggage that diminish-
es art, extends science to things it should not be, and creates a gap that 
has improperly been filled by technology.130 The notion of quantitative 
measures of ‘‘progress,’’ however, became a powerful central theme in 
the Enlightenment. 
Finally, the seventeenth century also saw the emergence of the term 
‘‘useful arts.’’ Like the early stages in the development of the liberal arts 
and the fine arts, there was originally considerable murkiness in the us-
age of ‘‘useful arts.’’ As noted above, Theophilus has been translated as 
referring to the mechanical arts he discussed in On Divers Arts as ‘‘useful 
arts’’ in the twelfth century. But this was long before the visual arts 
emerged as any kind of separate field. Nonetheless, it is critical to see 
that Theophilus is focusing on the actual practical techniques involved in 
creating art works (both practical and decorative). Thus, there remained 
even through the development of aesthetic considerations and composi-
tional techniques the necessity of practical techniques to manipulate nat-
ural materials and forces to produce paints, dyes, metal alloys, plaster, 
putty, etc. Accordingly, even as the fine arts began emerging as a sepa-
rate field based primarily on aesthetics, and not on practical utility, there 
would endure a need to discuss the practical artisanal techniques and ma-
terials that an artist employs to produce the physical embodiment of his 
aesthetic vision. 
While there may have been English, Latin, or other European lan-
guage uses of ‘‘useful arts’’ (or cognates in other languages) in the centu-
ries following On Divers Arts, I will begin with some examples from the 
seventeenth century that seem to show a convergence towards a concept 
of the set of arts consisting of the mechanical arts minus the fine arts 
(even as early exemplars seem to include practical aspects of what we to-
day would consider fine arts). In 1627, Michael Stanhope used the term 
in his Nevves out of York-shire to discuss the profitable artisanal manu-
facturing going on there: ‘‘And whence comes this their prosperity, and 
encrease of potency, if not from a generall circumspection, & sagacity in 
their affaires, cherishing all manner of vsefull Arts, and aduantagious 
knowledge, and not suffering any vnprofitable weeds, I meane idle per-
sons, to harbour amongst them?’’131 A few years later, John Preston ill- 
                                                                                                                                         
 128. Id. 
 129. For example, I suspect that this is what the marketers at the cosmetics company Aveda had 
in mind when they developed the corporate tag line ‘‘The Art and Science of Pure Flower and Plant 
Essences.’’ See AVEDA, http://www.aveda.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
 130. See infra text accompanying note 156. For the origins and evolution of the term technology, 
see O’CONNOR, supra note 5, at ch. 6. See also W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: 
WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 107--30 (2009) (using the term technology for what would have 
been called the mechanical arts); AUYANG, supra note 84, at 12--13 (same). 
 131. NEVVES OUT OF YORK-SHIRE; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF A IOVRNEY, IN THE TRUE DISCOVERY OF 
A SOUERAIGNE MINERALL, MEDICINALL WATER, IN THE WEST-RIDING OF YORKE-SHIRE, NEERE AN 
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ustrated his use of ‘‘useful art’’ by reference to Greek mythological fig-
ures for the practical harnessing of natural materials and forces: ‘‘Those 
that brought any speciall helpe, and comfort to the lives of men; as they 
that did invent usefull Arts, as Bacchus [wine], Ceres [agriculture], Vul-
can [fire], Aesculapius [medicine]; . . . .’’132 In 1638, Franciscus Junius sug-
gested the coming battle between those favoring the progress and arts of 
their contemporary ‘‘moderns’’ and those favoring that of the ‘‘ancients’’ 
in the classical Greco-Roman period,133 when he admonished contempo-
rary artisans to go beyond a superficial understanding of the ‘‘useful arts’’ 
and employ more of a techné art rigor in his multi-volume The paintings 
of the ancients in three bookes: 
To let them therefore along, wee doe rather wonder at their impu-
dence who presume to meddle with these grave and serious Arts, 
before they have tasted naturall and morall Philosophie, Historie, 
Poësie; not to speak of the Mathematickes; for our moderne wits 
are so deeply plunged and drowned in their secure confidence, that 
they mean to doe well enough without the Mathematickes; yea the 
best of them are content with a superficiall knowledge of such use-
full Arts, not considering that a sleight and carelesse manner of 
studying helpeth very little.134 
The following year, Thomas Fuller used the term to capture the mechan-
ical arts involved in ship building as her argued that such skills were a 
crucial European military advantage over the Turks that should not be 
squandered for personal financial gain:  
And though the Turks either [lack] ingenie or industrie, either care 
not or cannot be good shipwrights themselves; yet the spite is, as 
long as there is gold amongst the Turks there will be drosse 
amongst the Christians, I mean some who for base gain will betray 
the mysteries of our usefull arts unto them.135  
Note that Fuller also used the transitional variant of ‘‘ingenious’’ that still 
shows the ‘‘genie’’ root for what might be called supranatural inspiration, 
to distinguish it as a secularized supernatural inspiration from gods or 
demons. He also uses the term ‘‘mysteries’’ that has longstanding use 
down to this day in Britain to designate trade secrets. A decade later, 
John Dury employed ‘‘useful arts’’ to designate career skills needed by 
Church and government workers in The reformed school: ‘‘Thirdly from 
thirteen or fourteen, till nineteen or twentie; the things which are to be 
taught them, and wherin they shall be exercised, are all Usefull Arts and 
Sciences, which may fitt them for any employment in Church or Com-
                                                                                                                                         
ANCIENT TOWNE CLLED KNARESBROUGH, NOT INFERIOUR TO THE SPA IN GERMANY ALSO A TASTE 
OF OTHER MINERALL WATERS OF SEURALL NATURES ADIOYNING (LONDON 1627). 
 132. JOHN PRESTON, LIFE ETERNALL OR, A TREATISE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE 
ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES (LONDON 1631). 
 133. See infra Part II(E). 
 134. FRANCISCUS JUNIUS, THE PAINTINGS OF THE ANCIENTS IN THREE BOOKES (LONDON 1638). 
 135. THOMAS FULLER, THE HISTORIE OF THE HOLY VVARRE (LONDON 1639). 
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mon wealth.’’136 In 1666, Samuel Parker used the term in discussing Pla-
tonic philosophy to argue for the greater value of pioneer innovations 
over incremental or follow-on innovation: ‘‘the world surely is much 
more beholding to those that first invent useful Arts and Sciences, than 
to those that only improve them . . . .’’137 The following year, Thomas 
Sprat used the term to talk about practical mechanical arts in his The his-
tory of the Royal-Society of London for the improving of natural 
knowledge:  
And we do hereby make and constitute the said Society by the 
name, &c. to be a Body corporate, to be continued under the same 
name in a perpetual succession; And that they and their successors 
(whose studies are to be imployed for the promoting of the 
knowledge of natural things, and useful Arts by Experiments. To 
the glory of God, and the good of mankind) shall by the foresaid 
name of President . . . .This was the last Particular in this Subject 
which I undertook to make good, That our Church can never be 
impair’d by the growth of the useful Arts of Life. But now I come 
neerer to it, I find that I may safely omit it; For the thing itself is so 
manifest, that there can be no ground of raising a question about it. 
If our Church should be an Enemy to Commerce, Intelligence,  
Discovery, Navigation, or any sort of Mechanics; how could it be fit 
for the present Genius of this Nation?138  
A little more than a decade later, Edward Cocker referred to writing and 
engraving as ‘‘useful arts’’: ‘‘By the sacred Influence of Divine  
Providence, I have been instrumental to the Benefit of many by Vertue 
of those useful Arts, Writing and Engraving . . . .’’139 It is not clear wheth-
er Cocker meant ‘‘writing’’ and ‘‘engraving’’ in their aesthetic expression 
aspects, as we might use the terms today, or rather in their practical tech-
nique aspects, such as because he employed writing and engraving for the 
practical end of producing substantive and informative treatises on vari-
ous topics. Finally, at the end of the century, two authors, including one 
who is presumably an American as his work was published in Boston, 
employed ‘‘useful arts’’ in contexts that indicated they were practical arts. 
Translating Virgil’s Pastorals, Georgics, and Aeneis, one Mr. Dryden 
seemed to reference the then ongoing debate between the ‘‘Ancients’’ 
and ‘‘Moderns’’: ‘‘In short, [the Ancients] invented the most useful Arts, 
Pastorage, Tillage, Geometry, Writing, Musick, Astronomy, &c. Whilst 
the Moderns, like Extravagant Heirs, made rich by their Industry, in-
gratefully deride the good Old Gentlemen, who left them the Estate.’’140 It 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. JOHN DURY, THE REFORMED SCHOOL (LONDON 1649). 
  137. SAMUEL PARKER, A FREE AND IMPARTIAL CENSURE OF THE PLATONICK PHILOSOPHIE 
BEING A LETTER WRITTEN TO HIS MUCH HONOURED FRIEND MR. N.B. (OXFORD 1666). 
 138. THOMAS SPRAT, THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL-SOCIETY OF LONDON FOR THE IMPROVING OF 
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE (LONDON 1667). 
 139. EDWARD COCKER, COCKER’S ARITHMETICK (1678). 
 140. THE WORKS OF VIRGIL CONTAINING HIS PASTORALS, GEORGICS AND AENEIS (TRANS. MR. 
DRYDEN, LONDON 1697). 
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is unclear whether Dryden means to give a nonexclusive list of the useful 
arts (‘‘pastorage, tillage, . . .’’) or whether the useful arts are their own 
category in a list of activities that also include the others.141 Samuel  
Sewall talks about the ‘‘useful arts’’ as helpful things, together with ani-
mals and plants, that settlers brought to colonize America: ‘‘They who 
remove from one Land to another, there to dwell; that settlement of 
theirs is call’d a Plantation. Especially, when a land, before rude and un-
furnish’d, is by the New-comers replenished with usefull Arts, Vegeta-
bles, Animals.’’142 
At the outset of the eighteenth century, ‘‘useful art’’ continued to be 
employed to designate practical techniques that did not include the fine 
arts. In 1725, Daniel Defoe, notable today as the author of Robinson 
Crusoe, also authored nonfiction books including A General History of 
Discoveries and Improvements, in useful ARTS, Particularly in the great 
Branches of COMMERCE, NAVIGATION, and PLANTATION, in all 
Parts of the known WORLD.143 Batty Langley suggested the practical or 
artisanal side of geometry as it applied to certain ‘‘useful arts’’ in his 
Practical Geometry: Applied to the Useful ARTS of Building, Surveying, 
Gardening and Mensuration.144 
The aesthetics-based modern system of the Fine Arts also devel-
oped in the eighteenth century.145 Following the Querelle, debate over the 
beaux arts centered on questions of taste and sentiment: what was ‘‘good 
taste’’ and how could it be developed in people? Might the educated lay 
person be a better arbiter than a professional artist of the value of a 
work? In 1746, Abbé Charles Batteux codified a system of the Fine Arts 
in almost its current form.146 Working from the poetic theories of  
                                                                                                                                         
 141. In other words, the difference between: ‘‘the useful arts that include pastorage, tillage . . . ;’’ 
or ‘‘invented things like i) the most useful arts, ii) pastorage, iii) tillage . . . .’’ 
 142. SAMUEL SEWALL, SOME FEW LINES TOWARDS A DESCRIPTION OF THE NEW HEAVEN AS IT 
MAKES TO THOSE WHO STAND UPON NEW EARTH (BOSTON 1697). 
 143. DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF DISCOVERIES AND IMPROVEMENTS, IN USEFUL 
ARTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE GREAT BRANCHES OF COMMERCE, NAVIGATION, AND 
PLANTATION, IN ALL PARTS OF THE KNOWN WORLD (LONDON 1725--26). 
 144. BATTY LANGLEY, PRACTICAL GEOMETRY: APPLIED TO THE USEFUL ARTS OF BUILDING, 
SURVEYING, GARDENING AND MENSURATION (2D ED., LONDON 1729). 
 145. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthet-
ics (II), 13 J. HIST. IDEAS 17, 17--23, 25--31 (1952). 
 146. See CHARLES BATTEUX, LES BEAUX ARTS RÉDUITS Á UN MEME PRINCIPE (1746). Batteux 
included painting, sculpture, poetry, music, and dance as his five beaux arts. In England, the arts and 
sciences had been separated in the Royal Society by the early eighteenth century, while authors in-
cluding Wotton reiterated the Querelle distinction between fields that could be shown to have pro-
gressed beyond the Ancients and those that had not. Kristeller, supra note 145, at 25--26. Shaftesbury 
then became one of the founders of modern aesthetics with his work on fields in the fine arts, even 
though he still conflated moral and artistic beauty as the Ancients had done. Id. at 27. Other authors 
distinguished ‘‘arts of necessity’’ from ‘‘arts of elegance’’ (corresponding to the distinction between 
practical or mechanical arts and the fine arts). Id. at 29. The latter were sometimes referred to as the 
‘‘mimetic arts,’’ ‘‘imitative arts,’’ or even ‘‘polite arts.’’ Id. at 29--30 nn.230--31. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the notion of ‘‘fine arts’’ appears to have been taken for granted, in a system that 
was divided into necessary arts, polite arts, and a third set that were both necessary and polite. Id. at 
30. In Scotland, Hutcheson distinguished between the senses of morality and beauty, influencing 
Hume and Diderot, while Reid added the notion of ‘‘common sense,’’ setting the stage for the ‘‘three 
faculties of the soul’’ of Kant and Cousin. Id. at 28--29.  
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Aristotle and Horace, he developed a theory of the Fine Arts linking 
them as imitative arts with pleasure as their end.147 While Batteux’s sys-
tem was highly influential across Europe, it was criticized for its reliance 
on the notion of imitative arts that seemed both over- and underinclusive 
for the beaux arts.148 
A few years later, Denis Diderot, Jean le Rond D’Alembert, and 
the other French Encyclopédists and philosophes would adopt most of 
Batteux’s system but replace dance with architecture.149 This set of arts-----
painting, architecture, sculpture, music, and poetry-----have constituted 
the core of the Fine Arts ever since.150 The Encyclopédie entry on Taste, 
for example, seems to take the notion of the Fine Arts for granted,151 
while the entry on Beautiful discusses them and explicitly references 
Batteux.152 Kristeller argues that the Encyclopedists solidified the modern 
system of the arts because they identified them as those arts that are in-
formed mainly by genius, taste, and sentiment, and not by the five 
measures of the traditional techné arts (teachable, certifiable, exactitude, 
controllable, and reliable).153 In the eighteenth century, the term ‘‘aes-
thetics’’ would come into currency as the name for this essential attribute 
of the Fine Arts.154 
Discussion of the Fine Arts was only a small part of the  
Encyclopédie entries relevant to the arts however. The major entry ‘‘Art’’ 
and most of the discussion of ‘‘arts’’ throughout the Encyclopédie were 
focused instead on the traditional mechanical arts that remained after the 
Fine Arts had been separated out; these were the ‘‘useful arts.’’ The en-
tries demonstrate the continued vitality of the techné sense of art even 
after the emergence of aesthetics and identification of the Fine Arts. 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Kristeller, supra note 145, at 20--21. By contrast, the mechanical arts were practical applica-
tions that have function and utility to satisfy human necessities as their end. Batteux also created a 
new division of arts that combined pleasure and usefulness as ends, placing eloquence and architecture 
in this category. Finally, he gave theater its own status as a combination of other beaux arts.  
 148. While the Querelle had liberated quantitative fields from any requirement of grounding in 
ancient systems, commentators writing about qualitative fields still felt compelled to do so.  
 149. See Kristeller, supra note 145, at 23. There is a discrepancy between d’Alembert’s listing of 
the Fine Arts (the modern five) and that listed on the Map of Human Knowledge that accompanied 
the Encyclopédie. The latter adds engraving and elevates poetry to the overarching subdivision of Im-
agination within which all the other Fine Arts are subordinated. 
 150. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 497. 
 151. The entry consists of three separate parts written by different authors, Voltaire, Montes-
quieu, and Diderot. Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, Denis Diderot, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de 
La Brède et de Montesquieu & François-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Taste, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA: 
SELECTIONS: DIDEROT, D'ALEMBERT AND A SOCIETY OF MEN OF LETTERS (Nelly S. Hoyt & Thomas 
Cassirer trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (1757), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0000. 
168?view=text;rgn=main. 
 152. Denis Diderot, Beautiful, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & D’ALEMBERT 
COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (Philippe Bonin trans., 2006) (1754), available at http:// 
quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0000.609?view=text;rgn=main; see also Kristeller, supra note 145, at 
22. Diderot criticized Batteux for failing to define ‘‘beautiful nature’’ clearly and explicitly enough. 
 153. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 496--498; Kristeller, supra note 145, at 17--23. d’Alembert, for 
example, describes eloquence as an art governed by taste or sentiment, which cannot be taught, rather 
than skill or art. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. Thus eloquent speakers are born, not made, and those 
who aspire to it can only emulate those who have it. 
 154. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 496.  
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To d’Alembert was given the responsibility of preparing an over-
view of the ambitious scope of the Encyclopédie in the Preliminary Dis-
course. The subscription-based work would be issued volume by volume 
over time and would ‘‘set forth . . . the order and connection of the parts 
of human knowledge.’’155 Such order and connection was visually repre-
sented in a ‘‘Map of Human Knowledge’’ (the ‘‘Map’’ as reproduced in 
Figure 1 below) that accompanied the Encyclopédie. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 155. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123 (emphasis added). This distinguishes it from later encyclopedi-
as that usually organized around alphabetical sequences of entries on various topics. RICHARD YEO, 
ENCYCLOPAEDIC VISIONS: SCIENTIFIC DICTIONARIES AND ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE xii (2001). 
d’Alembert authored the first two sections of the Preliminary Discourse; the third section was an up-
dated version of Diderot’s Prospectus, used to solicit interest in the project. The Encyclopédie was one 
of the most well-known and ambitious intellectual undertakings of the eighteenth century. See 
O’Connor, supra note 3, at 36. 
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FIGURE 1156 
 
This was hardly the first time that philosophers had sought to order 
and display all of human knowledge. At the opening of the sixteenth  
century, Gregor Reisch produced a book in the Latin encyclopedia tradi-
tion that sought to encompass the full ‘‘circle of learning.’’157 Margarita 
                                                                                                                                         
  156. Diederot, Denis, ‘‘Map of the System of Human Knowledge,’’ The Encyclopedia of Diderot 
& d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project, Translated by Benjamin Heller, http://quod.lib.umich. 
edu/d/did/tree.htm. Translation of SYSTÈME FIGUR’E DES CONNAISSANCES HUMAINES, En-
cyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, vol. 1. Paris, 1751. Image re-
produced with permission of Benjamin Heller.   
  157. GREGOR REISCH, MARGARITA PHILOSOPHICA (FREIBURG, 1503). 
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Philosophica set out a system of arts and sciences as branches of philoso-
phy and included a ‘‘tree of science’’ map (reproduced in Figure 2 be-
low).158 The two major branches within it were theorica and practica. Of 
note, Hugh of St. Victor’s seven mechanical arts formed one subdivison 
within practica (see very bottom of map). 
FIGURE 2159 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 158. YEO, supra note 155, at 132--33. 
  159. Philosophiae partitio, in GREGOR REISCH, MARGARITA PHILOSOPHICA (1503), available at 
https://archive.org/details/gri_c00033125008256329. 
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Francis Bacon had divided up all of human knowledge into three 
categories of ‘‘Imagination,’’ ‘‘Reason,’’ and ‘‘Memory.’’ Imagination cor-
related to the Aristotelian poeisis activities that produced new things 
than had not existed before. Reason contained the mental activities of 
logic, mathematics, and other reasoning functions. And Memory includ-
ed not only history, but also the craft knowledge of artisans. I am not 
aware of a chart or map of this produced by Bacon, although one may 
exist. 
Ephraim Chambers set out a different path for categorizing human 
knowledge in a ‘‘tree of science’’ branching chart, the ‘‘View of 
Knowledge’’ (see Figure 3 below), in his 1728 Cyclopedia. But Chambers 
confessed to being a bit confused about the distinction between arts and 
sciences because ‘‘‘the precise Notion of an Art and Science, and their 
just, adequate Distinction, are not yet well fixed.’’’160 Accordingly the var-
ious liberal arts, mechanical arts, and sciences are in an odd jumble in his 
chart. But the core distinction between ‘‘Natural and Scientifical’’ and 
‘‘Artificial and Technical’’ is clearly the art as applied activities vs. sci-
ence as contemplative study distinction. In the View itself, Chambers’ de-
fines ‘‘Artificial and Technical’’ as ‘‘consisting in the Application of Natu-
ral Notices to further Purposes.’’ 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 160. YEO, supra note 155, at 135 (quoting EPHRAIM CHAMBERS, II CYCLOPEDIA, SCIENCE 
(LONDON, 1728)). 
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 161. Chambers View of Knowledge, in EPHRAIM CHAMBERS, CYCLOPAEDIA, OR, AN UNIVERSAL 
DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (1728). 
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The Encyclopedists decided to follow Bacon, and so the  
Encyclopédie divided all human ‘‘knowledge’’ into his same three divi-
sions, but they ordered them in the reverse as Memory, Reason, and  
Imagination.162 Also following Bacon’s interest in the intellectual value of 
the mechanical arts, the Encyclopedists sought to create ‘‘a grammar of 
the arts’’ that would use shorthand descriptions for non-codifiable tacit 
knowledge or muscle-memory-based know-how as well as more tradi-
tional codifiable knowledge.163 D’Alembert described the Encyclopédie 
as a ‘‘Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Trades . . . to contain 
the general principles that form the basis of each science and each art, 
liberal or mechanical, and the most essential facts that make up the body 
and substance of each.’’164 
D’Alembert was particularly focused on ‘‘discoveries’’ as one of the 
connecting points between arts and sciences.165 The concept was appar-
ently quite important as he penned two separate entries for it: one as a 
noun, Discovery,166 and the other as a verb, Discover, Find.167 Distinct 
from our modern sense of ‘‘discovery’’ as an uncovering or identification 
of something already existing, ‘‘discovery’’ for d’Alembert was a subcate-
gory of ‘‘inventions,’’ which in turn were any newly created physical or 
mental objects.168 Accordingly, d’Alembert praised Descartes’ ‘‘inventive 
genius’’ and referred to Newton as having ‘‘invent[ed] calculus,’’ in the 
same way as he referred to the inventions of the wristwatch and the tele-
scope.169 He also invoked Aristotle’s poiesis, as the creation or invention 
of new things, when discussing the Fine Arts.170 Crucially, he reserved the 
                                                                                                                                         
 162. Thus, while Bacon put ‘‘imagination’’ as the first type of mental activity humans undertook, 
the Encyclopedists placed ‘‘memory’’ first. This may be due to their Lockean view of human nature as 
proceeding from direct sense impressions to reflective manipulations of the resulting mental ideas. 
They rejected Descartes’ rationalist account that we begin from innate ideas and move outwards to the 
world. See D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123; Denis Diderot, Observations on Bacon’s Division of the Sci-
ences, in D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. 
 163. See Denis Diderot, Art, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & D’ALEMBERT 
COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (Nelly Hoyt & Thomas Cassirer trans., 1965) (1751), http:// 
hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.139. 
 164. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. By ‘‘reasoned dictionary,’’ d’Alembert meant a ‘‘systematic’’ 
dictionary, i.e., one based on a rational system and not simply an alphabetized sequence of definitions. 
Id. 
 165. ‘‘If one reflects somewhat upon the connection that discoveries have with one another, it is 
readily apparent that the sciences and the arts are mutually supporting, and that consequently there is 
a chain that binds them together.’’ Id. 
 166. Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Discovery, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & D'ALEMBERT 
COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (Dena Goodman trans., 2012) (1754), http://hdl.handle. 
net/2027/spo.did2222.0002.781 (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original). 
 167. Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Discover, Find, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & 
D’ALEMBERT COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (Dena Goodman trans., 2013) (1754), http:// 
quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0002.899/--discover-find?rgn=main;view=fulltext. I am deeply in-
debted to Professor Dena Goodman, a director of the Translation Project and professor at The Uni-
versity of Michigan, for providing me with an advance translation of this entry. 
 168. See Louis de Jaucourt, Invention, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA: SELECTIONS: DIDEROT, 
D'ALEMBERT AND A SOCIETY OF MEN OF LETTERS, supra note 151. 
 169. D’ALEMBERt, supra note 123. Further, ‘‘Imagination acts no less in a geometer who creates 
than in a poet who invents.’’ Id.  
 170. ‘‘[W]e could relate [all the Fine Arts] to Poetry by taking this word [Poetry] in its natural 
signification, which is simply invention or creation.’’ Id. d’Alembert was referring to the already chang-
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word ‘‘discovery’’ for only the most important inventions.171 He also pro-
vided a test for distinguishing important discoveries from the more com-
monplace inventions. Discoveries must be ‘‘curious, useful, and difficult 
to find, and which, consequently [have] a certain degree of  
importance.’’172 
According to d’Alembert, the arts developed before any other cate-
gories of human knowledge because they were necessary for human sur-
vival (e.g., healing and agriculture). D’Alembert noted the importance of 
individuals being able to learn arts from each other.173 Art originally con-
stituted the manipulation of naturally occurring materials to satisfy hu-
man needs. But over time it became the executable tasks of any field so 
long as they followed principled rules-----essentially techné art.174 
Science followed as humans had more leisure to engage in ‘‘idle 
speculations’’ that involved examining such materials for ‘‘less evident 
properties.’’175 For both Diderot and D’Alembert, ‘‘science’’ was any ac-
tivity where ‘‘the object of a discipline is only contemplated from different 
approaches, the technical collection and disposition of observations rela-
tive to that object are called ‘science.’’’176 An artisan could ‘‘make a sci-
ence’’ of his field by taking the subject of what he normally practices and 
making it the object of contemplation; he moves from being the internal, 
subjective actor to the external, objective observer.177 D’Alembert added 
                                                                                                                                         
ing notion of the modern word ‘‘poetry’’ from its Greek roots in poiesis (simply the human creation of 
any new thing not existing in nature) to our contemporary sense of a particular form of written expres-
sion, or alternately an ‘‘artful’’ display of some skill (e.g., ‘‘poetry in motion’’). 
 171. ‘‘In general this name [discovery] can be given to everything that is newly found in the Arts 
and the Sciences; however, it is scarcely applied, and ought not to be applied, except to that which is not 
only new, but also curious, useful, and difficult to find, and which, consequently has a certain degree of 
importance. The less important discoveries are simply called inventions.’’ d’Alembert, supra note 166 
(first emphasis added, second and third emphases in original). 
 172. Id. 
 173. ‘‘[From the beginning, man had to preserve his physical body by] . . . preventing the evils that 
threaten it or . . . remedying those that have attacked it. We try to satisfy these needs by two means: by 
our own discoveries and by the investigations of other men, which our social intercourse puts us in a 
position to enjoy. Whence must have come the birth of agriculture and medicine first, and then all the 
most absolutely necessary arts.’’ Id. 
 174. ‘‘In general the name Art may be given to any system of knowledge which can be reduced to 
positive and invariable rules independent of caprice or opinion. . . . But just as there are rules for the 
operations of the mind or soul, there are also rules for those of the body: that is, for those operations 
which, applying exclusively to external bodies, can be executed by hand alone.’’ D’ALEMBERT, supra 
note 123.  
 175. Id. This is similar to Condorcet’s ‘‘first combining’’ approach to how practical or useful arts 
developed first. See id. (citing MARIE JEAN ANTOINE DE CONDORECT, SKETCH FOR A HISTORICAL 
PICTURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 15--16 (June Barraclough trans., Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1955) 
(1794)). 
 176. Id. (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original); see id. (sciences are activities ‘‘of a 
purely speculative nature’’ that ‘‘are limited to the examination of their object and the contemplation 
of its properties’’).  
 177. d’Alembert arguably anticipated Auguste Comte’s assertion that every science is born from 
an art. Id. For more on Comte’s views in this regard, see L. LEVY-BRUHL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
AUGUSTE COMTE 62 (Kathleen de Beaumont-Klein trans., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1903). Like earlier 
thinkers, d’Alembert was confounded by disciplines that seemed to be both an art and a science. He 
suggested that they could be ‘‘simultaneously’’ an art and a science, even though it would be more pre-
cise to identify different aspects of a field as art or science. In fact, d’Alembert essentially used the 
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a third set of activities that ‘‘derive practical use from the speculative 
study of their object.’’178 Intriguingly, this last set seems to capture the 
emerging concept of technology, but the term was not in wide currency 
and d’Alembert did nothing more with the concept.179 
D’Alembert classified the different categories of arts within each of 
the three major divisions of human knowledge (Memory, Reason, and 
Imagination). The mechanical arts minus the fine arts became the ‘‘useful 
arts’’ and were classed within Memory (effectively as tacit knowledge 
handed down from artisan to artisan).180 In the Map, the useful arts can 
be found within the division of Memory, underneath the subdivision of 
‘‘Natural History’’ in the section ‘‘Uses of Nature.’’ The arts of ‘‘think-
ing,’’ ‘‘remembering,’’ and ‘‘communicating’’ were classed within Reason 
(under the ‘‘Science of Man’’ subdivision in the Map). From the modern 
cognitive science perspective, mental activities within the category of 
Reason used the ‘‘procedural knowledge’’ (muscle memory) and direct 
sense impressions included in the category of Memory and generalized 
them into abstract ‘‘declarative’’ or propositional knowledge.181 Careful 
logic was the hallmark of the knowledge category of Reason. The fine 
arts were classed within the knowledge category of Imagination. By con-
trast to Reason, Imagination was a reflective capacity by which we com-
bine our existing ideas into new ones.182 
Imagination often relied on genius, which for the philosophes was 
the capacity to respond immediately and intuitively to one’s environ-
ment.183 The genius was a personality type who was deeply sensitive and 
wont to flights of fancy that allowed for more sublime truths than those 
produced by careful rational thinkers (albeit with many more errors 
along the way). In this way, both it and its earlier ‘‘divine madness’’ and 
secularized inspiration versions were different from our modern popular 
usage that signifies high I.Q. or intelligence. While the Enlightenment is 
                                                                                                                                         
terms in this way (‘‘science’’ for the contemplation of a field as object; ‘‘art’’ for the use of a field as 
subject). See D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123 (‘‘[We could say] that several of our sciences are arts when 
they are viewed from their practical side.’’). Thus, the use of logic in reasoning is logic as art; the study 
of logic as an object is logic as science. See id. But it would be a mistake to equate art with ‘‘practice,’’ 
and science with ‘‘theory.’’ There is a theory and practice element to an art as well as for a science. 
Peter Dear explains this nicely when discussing twin aspects of theorica and practica that early modern 
writers ascribed to any given field. Theorica was the apparatus of a field, such as tools and methods, 
and the study of them; practica was the actual use of these tools to achieve a specific goal. Dear, supra 
note 38, at 393. 
 178. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra Part II. 
 182. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123 (Imagination ‘‘consists of the ideas which we create for our-
selves by imagining and putting together beings similar to those which are the object of our direct ide-
as.’’). 
 183. See Jean-François de Saint-Lambert, Genius, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & 
D’ALEMBERT: COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (John S.D. Glaus trans., 2007) (1757), http:// 
quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0000.819?view=text;rgn=main. d’Alembert occasionally used an 
older sense of genius in his entries, signifying an ‘‘excellent quality,’’ as well as a sense that genius is a 
‘‘feeling that creates.’’ See D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. 
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sometimes referred to as the ‘‘age of reason,’’ it would be a mistake to in-
fer that imagination and intuition were disfavored. Like the philosophes’ 
reverence for the uncodifiable ‘‘skill’’ (procedural knowledge) of the arti-
san, the respect they had for the non-rational genius was palpable in their 
writings.184 Each aptitude had its place in a well-functioning society.185 
D’Alembert and the other philosophes’ notion of genius may also 
have set the stage for the Romantic notion of the author as a passionate 
seer guided by inspiration and intuition to find greater truths than those 
possible by incremental rational analysis.186 Genius was not teachable and 
thus was not an art. Its central role in the emerging Fine Arts may have 
facilitated the modern sense that they are unteachable and purely intui-
tive. For the philosophes, however, the skill of the fine artist in existing 
techniques was very much teachable. It was only genius that was un-
teachable. 
Likewise, for the philosophes, works of the Fine Arts were assessed 
qualitatively through taste, sentiment, and the emerging field of aesthet-
ics.187 Thus, they could not be placed into a ‘‘progress’’ narrative.188 Sum-
marized by the old fashion industry saying ‘‘hem lines go up; hem lines go 
down,’’ there was no arrow of progress for taste-based fields. Or, as 
economists hold, there is no accounting for taste, it is simply an inherent 
starting point for personal preferences. While earlier writers needed to 
separate out the visual fine arts from the mechanical arts, d’Alembert 
sought to keep them from being merged into the liberal arts, which he 
saw as rule-based and practical for mental operations such as logic and 
mathematics. The fine arts, by contrast, were for pleasure only and pri-
marily centered on genius and taste. 
                                                                                                                                         
 184. ‘‘There are few errors in Locke and too few truths in Shaftsbury; the former however has 
nothing but expansive intellect, penetrating and correct; but the latter is a genius of the first order. 
Locke has seen; Shaftsbury has created, constructed, strengthened.’’ de Saint-Lambert, supra note 183. 
 185. For example, the genius was great at pioneering bold new ideas and acting ‘‘on the fly,’’ but, 
being accordingly error prone, was poor at managing established projects. ‘‘Men of genius . . . are bet-
ter made to overthrow and establish states and to maintain or re-establish order than to follow it.’’ Id. 
(emphasis in the original). In this way, geniuses resemble the modern notion of the entrepreneur. They 
were also better suited for philosophy and the Fine Arts than for government as errors in the latter 
could directly harm others. 
 186. This is likely no accident in that Rousseau was originally a contributor to the Encyclopédie 
before breaking off from the philosophes on ideological grounds concerning this very point. See 
D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. 
 187. D’Alembert follows J.P. de Crousaz, who is considered to have written the first French trea-
tise on aesthetics, Beauty, in 1714. See Kristeller, supra note 145, at 17. 
 188. Barton Beebe argues for a notion of ‘‘aesthetic progress’’ in the eighteenth century that in-
fluenced the framers of the Constitution and early statutes and case law. See Barton Beebe Examines 
Intellectual Property Law and Aesthetic Progress at the Inaugural Desmarais Lecture, N.Y.U. LAW 
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/barton-beebe-inaugural-desmarais-lecture. I disagree. 
While the Encyclopedia entry on ‘‘Taste,’’ for example, argues that taste can be refined in persons, this 
is a matter of established ‘‘high’’ versus ‘‘low’’ taste and not a matter of limitless measurable potential 
in the way that ‘‘progress’’ in quantifiable fields was described. See d'Alembert, Diderot, Montesquieu 
& Voltaire, supra note 151. 
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Diderot’s Prospectus189 and entry on Art190 are paeans to the useful 
arts, articulating both what we would call procedural knowledge and 
techné art.191 While some workers were mere hired hands who did not 
understand why their craft worked, others were true artisans who mas-
tered both the principles and practice of their art.192 Importantly, though, 
such ‘‘principles’’ did not need to be couched in the emerging terms of 
the new sciences. Rather they were simply abstractions that operated as 
high-level guidelines for the field-----such as the theorica that Dear dis-
cusses.193 Diderot criticized earlier authors for not engaging directly with 
artisans in their workshops.194 He and the other Encyclopedists not only 
visited the shops, but also tried the various arts and crafts with their own 
hands.195 Diderot explored the ‘‘shorthand’’ language that experienced 
artisans can use with each other. While this appears to codify procedural 
knowledge, it does not enable those unskilled in the art to understand 
the technique, let alone practice it.196 
Diderot’s definition of ‘‘art,’’ like d’Alembert’s, was directed to the 
useful arts and mapped onto the traditional notion of a techné art.197 Also 
like d’Alembert and nearly two millennia of precedent, Diderot distin-
guished ‘‘art’’ from ‘‘science’’ by asking whether there was a subject of ac-
tion or an object of contemplation.198 For Diderot, a useful art was that 
which transformed a natural material by hand or machine for practical 
human ends.199 For each art, the Encyclopedists thus sought to document: 
(1) the details of the material to be worked and the processes to trans-
form it; (2) ‘‘the principal things that are made from it, and the manner of 
                                                                                                                                         
 189. The Prospectus reviewed here is the amended version appearing as Part III of the Prelimi-
nary Discourse. See D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. 
 190. Diderot, Art, supra note 163. Art was considered so important that it was published as its 
own separate monograph as well as in the Encyclopédie. 
 191. Diderot was in fact the son of an artisan and had a fascination with craft operations. See 
D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123, at pt.III n.26. An unattributed Encyclopédie entry on ‘‘Craft’’ likewise 
sought to dignify the craftsman above the lowly position society had placed him in. See Denis Diderot, 
Craft, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & D’ALEMBERT: COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT 
(Stephen J. Gendzier trans., 1967) (1765), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0001.301?view= 
text;rgn=main. 
 192. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. 
 193. See Dear, supra note 38, at 393. 
 194. Diderot singles out Ephraim Chambers and the latter’s English Encyclopedia in particular. 
 195. D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123, at pt. IV n.26. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Art is ‘‘a system of instruments, or of rules which were all directed toward the same object.’’ 
Diderot, Art, supra note 163. The entry was classified as ‘‘Applied Natural History,’’ linking it to the 
useful arts section of the Map. Importantly, the entry in the second edition of the Encyclopédie ap-
pended a section on the fine arts, underscoring that the ‘‘art’’ Diderot focused on was not the fine arts. 
 198. ‘‘If the object leads to action, we give the name of ‘art’ to the compendium of rules governing 
its use and to their technical order. If the object is merely contemplated under different aspects, the 
compendium and technical order of the observations concerning this object are called ‘science.’’’ Id. 
This again maps to Dear’s exposition of both arts and sciences as having theorica and practica compo-
nents. 
 199. Id. at 83. This suggests an early root for the ‘‘machine or transformation’’ test relied on by the 
Federal Circuit in In re Bilski. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). While this test was rejected by the  
Supreme Court as the sole test for patent eligibility, it captured a longstanding attribute of useful arts 
(and hence patent eligible inventions). Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010). 
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making them;’’ (3) the details of the tools and machines used; (4) the 
steps of workmanship through illustrated plates; and (5) the terms of the 
art.200 While it is unclear whether the manipulation of natural forces could 
also be the subject of an art, Diderot referenced the patented steam en-
gine of Savery as an art (without tying it to a material product of  
nature).201 
Going beyond d’Alembert, Diderot recognized that each art includ-
ed theorica and practica elements.202 The latter were ‘‘habitual and un-
thinking’’ and may equate to procedural knowledge.203 Both elements 
needed to interact for progress to occur in an art.204 My metaphor for this 
is a person striding forward: one leg is the speculative aspect of an art, 
the other is its practical aspect. Each one can only move ahead so far 
without the other catching up and then leading in turn. 
Like d’Alembert, Diderot sought to elevate the useful arts by call-
ing for a new kind of artisan-scientist-----similar to the modern tech- 
nologist-----who could use scientific insights to develop entirely new arts 
rather than incremental improvements in existing ones.205 Although what 
he really seemed to want was a return of the ingeniator who weaved to-
gether imagination (genius), memory (procedural and declarative 
knowledge), and reason (logic) to discover entirely new problem solving 
methods. 
In the wake of the Encyclopédie project, the concept of the ‘‘useful 
arts’’ seemed to finally cohere around the mechanical arts minus the fine 
arts. In 1774, W. Kenrick published a fascinating piece arguing for ‘‘use-
ful artists’’ to be accorded the same respect, and given the same rights to 
‘‘secure’’ property in their inventions, as authors and engravers. Entitled, 
An Address to the Artists and Manufacturers of Great Britain, it clearly 
followed Bacon’s and the Encyclopedists call for elevation of useful arti-
sans.206 The subtitle is quite telling: ‘‘Respecting an Application to  
                                                                                                                                         
 200. D’Alembert, supra note 123. 
 201. Diderot, Art, supra note 163. The reference is to ‘‘raising water by fire.’’ Id. 
 202. Id. (‘‘[I]t is evident that every art has its speculative and its practical aspect: the former con-
sists in knowing the principles of an art, without their being applied, the latter in their habitual and 
unthinking application.’’); Denis Diderot, Encyclopedia, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & 
D’ALEMBERT COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (Philip Stewart trans., 2002), http://quod. 
lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0000.004?view=text;rgn=main (‘‘Each science and each art has its meta-
physics. This aspect is always abstract, lofty, and difficult.’’). 
 203. Diderot, Art, supra note 163 (‘‘In every art there are many particulars concerning its materi-
al, its instruments, and its application which can only be learned through practice.’’).  
 204. Id. (‘‘It is difficult if not impossible to go far in the practice of an art without speculation, 
and, conversely, to have a thorough knowledge of the speculative aspects of an art without being 
versed in its practice.’’). 
 205. Diderot explained how those familiar with wheels, pulleys, levers, counterweights, etc. could 
scarcely predict or comprehend the destructive power made possible by gunpowder. Its effects were 
not incremental to catapults, etc., but orders of magnitude greater in taking down fortification walls. 
Id. He admonished ‘‘learned men’’ to not be so quick to dismiss bold new experimental avenues just 
because the earliest demonstrations were less than impressive. For example, Montaigne prematurely 
wrote off firearms because the early incarnations were so ineffective. Id. 
 206. W. KENRICK, AN ADDRESS TO THE ARTISTS AND MANUFACTURERS OF GREAT BRITAIN 
(LONDON 1774). Note that Croker’s English Encyclopedia that was supposed to surpass both Cham-
bers’ earlier English Cyclopedia and the French Encyclopédie, echoed this call and included a very 
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Parliament for the further Encouragement of New Discoveries and  
Inventions in the Useful Arts; to the facilitating future Improvements in 
the Produce, Manufactures and Commerce of these Kingdoms.’’207  
Kenrick’s ultimate goal was to get Parliament to pass a version of the 
Statute of Anne directed towards inventions in the useful arts. Why? Be-
cause the Statute of Monopolies-----the only positive law in England to 
address inventions and ‘‘patents’’ (in the broader sense of the Crown 
‘‘prerogative’’ to grant exclusive privileges for all manner of commercial 
activities)-----was a backhanded concession by Parliament to allow patents 
by the Crown only for new manufactures, and that for only 14 years. 
Most other Crown patents were now prohibited. But the process for ob-
taining Crown patent protection was expensive, complex, and quite un-
certain. Kenrick and others envied the relative ease of the registration 
system for literary works under the Statute of Anne, and desired some-
thing similar for inventors.  
More directly on point for present purposes, Kenrick distinguished 
useful from polite arts. The latter included literary works, engravings and 
etchings (which had come under the Statute of Anne because of their 
central role as illustrations or plates, especially in ‘‘scientific’’ books), fine 
art, and the emerging new category of ‘‘decorative arts.’’ The last catego-
ry would play an increasingly important role in the industrializing West 
and mass production of both objets d’art and utilitarian objects that in-
corporated aesthetic design elements, ornamentation, or embellish-
ment.208 Kenrick appears to designate fine artists as capital A ‘‘Artists’’-----
a convention that would certainly take hold in the nineteenth century-----
while referring to (useful) artisans as ‘‘useful artists,’’ ‘‘artisans,’’ or, fre-
quently, ‘‘artificers.’’209 In this way, he seems to exemplify the challenge 
stemming from the emerging privileged sense of ‘‘Art’’ as fine art, and its 
accompanying appropriation of the term ‘‘art.’’ Terminology was desper-
ately needed to designate all the other ‘‘artists’’ working outside the rela-
tively narrow area of the fine arts. But, as Kenrick admits, the polite arts 
‘‘make a more splendid and imposing appearance; they assume a dignity 
and importance,’’ over the useful arts, which may explain why they were 
being elevated above the practical arts and their disproportional claim to 
the universal term ‘‘art.’’210 Notwithstanding, Kenrick argues passionately 
for the importance of advances in the useful arts as better leading to  
‘‘political happiness’’ than the fine or decorative arts.211 While Kenrick 
                                                                                                                                         
close English language version of the Map of Human Knowledge in the latter. CROKER’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA. 
 207. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 208. See infra Part II(G). Kenrick references the reproductions of ancient objets d’art by Wedg-
wood and Bently. See KENDRICK, supra note 206, at 26. Kenrick’s argument for equivalent treatment 
of literary property and useful arts inventions centers around the close connection between the manual 
but decorative arts of engraving, etching, and mezzo tinto scrapers, on the one hand, and the manual 
but practical useful arts (woodworking, metal work, machinery, etc.), on the other. 
 209. See, e.g., id. at 1--3. 
 210. Id. at 22. 
 211. Id. at 21--30. 
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never defines the ‘‘useful arts,’’ it is clear that it is the set of mechanical 
arts that excludes the polite arts (and thus fine and decorative arts are 
outside the useful arts). Inferring from the subtitle and elsewhere in the 
monograph, agriculture and commerce join manufacturing within the 
useful arts. 
By 1787, the year the U.S. Constitution and its IP Clause were 
drafted, the ‘‘useful arts’’ were closely allied with commerce, manufactur-
ing, and agriculture. Societies were being established to encourage de-
velopment of these economically valuable trades. One example is the 
‘‘Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the 
Useful Arts,’’ which promoted manufacturing in Pennsylvania. In setting 
out its purpose, the Society’s leaders cited the fact that the people of 
Pennsylvania ‘‘possess[ed] within [them]selves the materials of the useful 
arts, and articles of consumption and commerce.’’212 Likewise, Tench 
Coxe, an American thinker who was influential on George Washington 
and other Founding Fathers, published An Address to an Assembly of the 
Friends of American Manufacturers, in which he mentioned ‘‘citizens, 
who are expert at manufactures and the useful arts.’’213 
Pivotal in my story, however, is the treatment of ‘‘useful arts’’ in 
British author E.A.W. Zimmerman’s A Political Survey of the Present 
State of Europe, published that same year in London.214 In the Preface, he 
both solidifies the sense of useful arts I argue for here and makes a con-
nection to a new sense of the term ‘‘technology’’ (which had emerged in 
its first incarnation during the seventeenth century as solely, and surpris-
ingly, the name for treatises on grammar and language):215 ‘‘Besides 
chemistry, natural philosophy, and natural history, a new branch of scien-
tific knowledge, viz. technology, or the theory and accurate description 
of useful arts and manufactures, was much cultivated in Germany.’’216 
‘‘Useful arts’’ are again associated with manufactures. But ‘‘technology’’ 
is introduced in one of two powerful new ways in which it would be used 
in the nineteenth century: (1) a kind of literal reading of its constituent 
parts: techné + ology or a science (systematic study) of techné; and 
(2) the practical application of principles discovered through the ‘‘new 
sciences’’ (that would ultimately become ‘‘Science’’ in the modern popu-
lar sense as the physical or natural sciences such as physics, biology, 
chemistry, etc.).217 In the use, ‘‘technology’’ is not the processes or arti-
facts of the useful arts, but rather is the external study of such processes 
and artifacts. Ultimately, however, ‘‘technology’’ would become the term 
                                                                                                                                         
 212. THE PLAN OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF 
MANUFACTURES AND THE USEFUL ARTS 4 (AITKEN & SON 1787). 
 213. TENCH COXE, AN ADDRESS TO AN ASSEMBLY OF THE FRIENDS OF AMERICAN 
MANUFACTURERS 7 (AITKEN & SON 1787). 
 214. E.A.W. ZIMMERMAN, A POLITICAL SURVEY OF THE PRESENT STATE OF EUROPE (LONDON 
1787). 
 215. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2014). 
 216. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 214, at iii. 
 217. See infra Part V(B). 
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for the processes and artifacts of the useful arts starting slowly in the 
nineteenth century and then fully displacing ‘‘useful arts’’ in the early 
twentieth century.218 Thus, in the ultimate complication for terminology 
and conceptual underpinnings of the patent system, just as ‘‘(useful) arts’’ 
had become nearly as unified or systematized as ‘‘fine arts,’’ it was about 
to be replaced by ‘‘technology.’’ But whereas the collapse of ‘‘fine art’’ 
into ‘‘Art’’ did not fundamentally alter the notion of what constituted the 
full breadth of fine arts, the displacement of ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘useful art’’ with 
‘‘technology’’ would improvidently both narrow and expand the territory 
of the ‘‘useful arts’’ that the patent system was built upon. 
F. The Romantic Period 
The emergence of aesthetics as a unifying theory of the Fine Arts, 
together with the ‘‘Counter-Enlightenment’’ of the Romantic period, 
narrowed art to the Fine Arts and the artist to the nonrational, expressive 
artiste (the antithesis of the techné artisan).219 By the early nineteenth 
century, Kant and others had incorporated aesthetics as a major compo-
nent of philosophical systems, even as the useful arts-----so important to 
Galileo, Bacon, and the philosophes-----were once again left behind.220 In-
tellectuals focused on the ‘‘scientific’’ or ‘‘philosophical’’ principles 
(meaning contemplative laws of nature) behind artisanal achievements 
such as the steam engine, neglecting practical advances in, for example, 
boilers, valves, and pipes that made them possible.221 At the same time 
there were mid-level practical principles that were neither uncodifiable 
know-how nor laws of nature, such as that the pressure from a boiler 
could be harnessed by a reciprocating piston attached to a gear or wheel 
to create force or motion. This principle could be applied in many practi-
cal ways. 
                                                                                                                                         
 218. This, again, is like the transfer of the name ‘‘Frankenstein’’ to the monster that Dr. Franken-
stein creates. See supra note 95. 
 219. For example, Sulzer published General Theory of the Fine Arts in the early 1770s. Kristeller, 
supra note 130, at 38--39. Goethe first rejected, then adopted, a comprehensive system of the fine arts, 
even as he continued using the techné sense of ‘‘art.’’ For example, he rejected poetry as an ‘‘art’’ be-
cause it was based on genius, not rule-based skill. Id. at 40--41. He also provided an early example of 
presentist errors based on the changing sense of art: Hippocrates had contrasted ‘‘Art’’ with ‘‘Life,’’ 
meaning human artifice compared to natural phenomena, which Goethe misinterpreted to contrast the 
imagination-based Fine Arts with the ‘‘real’’ world. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 498--99. This is sim-
ilar to modern popular (mis)usages such as ‘‘art imitates life’’ (or ‘‘life imitates art’’). 
 220. See Kristeller, supra note 145, at 24. For example, Victor Cousin built the foundation of 
modern value theory on three pillars of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Id. Unfortunately, the 
developing modern sense of aesthetics-based ‘‘beauty’’ led to increasing misreadings of ancient and 
medieval texts. The Greeks’ purely moral sense of ‘‘beauty’’ (right actions) was replaced by the purely 
aesthetic sense. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 499--500. 
 221. See, e.g., Hornblower v. Boulton, [1799] 8 T.R. 95 (K.B.) 99 (finding Watt’s patent for a 
steam engine to claim a manufacture and not a philosophical principle, the latter which would have 
been prohibited); Neilson v. Harford, [1841] 8 M. & W. 806 (S.C.) 824 (holding that a patent for inter-
posing a heated receptacle between a blower and a furnace such that the air sent into the furnace 
would be warm, not cold, was not invalid as simply a scientific principle; whereas a patent for only a 
scientific principle (with no particular application) would be invalid). 
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The Romantics rejected scientific rationalization of nature and in-
dustrialization in favor of the natural and the emotive. Passions were cel-
ebrated. The solitary artiste, adopted from the philosophes’ genius, was a 
heroic figure leading change through vision and intuition in the emerging 
‘‘Great Man’’ approach to history in which many major events and 
changes were attributed to particular individuals instead of groups. He 
no longer merely imitated nature, but created entirely new things just as 
Prometheus had done, bestowing them as gifts upon his less inspired fel-
lows. Absolute originality and personal expression became his touch-
stones. The author was no longer an authority directing the production of 
works, but a font of assertive self-expression and creativity.222 The genius 
component of art became all-encompassing and artistes were seen as 
born, not made. The elevation of Romantic artistes to cultural heroes led 
to the self-importance of capital-A ‘‘Art.’’ 
Meanwhile, the new terms introduced for the increasingly successful 
practice of science-based artisanal innovation in the seventeenth century 
began to take root. ‘‘Technology’’ captured both a science of techné arts 
(techné + ology) and the application of scientific principles to speed up 
artisanal innovation.223 And some commentators at long last explicitly 
held that particular fields could have both science and art components.224 
‘‘Engineer’’ emerged in French as a modification of ingeniator and 
ingegnere, and quickly spread to England and elsewhere, displacing any 
continued need for techné artisans to call themselves ‘‘artists.’’225 
While engineering involves genius, and is etymologically rooted in 
it, the newly named ‘‘engineers’’ seemed to have little interest in being 
confused with artistes.226 The terms art and artist were accordingly yielded 
to the Romantics. Those who considered themselves ‘‘scientists’’ focused 
on the ‘‘scientific progress’’ component of the Enlightenment, rejecting 
the qualitative and noncodifiable.227 Thus, Diderot’s dream of a ‘‘gram-
                                                                                                                                         
 222. The ‘‘novel’’ thus obtained its modern meaning as a work of creative self-expression, rather 
than simply a work that had never been published before. 
 223. See JACOB BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY 1--6 (1829). Bigelow’s work is described 
on the title page as taken from lectures on the ‘‘application of the sciences to the useful arts.’’ Its In-
troduction reinforces the longstanding senses of science and art. The former are ‘‘those departments of 
knowledge which are more speculative, or abstract, in their nature, and which are conversant with 
truths or with phenomena, that are in existence at the time we contemplate them.’’ Id. at 1. The latter 
are ‘‘departments of knowledge, which have their origin in human ingenuity, which depend on the ac-
tive, or formative processes of the human mind, and which without these, would not have existed.’’ Id. 
Notably, the term technology is never used in the entire Introduction; rather all discussion is in terms 
of science and art and the interaction of the two. Zimmerman’s earlier 1787 reference, described 
above, had ‘‘technology’’ described in a way that underscored its newness. 
 224. ‘‘[W]e find both a science and an art involved in the same branch of study. For example, 
chemistry is a science depending on the immutable relations of matter, which relations must have ex-
isted, had there never been minds to study them. Yet these laws of matter would not have become the 
subjects of science, had not mankind invented the art of separating their agents, and making them cog-
nizable to the senses.’’ Id. 
 225. AUGUSTE BRACHET, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE 212 
(G.W. Kitchin trans., Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1882). 
 226. ANN JEFFERSON, GENIUS IN FRANCE: AN IDEA AND ITS USES 3 (2015). 
 227. Shafik Dharamsi & Ian Scott, Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Received and Interpre-
tivist Views of Science, 55 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIANS 843, 843 (2009). 
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mar of the arts’’ was dead. The new order of arts and sciences was based 
on the divisions of arts (Fine Arts), sciences (theoretical and experi-
mental basic science), and engineering (applied science and tech- 
nology).228 
G. The ‘‘Arts and Crafts’’ Movement 
Inspired by Romanticism, the Arts and Crafts movement in nine-
teenth century England sought a (re)unity of the arts and revival of an 
idealized master artisan.229 Its intellectual forefathers, John Ruskin and 
William Morris, rebelled against neo-classicism, Royal Academy Fine 
Arts elitism, Enlightenment scientific progress, and industrialization’s 
crass commercialism. They embraced medieval gothic forms of decora-
tion and design.230 Like the ancients proponents in the Querelle, they saw 
past masters and works as superior to those of the present. But their past 
was the medieval, not the Classical. They extolled the ‘‘ordinary’’ art and 
‘‘joy in labor’’ of a mythical craftsman creating utilitarian wares and 
buildings for timeless ordinary folk.231 And they rejected the coolly ana-
lytic logic of Adam Smith and the industrialists that reduced the crafts-
man to a rote factory hand and produced shoddy mass-produced wares.232 
Like Galileo, Bacon, and the philosophes, Ruskin and Morris hoped to 
elevate a segment of the useful arts and its artisans to the prestige of the 
Fine Arts and liberal arts,233 although they rejected the role of science, 
                                                                                                                                         
 228. Eric Schatzberg, From Art to Applied Science, 103 ISIS 555, 558--561 (2012). 
 229. While the beginnings of the movement originated in the 1830s, the name ‘‘Arts and Crafts’’ 
did not formally appear until the launch of the Arts and Crafts Exhibition Society in the late 1880s 
(replacing the term the ‘‘combined arts’’). See Alan Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, Machinery, and the 
Arts and Crafts Movement in Britain, 24 J. DECORATIVE & PROPAGANDA ARTS 94, 100 (2002). 
 230. See GILLIAN NAYLOR, THE ARTS AND CRAFTS MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ITS SOURCES, 
IDEALS, AND INFLUENCE ON DESIGN THEORY 96--100 (1971). 
 231. Id. at 17--18, 20. Later Arts and Crafts leaders embraced this ideal and also hoped that ‘‘art-
ful’’ works would civilize the average person, particularly those in the emerging middle class, causing 
them to reject shoddy mass-produced goods in favor of hand-crafted ones. See Crawford, supra note 
229, at 98--100. 
 232. See EILEEN BORIS, ART AND LABOR xi (1986); NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 11--12. The term 
‘‘manufacture’’ itself underwent a transformation from its literal meaning of production by hand 
(‘‘manu-’’ + ‘‘factor’’) to the modern sense of mechanized industrial production. According to Smith, a 
narrowly defined, semi-skilled task would become the ‘‘sole employment of [the worker’s] life.’’ ADAM 
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 10--14 (Prometheus Books ed. 1991) (1776). Smith maintained the 
mechanical or techné sense of ‘‘art,’’ using it to discuss the processes of manufacturing. Id. He also ad-
vocated the ‘‘speculative’’ philosopher who ‘‘does no thing’’ (produces no physical object) but through 
his broad knowledge and observations can imagine putting together disparate elements from different 
fields to create a new kind of useful machine. Id. 
 233. The movement temporarily revived Diderot’s dream of a ‘‘grammar of the arts’’ as it sought a 
‘‘‘grammar of the Industrial Arts, Architecture and Industry.’’’ NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 176. While 
its leaders usually included architecture------a fine art------in the arts covered by the movement, they were 
primarily focused on the ‘‘lesser arts’’ or ‘‘minor arts,’’ an indeterminate set of mechanical arts that 
were concerned with decoration and design. See id. at 120; Alan Crawford, Ideas and Objects: The Arts 
and Crafts Movement in Britain, 13 DESIGN ISSUES 15, 16, 19 (1997) [hereinafter ‘‘Crawford, Ideas and 
Objects’’]. For example, the Central School, founded on Arts and Crafts ideals in the late nineteenth 
century, contained five major departments: (1) fine metalwork (largely focused on gold, silver, and 
jewelry); (2) furniture; (3) dress design, embroidery, and needlework; (4) stained glass; and (5) book 
design and printing. See NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 180. Morris and Ruskin sought to position their 
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technology, and quantitative ‘‘progress.’’ They idealized an ‘‘all round’’ 
artisan who could design and build wares with time-honored, apprentice-
based techniques,234 pitting themselves against machine-based, industrial 
production that relied on both scientific progress and a sharp division of 
labor. Ultimately, however, this vision could not compete against the 
economic and social conditions of the industrializing West. 
Two factors kept Morris’ and Ruskin’s views from being relegated 
to the fringe at the outset: (1) a visceral public reaction against factory 
work conditions,235 and (2) the lagging of British manufactures behind 
better designed Continental wares.236 The former led to a groundswell of 
popular support for the emerging Arts and Crafts movement. The latter 
led to government support for the creation of new ‘‘design schools’’ that 
effectively made design a formal profession.237 However, Ruskin’s  
Romantic inclinations led him to reject the teachability of design,238 lead-
ing to one of the tensions in the movement: was design a techné art or a 
genius art? Many Arts and Crafts leaders emphasized learning-by-doing 
and apprenticeship approaches to training (including a revival of guilds), 
suggesting that design was indeed teachable, if not codifiable.239 
Notwithstanding the early movement’s opposition to machines and 
commercialism, later leaders allowed some mechanization and profit-
mindedness.240 They also limited the scope of Arts and Crafts manufac-
tures, conceding ‘‘the heavier and ruder productions of industry’’ to the 
techno-industrialists and retaining only those objects ‘‘in which Art and 
handicraft are happily blended.’’241 The former were ‘‘engineered,’’ while 
the latter should be ‘‘designed.’’ Yet as the movement wore on, and espe-
                                                                                                                                         
model artisan between the Royal Academy artistes, who would not sully themselves with the ‘‘lesser 
arts,’’ and the ‘‘professional’’ or ‘‘tradesmen’’ commercial architects of the Institute of British  
Architects. See NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 167; Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, supra note 229, at 100; 
Crawford, Ideas and Objects, supra note 233, at 16. 
 234. See Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, supra note 229, at 107; see also Crawford, Ideas and Objects 
supra note 233, at 16. Anticipating the current rise of ‘‘DIY’’ (‘‘do-it-yourself’’) and ‘‘maker’’ ap-
proaches discussed below in Part II(I), Morris and Company began making their own dyes from 
scratch for their fabrics, rather than using commercially available ones. NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 
105. William de Morgan would take this even further by mastering all the crafts required to make his 
pottery from scratch. Id. at 151--53. 
 235. See NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 25--29. 
 236. See id. at 16, 23--32, 93--95. 
 237. See id. at 15--18. The field was further legitimized by journals and exhibitions. See id. at 18--
22, 113--120; Crawford, Ideas and Objects supra note 233, at 19. Various factions also sought to 
strengthen patent and copyright laws to better protect and incentivize design innovation. See NAYLOR, 
supra note 230, at 19--20. Later Arts and Crafts leaders, such as Benson, used both trade secrets and 
patents to protect their innovations. Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, supra note 229, at 106, 110--11. The 
United States would later modify its patent laws to add a new kind of patent, the ‘‘design patent’’ 
which protects only the ornamental features of a manufacture. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). 
 238. See NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 22 (‘‘[T]he very words ‘School of Design’ involve the pro-
foundest of art fallacies. Drawing may be taught by tutors, but Design only by Heaven; . . . .’’). Under-
scoring this notion, Walter Crane later declared that ‘‘Art is not Science.’’ Id. at 145.  
 239. NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 113; Crawford, supra note 229, at 104. 
 240. NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 176. This blurred the matter, though, as in many cases, British 
industry combined hand and machine production too. Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, supra note 229, at 
107. 
 241. NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 148. 
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cially as it was adapted in the United States, even ‘‘Art’’ wares became 
mass-produced and machines were no longer anathema.242 The role of the 
designer was reduced to introducing good design into mass-produced 
goods.243 This led to a second tension in the movement: whereas some 
leaders prioritized the idiosyncratic styles and imperfections that came 
along with the procedural knowledge of handicraft,244 others pragmatical-
ly emphasized good design for both machine and hand manufactures.245 
The latter proved to be the future.246 
Even as one faction led directly to the modern consumer products 
designer, another faction obstinately looked to an idealized, rural crafts 
past. For better or for worse, the latter became the enduring symbols of 
the phrase ‘‘Arts and Crafts’’: ‘‘a progeny of cranks and eccentrics, the 
‘arty crafty’ with their aura of the homespun and the country dance.’’247 
Partly, this originated from the good intentions of the ‘‘home industries’’ 
initiative, which sought economic development through the revival of 
traditional crafts in distressed rural economies.248 Left behind by urban 
industrialization, these communities might capitalize on the popularity of 
the Arts and Crafts style by producing the kind of quirky, nostalgic hand-
icrafts that could not be mass-produced. The challenge was whether a 
market would endure for period-based craft styles. 
H. Design Beyond the Arts and Crafts Movement 
In the United States, the Arts and Crafts movement was adapted for 
the peculiarities of American culture. Because the early factory experi-
ences in the United States were not as grim as those of England,249 there 
was less resistance to machine production.250 This sensibility led to hybrid 
operations such as Rookwood Pottery, Tiffany Studios, and Roycroft, 
                                                                                                                                         
 242. BORIS, supra note 232, at 139--55. 
 243. NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 148--49, 176.  
 244. See id. at 167. Ashbee in particular saw the experienced interplay of masters in the shop as 
crucial to the development of virtuosity, style, and creativity. See id. Thus could be equated to the val-
ue of seasoned sports teams and music groups.  
 245. See id. at 149--61. For example, Benson approached his subject ‘‘‘as an engineer rather than a 
hand-worker’’’ and produced his ‘‘beautiful forms by machinery on a commercial scale rather then 
single works of art.’’’ Id. at 160. 
 246. Ashbee, for example, argued that architecture ‘‘‘should be studied both as an Art and a Sci-
ence’’’ and predicted that designers should shift from creators of beauty to aesthetically-minded prob-
lem solvers. Id. at 176--77. In fact, much later, Steve Jobs would become exactly this kind of designer. 
 247. Id. at 191. 
 248. See id. at 158, 170--72; Clive Edwards, ‘Home is Where the Art is’: Women, Handicrafts, and 
Home Improvements 1750--1900, 19 J. DESIGN HIST. 11, 11--19 (2006). 
 249. BORIS, supra note 232, at xii. Further, in a land where people------and hence labor------were 
scarce, labor saving processes were almost always welcome. See, e.g., THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN 
ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS xxxii (D. Mallory, & Co. 1810). This was in 
stark contrast to the overpopulated European experience in which labor-saving machines and process-
es were often opposed for putting people out of work. See id. 
 250. See BORIS, supra note 232, at 29; Annette Carruthers, Book Review, 19 J. DESIGN HIST. 95, 
96 (2006) (reviewing THE ARTS & CRAFTS MOVEMENT IN EUROPE & AMERICA: DESIGN FOR THE 
MODERN WORLD, 1880-1920 (Wendy Kaplan ed., 2004)); Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, supra note 229, 
at 96. Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, was a major proponent of machine production. See NAYLOR, 
supra note 230, at 174. 
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which operated on a mass-production scale, even as they maintained an 
artisanal culture.251 The burgeoning middle class was increasingly able to 
afford these consumer-oriented art wares.252 But, as in England, ‘‘Arts 
and Crafts’’ quickly became limited in the public mind to a decora-
tive/design style. 
The middle class was not able to afford handcrafted furniture, light-
ing, and homes.253 And the self-sufficient frontier American, who would 
have embraced the Arts and Crafts DIY (‘‘do-it-yourself’’) ethic as he 
built his own furniture and houses, was transforming into the company 
man working long hours at the factory and looking for easy style and 
comfort in his off hours.254 This drove the success of department and cata-
logue stores such as Sears Roebuck and Macy’s. Also popular were un-
finished, mass-produced art wares, to be painted or ornamented by the 
consumer, and affordable objects d’art, that enabled middle class home-
makers to apply their personal expressive touches to their homes.255 
The U.S. Arts and Crafts movement was also transformed by its 
role in education. Mechanical arts were introduced into public schools 
alternatively to: (1) develop aesthetic values in working class children;256 
(2) create consumers who could recognize and reject shoddy products;257 
or (3) ‘‘Americanize’’ immigrants.258 Elementary school teaching itself 
became ‘‘women’s work’’ because it was ‘‘nurturing’’ and women were 
‘‘better’’ at teaching aesthetic values to children.259 Domestic crafts such 
as basket weaving became a popular therapy for the physically and men-
tally disabled.260 American psychologists and education reformers John 
Dewey and G. Stanley Hall sought to implement their child development 
theories through arts and crafts.261 The Progressives promoted new voca-
tional-technical schools to educate tradesmen through a mix of ‘‘learning 
                                                                                                                                         
 251. BORIS, supra note 232, at xiii. 
 252. Such purchases were also fueled by the ‘‘House Beautiful’’ and ‘‘Healthful Home’’ ideals be-
ginning at that time. See id. at 53. 
 253. See id. at 56. 
 254. See id. at xiv--xv. The initial profusion of American Arts and Crafts workshops, societies, and 
guilds------producing decorative, ‘‘democratic’’ art such as chairs, vases, and rugs for the middle class------
later became niche organizations as the consumerist mindset of the mid-twentieth century took hold. 
See id. at 32. 
 255. This trend began in the 1870s when pottery manufacturers sought to establish ‘‘art pottery’’ 
lines by employing fine artists to paint unfinished pottery. See BORIS, supra note 232, at 101--102; 
NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 149--50. Over time amateurs were employed and ultimately the unfinished 
pottery was sold directly to consumers to decorate with their own ‘‘personal touch.’’ This business 
model is alive and well today, and includes businesses that provide the space and materials for decora-
tion. Major chain stores today that also cater to this demographic include Michaels Arts and Crafts 
and Jo-Anne Fabric and Craft Stores. Small studios where consumers can decorate pre-made pottery, 
etc. also exist in most cities. 
 256. BORIS, supra note 232, at xv, 34--37, 82--98.  
 257. Id. at 86--87. 
 258. Id. at 88--89. 
 259. Id. at 91--98. 
 260. Id. at 103--04. 
 261. See id. at 84, 89--91. Particularly, the view that the child recapitulates the development of 
humanity. 
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by doing’’ apprenticeships and academic classes.262 But the unitary craft 
vision of the Progressives and Arts and Crafts leaders quickly dissolved 
into a ‘‘heads and hands’’ system in which vocational-technical schools 
produced workers while general education high schools produced man-
agers (increasingly by way of a follow-on college degree).263 The subject 
matter of vocational-technical schools was not characterized as ‘‘arts and 
crafts’’ anyway, but rather as ‘‘vocational,’’ ‘‘technical,’’ or ‘‘trades.’’ ‘‘Arts 
and crafts’’ were taught in ‘‘home economics’’ courses introduced as the 
female counterpart to male ‘‘shop’’ classes.264 Arts and crafts were mar-
ginalized even at the college level: ‘‘Basketweaving 101’’ became a short-
hand for the alleged useless and easy courses introduced in the later 
twentieth century that students could take in place of ‘‘tough’’ and ‘‘use-
ful’’ courses in science, technology, engineering, and math (‘‘STEM’’).265 
German designers transformed parts of the British Arts and Crafts 
movement into the Bauhaus movement of the early twentieth century. 
They were most interested in attempts to integrate art and machines, in 
line with their modernist and Futurist orientation.266 The Werkbund 
school became a battle of design ideologies, while gaining fame for its 
‘‘type’’ furniture that had both style and machine production efficiency.267 
The Germans revived the techné arts by adapting Ancient Greek princi-
ples of orderly, rational design that provided as much a role for the engi-
neer as for the ‘‘artist.’’268 The German word for ‘‘art’’ (kunst) maintained 
the sense of techné art (as well as fine art). Gropius and the Bauhaus 
school followed with their assertion that ‘‘architecture was both a science 
and the highest form of art.’’269 But this should not be misread with to-
day’s American connotations of art and science; the Germans followed 
                                                                                                                                         
 262. Id. at 89--91. The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 established federal funding for these schools, 
distinct from existing general education high schools. Smith-Hughes National Vocational Education 
Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (repealed 1997). 
 263. See BORIS, supra note 232, at 90--91; MATTHEW B. CRAWFORD, SHOP CLASS AS SOULCRAFT: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE VALUE OF WORK 30--31 (2009). For decades, stigma has attached to both voca-
tional-technical schools and shop classes in general education high schools. Many vocational-technical 
schools closed over the past two decades. However, the ones that remain have seen a recent resur-
gence in interest and relative respect. See Linda Matchan, Drills and Skills: Why Some Educators are 
Putting a New Emphasis on Woodworking Class, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.boston.com/ 
lifestyle/family/articles/2011/01/04/why_some_educators_are_putting_a_new_emphasis_on_wood 
working_class/. 
 264. See BORIS, supra note 232, at 87. 
 265. DAVID HOWES, THE CRAFT OF THE SENSES 1 (Aug. 2012), available at http://centrefor 
sensorystudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Craft-of-the-Senses.pdf . 
 266. See Crawford, W. A. S. Benson, supra note 229, at 117. Otto Wagner, for example, stated that 
‘‘all modern forms must correspond to new materials and new requirements of our time, if they are to 
fit modern mankind.’’ NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 185. 
 267. See id. The Werkbund shared a broad view of ‘‘art’’ with the British Arts and Crafts: ‘‘art’’ 
was more than just the fine arts and must include the crafts (lesser arts) and ‘‘embrace the whole of 
life.’’ Id. at 187.  
 268. Id. at 188. Architecture for example could be ‘‘controlled and rational, pure and predicta-
ble; . . . its creators concerned not with self-expression but with the eternal concepts of space, structure 
and harmony, concepts which could be expressed by the use of predetermined orders.’’ Id. 
 269. Id. at 188--89. In France, Le Corbusier expressed a similar sentiment: ‘‘Architecture is gov-
erned by standards. Standards are a matter of logic, analysis and precise study.’’ Id. Note that ‘‘archi-
tecture’’ often encompassed design of furniture and machines as well. 
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the traditional senses of science as systematic study of a field as object 
and of art as the manipulation of objects for practical ends as subject. 
Regrettably, however, even the progressive Bauhaus succumbed to the 
genderization of arts.270 
Finland was also influenced by the Arts and Crafts movement as its 
leaders sought a design identity to help manufacturers compete in the 
market and as the public responded to shoddy goods and poor factory 
working conditions.271 Nordic ‘‘functionalism’’ emerged from the rapid 
urbanization and small apartments of early twentieth century Helsinki 
and other cities. Furniture needed to be stackable and have multiple 
functions. But Finnish designers refused to allow functionalism to dictate 
aesthetically unappealing objects. Alvar Aalto and his Artek company 
worked with the largest department store, Stockmann, to create a design 
department for consumers.272 The scarcity of materials after World War 
II led to creative uses in products designed for ‘‘Everyday Beauty.’’273 The 
importance of designers resulted in celebrity status for them and their 
designs, which went worldwide after the 1952 Helsinki Olympics.274 
Meanwhile, other Scandinavian countries followed suit with variants on 
the well-designed, clean lines, multi-purpose functionality, and mass pro-
duction with inexpensive materials approach.275 Ultimately, this included 
anthropometric research and a realization of the British Arts and Crafts 
ideal that household objects should be rethought to maximally fulfill 
their utilitarian purpose.276 
I. ‘‘Art’’ Becomes Synonymous with ‘‘Fine Art’’ in Popular Usage 
By the mid-twentieth century, the loss of the techné sense of ‘‘art’’ in 
popular culture was complete.277 Similarly, despite the efforts of Arts and 
                                                                                                                                         
 270. Gifted female students who had won competitive scholarships to study architecture were 
shunted to ‘‘feminine’’ arts such as weaving. See Alice Rawsthorn, Female Pioneers of the Bauhaus, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/arts/25iht-design25.html?_r=0. In lat-
er years, this was remedied and ultimately women trained in ‘‘male’’ domains such as metal-working 
and industrial design. See id. 
 271. This paragraph is summarized from notes taken during a 2013 visit to the permanent exhibit 
at the Finnish Design Museum in Helsinki. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Examples include Eero Aarnio and his 1966 ‘‘egg chair,’’ Marimekko colorful print clothes, 
and Littala glassware. 
 275. See NAYLOR, supra note 230, at 191--92. This is perhaps most famously typified today by 
IKEA of Sweden. 
 276. Id. at 192--94. 
 277. Richard C. De Wolf, Registrar of Copyrights and the author of a major copyright treatise in 
the early twentieth century, noted the transformation of the term amongst the public and even many 
lawyers. RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 15--16 (1925) (‘‘[T]he word art was 
not so closely associated as it now is with the fine arts.’’). Hendrik Willem Van Loon published a popu-
lar history of ‘‘The Arts’’ that encompassed only the fine arts and the ‘‘minor arts’’ (similar to the deco-
rative arts covered by the Arts and Crafts movement) and did not even bother explaining why it did 
not include the mechanical or other useful arts. See generally HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON, THE 
ARTS: WRITTEN AND ILLUSTRATED (1939). By the 1950s, Kristeller would have to explain in detail the 
origins and development of the techné sense of ‘‘art’’ just to remind readers that it had even existed 
(for over two thousand years). See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 496--510. Similarly, in 1966, art critic 
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Crafts advocates, ‘‘arts and crafts’’ were narrowed down to amateur or 
primitive decorative projects that women, children, or invalids might do 
to while away the time and creatively ‘‘express themselves.’’ ‘‘Art’’ meant 
all and only ‘‘capital A’’ Arts (the Fine Arts), plus new so-called minor or 
entertainment creative arts such as movies, television, and photog-
raphy.278 
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the hippie and ‘‘back-to-the-
land’’ movements turned away from techno-industrial capitalist ‘‘pro-
gress’’ and in some ways recapitulated the Arts and Crafts movement. 
Whereas in the 1950s, machine-made goods and foods were often seen as 
superior to hand-made ones,279 counter-culture types of the ‘60s and ‘70s 
sought ‘‘authenticity’’ (similar to the rough tool marks that Ruskin and 
Morris favored to show the hand of the artisan). ‘‘Natural,’’ ‘‘organic,’’ 
and simpler ways of living became favored. Yet none of this brought 
back the techné sense of art. If anything, it seemed to reinforce the 
homey sense of ‘‘arts and crafts’’ as hippies and then mainstream middle 
class young adults crocheted belts and tie dyed t-shirts for personal use 
or casual sales and exchanges. 
By the 1980s, however, affluent yuppies-----liberal and conservative 
alike-----sought out high-end artisanal, hand-crafted goods. Catalogues 
with expertly written brand backstories about master craftsmen promot-
ed a lifestyle (for those who could afford it) not so different from the af-
fluent of the turn of the century who had outfitted their homes from 
Benson, Tiffany, and Morris and Company.280 This led to a resurgence of 
demand and respect for ‘‘craftsmen’’ and ‘‘artisans.’’ 
Out of both the counter-culture and high-end artisanal trends 
emerged the DIY and ‘‘Maker’’ movements in the 1990s. These interre-
lated trends are not limited to handicrafts, home decorative arts, or ‘‘Old 
World craftsmanship.’’ Nor are they limited to the Fine Arts or to a nos-
talgic return to the ‘‘simpler’’ activities of yesteryear. Instead, they are as 
much based on cutting edge advances in machines and materials, such as 
3D printing (squarely within the current popular sense of technology), as 
they are on old school artisanal techniques.281 Even where the focus is on 
                                                                                                                                         
Raymond Williams had to explain that ‘‘An art had formerly been any skill; but Art, now, signified a 
particular group of skills, the ‘imaginative’ or ‘creative’ arts. Artist had meant a skilled person, as had 
artisan; but artist now referred to those selected skills alone. . . . Art came to stand for a special kind of 
truth, ‘imaginative truth.’ and artist for a special kind of person.’’ RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE 
AND SOCIETY 1780-1950, xiii (1966). 
 278. WILLIAMS, supra note 277, at xiii. 
 279. Consider this in the context of American cars, Wonder bread, and ‘‘scientifically formulated’’ 
baby formula in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 280. J. Peterman and Banana Republic catalogues from the 1980s are great examples. See, e.g., 
Tom Bonamici, Shopping from the Past, ARCHIVAL CLOTHING, http://archivalclothing.com/shopping-
from-the-past-banana-republic/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2015); Tom Cunniff, J. Peterman, Seinfeld, and 
Me, TOM CUNNIFF, http://tomcunniff.com/2012/03/j-peterman-seinfeld-and-me/ (last visited Mar. 12, 
2015). 
 281. See, e.g., CHRIS ANDERSON, MAKERS: THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2012); Jennifer 
Wang, Entrepreneur of 2012: Limor Fried, Adafruit, ENTREPRENEUR, Jan. 2013, at 46, 47--48. Accord-
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‘‘traditional’’ products like foods and beverages, the new makers are as 
apt to experiment with new tools, methods, and materials as to use exist-
ing ways.282 Makers enthusiastically use new knowledge about natural 
phenomena emerging from scientific research. Thus, they engage in 
technology in its sense of the application of science to art to accelerate 
innovation. In fact, many successful technology entrepreneurs and VCs 
are now turning to ‘‘start-ups’’ focused on artisanal premium products 
such as coffee, chocolate, and cheese.283 
Makers and DIY enthusiasts of all stripes, however, are primarily 
engaged in art. Many have adopted the term ‘‘artisanal,’’ rather than ‘‘art-
ist,’’ likely because this evokes the skilled craftsman and not the Roman-
tic artiste.284 But this is an unfortunate byproduct of the transformation of 
the term art to mean only the fine arts (and related aesthetics-based arts). 
The techné sense of art that this Article uncovers is, nonetheless, 
still alive and well in authoritative definitions of ‘‘art.’’ The first five sens-
es of art in the Oxford English Dictionary (‘‘OED’’) are variations on the 
fundamental theme of skill in practicing the methods of any kind of 
field.285 In one sense it is ‘‘Skill in the practical application of the princi-
ples of a particular field of knowledge or learning.’’286 In another, art is 
equated with the ‘‘useful arts’’ and strongly suggests the techné sense of 
art in its two parts.287 The fine arts sense of art corresponds to only the 
sixth through eighth senses.288 Further, only sense eight suggests art as 
                                                                                                                                         
ingly, these trends are quite different from the period arts and trades practiced by artisans at historical 
sites such as Colonial Williamsburg and Plimoth Plantation. 
 282. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 281. 
 283. See, e.g., Evelyn M. Rusli, Tech Cash Pours Into Food Start-Ups, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443675404578060722851040736. Nathan Myhrvold, of 
both Microsoft and Intellectual Ventures fame, and co-authors joined the high tech chef movement 
with a massive six-volume, 2,400 page cookbook. See NATHAN MYHRVOLD ET AL., MODERNIST 
CUISINE: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF COOKING (2011). 
 284. William Deresiewicz, The Death of the Artist------and the Birth of the Creative Entrepreneuer, 
THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 28, 2014, http://m.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-death-of-the-
artist-and-the-birth-of-the-creative-entrepreneur/383497/. 
 285. ‘‘1. Skill in doing something, esp. as the result of knowledge or practice. . . . 2. Skill in the 
practical application of the principles of a particular field of knowledge or learning; technical skill. . . . 
3. . . . a. A practical application of knowledge; (hence) something which can be achieved or understood 
by the employment of skill and knowledge; (in early use also) a body or system of rules serving to fa-
cilitate the carrying out of certain principles. . . . b. A practical pursuit or trade of a skilled nature, a 
craft; an activity that can be achieved or mastered by the application of specialist skills; (also) any one 
of the useful arts . . . . c. A company of craftsmen; a guild. . . . 4. With modifying word or words denot-
ing skill in a particular craft, profession, or other sphere of activity. . . . 5. An acquired ability of any 
kind; a skill at doing a specified thing, typically acquired through study and practice; a knack.’’ See 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2014). 
 286. Id. at sense 2. 
 287. Id. at sense 3(b). 
 288. ‘‘6. Skill in an activity regarded as governed by aesthetic as well as organizational princi-
ples. . . . 7. . . . Any of various pursuits or occupations in which creative or imaginative skill is applied 
according to aesthetic principles (formerly often defined in terms of ‘taste’ . . .) . . . the various branch-
es of creative activity, as painting, sculpture, music, literature, dance, drama, oratory, etc. . . . . a. The 
expression or application of creative skill and imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting, 
drawing, or sculpture, producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional pow-
er. Also: such works themselves considered collectively. . . . b. The theory and practice of the visual 
arts as a subject of study or examination; (also) a class or lesson in art.’’ Id. 
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‘‘works’’ (meaning artifacts).289 The OED links this sense to the definition 
of ‘‘work’’ which includes senses for various works of fine and creative 
arts among many other senses.290 Indeed, the bulk of senses for denoting 
artifacts resulting from the broad definition of arts is within the defini-
tion of ‘‘work’’ instead.291 The fuzzy, mysterious sense of art does not 
even directly appear in the OED.292 Rather, the remaining two categories 
of senses pertain to learning (as in the ‘‘liberal arts’’) and cunning or hu-
man agency.293 
Nonetheless, in American popular usage ‘‘art’’ is hopelessly en-
meshed in the fine arts. Just think about what is covered in the ‘‘arts’’ sec-
tion of a newspaper or in a television local newscast. While there is little 
chance of fully reviving the techné sense of art, the current interest in ar-
tisanal goods is at least making it easier to explain that earlier sense of art 
without seeming completely crazy. 
III. THE ROLE OF ‘‘ART’’ IN EARLY PATENT SYSTEMS 
The Italian Renaissance produced the first invention patents, driven 
by the new ingeniators. While English rulers are reported to have granted 
exclusive rights to artisans as early as the thirteenth century, these were 
‘‘patents of importation’’ to incentivize an artisan skilled in an art not yet 
practiced in England to establish it there.294 In Florence, Brunelleschi’s 
status allowed him to petition the government for a grant of exclusive 
rights for a new cargo boat he claimed to have invented. Operating out-
side of the guilds, he would not be able to rely on the regulations normal-
ly protecting practice of an art. Plus, his invention was embodied in the 
boat itself-----not the methods of producing it-----so that secrecy would have 
had limited value. In 1421, he was awarded the exclusive right to build 
                                                                                                                                         
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. at senses 9--16. 
 292. Origins of this sense may be from misinterpretations over time of words and phrases such as 
mystery and art and mystery which were used to signify orders or guilds of tradesmen and skill at prac-
ticing their trade. But mystery in these usages did not mean mystical or a puzzle or hidden knowledge, 
but rather simply a kind of office------like ministry or ministerial------in practicing a trade or skill. See 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2014). There may also be a connection with an alternate 
definition of mystery that signifies a skillful trade or operation that is kept secret, as had often been the 
case during the height of the guild system in Europe. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 
2014). But this had nothing to do whether the practice was fuzzy or mysterious to those to whom it was 
shown. 
 293. Id. at senses 10 and 11--12, respectively. 
 294. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 59, at 10; P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 292, 293 (1929). Patents of importation took two forms. The first granted exclusive 
rights to a foreign artisan to relocate to England, set up shop, and train local apprentices. The second 
granted exclusive rights to an Englishman who would travel to the foreign land, master the art, and 
then bring it back to England. In both cases, British apprentices would have to be trained to continue 
the art. Similar grants are reported to have issued elsewhere. While the value of such patents may 
seem suspect, they are justified when one takes into account the centrality of procedural knowledge 
for mechanical and early mechanical arts. It was simply impossible to transmit the art by codified 
knowledge alone. 
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and operate any new kinds of boats on the Arno River for three years.295 
Crucially, Brunelleschi was not seeking an incentive to create, but rather 
an incentive to disclose or to commercialize. 
While Florence did not immediately follow up this grant with oth-
ers, Venice was establishing an administrative process to grant similar 
rights to ingeniators outside the guild system in the mid-fifteenth centu-
ry.296 This led to the first true patent system, ultimately codified in the 
Venetian Patent Act of 1474.297 It exclusively used the terminology of art, 
and the arts provided the sole patent eligible subject matter.298 
Venetian artisans spread out across Europe bringing the legal inno-
vation of a patent system with them. In the seventeenth century, England 
appears to have added key aspects of the Venetian system to regularize 
its existing ad hoc patents of importation.299 England contributed the 
term ‘‘patents’’ as well: exclusive grants of public record from the Crown 
were included on the ‘‘patent rolls’’ that recorded every other issuance of 
‘‘open letters’’ (litterae patente) from the Crown (including titles, land, or 
other privileges); over time, the term ‘‘letters patent’’ was shortened to 
‘‘patents’’ and came to primarily signify the open letters granting exclu-
sive rights to inventions.300 Like the Venetian grants, British ‘‘patents’’ 
were directed to an art (or ‘‘mystery’’),301 and not to ‘‘technology’’ or ‘‘sci-
ence’’. Further, arts were methods, not artifacts.302 Because of this, key 
concepts in Anglo-American patent law have always centered on ‘‘art’’: 
‘‘prior art,’’ ‘‘person having ordinary skill in the "art,’’ ‘‘state of the art,’’ 
‘‘teaching in the art,’’ etc. 
                                                                                                                                         
 295. See Frank D. Prager, Brunelleschi’s Patent, 28 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 109, 109--10 (1946) (reprint-
ing text of grant). In the grant, he was described as ‘‘a man of the most perspicacious intellect, industry 
and of invention’’ who had invented a new boat that could haul loads more cheaply than existing 
boats. He ‘‘refuse[d] to make such machine available to the public, in order that the fruit of his genius 
and skill may not be reaped by another without his will and consent . . . .’’ But, if he would be granted 
‘‘some prerogative’’ on his invention, then ‘‘he would open up what he is hiding and would disclose it 
to all[,]’’ and would further be motivated ‘‘to even higher pursuits, and stimulated to more subtle in-
vestigations.’’ 
 296. See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 74, at 1269--70. 
 297. See id. Note that the Venetians did not refer to ‘‘patents,’’ and the name of the statute was 
given to it by later English speaking commentators. The statute itself has no title in its text. 
 298. Technology as a term and concept did not yet exist. Science------as a purely contemplative affair 
making a systematic study of a field or phenomena as object------had nothing to do with the practice of 
artisanal techniques, inventions, machines, or other practical matters. 
 299. See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 74, at 1270. 
 300. See CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH 
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, 10--11 (1988). Under the Tudors these grants became secret, albeit still 
with the purpose of luring in foreign artisans. Under Elizabeth I, the grants became open again. How-
ever, they became a powerful and controversial piece of patronage that she, and later King Charles, 
used to reward favorites. When the grants extended to existing commodities such as salt, they became 
quite unpopular and Parliament passed the 1624 Statute of Monopolies limiting them to new manufac-
tures and to those issued to corporations. 
 301. See supra note 292.  
 302. While the Statute of Monopolies technically precluded method patents, over time English 
jurists found ways to allow patents on methods through what today we might call ‘‘product by process’’ 
claim interpretations. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 628 (2010). 
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Standard patent and copyright histories place the antecedents of 
U.S. IP law in Britain,303 but a place must be made for the influence of the 
French philosophes.304 The Encyclopédie has ‘‘became almost synony-
mous with [the] Enlightenment,’’305 and ‘‘is generally agreed [to be] the 
most influential work published in the eighteenth century’’306 as ‘‘the 
epitome of the [French Enlightenment] philosophes achievement.’’307 It 
was also the ‘‘greatest publishing venture’’ of the eighteenth century giv-
en its ambitious number of volumes, lavishly illustrated plates, and wide 
subscription base.308 Madison, a key drafter of the IP Clause, owned a 
copy, and referenced it five times in the preparation of his memorandum 
‘‘Of Ancient & Modern Confederacies.’’309 Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin 
Franklin, John Adams, William Short, and John Randolph all held copies 
as well.310 And while some conservatives in America were alarmed by the 
antireligious views (and possible all-out atheism) in the Encyclopédie, 
and others held a dim view of French culture, the French Enlightenment 
was the ascendant intellectual trend of the time.311 Americans shared ide-
as about the rights of man with French thinkers, clearly influential to the 
framing of the Constitution,312 and were deeply indebted to Lafayette and 
the French forces for the victory against the British in the Revolutionary 
War. 
                                                                                                                                         
 303. See, e.g., ROBERT MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE (6th ed. 2012). I explain elsewhere that this Anglo-centric focus is likely due to path dependence 
emanating from early U.S. jurists reliance on British cases to help interpret the patent and copyright 
statutes (but not the IP Clause itself). See O’Connor, supra note 3, at 2. 
 304. This section is a summary of my arguments in The Overlooked French Influence on the Intel-
lectual Property Clause. See O’Connor, supra note 3. 
 305. YEO, supra note 155, at xii. 
 306. ABRAHAM WOLF, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 38--39 (1939) (‘‘With all its imperfections, the Encyclopédie was the greatest 
achievement of its kind, and the most potent influence on the Age of Enlightenment.’’). See also PAUL 
MERRILL SPURLIN, THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TIMES OF THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS 108 (1984) (‘‘The Encyclopédie was also an arsenal of philosophic thought in the 
Age of Reason.’’); id. (quoting IRA WADE, AN ANTHOLOGY OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRENCH 
LITERATURE (1930)) (‘‘This great work, wrote Ira Wade, ‘organized definitely the knowledge of the 
eighteenth century; it created a close organization of the more liberal thinkers of the century; and last-
ly, it welded the political, social and religious doctrines and theories into a compact whole.’’’). 
 307. HANNAM, supra note 53, at 3. 
 308. See SPURLIN, supra note 306, at 116--18. 
 309. Id. at 117. Madison received a copy from Jefferson in 1785, while the latter was minister to 
France. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 1, 1785), in JEFFERSON ABROAD 
24--27 (Douglas L. Wilson & Lucia Stanton eds., 1984). Further, Madison was part of a committee of 
the 1783 Continental Congress that made the first recommendation for a Library of Congress. As part 
of that, Madison and the committee created a list of 300 books that should be in that Library. First on 
the list was the abridged follow-up to the Encyclopédie, the ENCYCLOPÉDIE MÉTHODIQUE, OU PAR 
ORDRE DE MATIÈRES, published by Charles-Joseph Panckoucke. See Loren Eugene Smith, The Li-
brary List of 1783 (1969). CGU Theses & Dissertations. Paper 87, available at http://scholarship. 
claremont.edu/cgu_etd/87. 
 310. SPURLIN, supra note 306, at 117. As Governor of Virginia, Jefferson also bought a copy in 
1780 for the use of the public. Id. 
 311. See id. at 117--20. 
 312. Thanks to Geoff Turnovsky for reminding me of this connection. 
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The philosophes were highly supportive of ‘‘literary property,’’313 but 
their views on protection for inventions were less clear.314 Diderot was 
opposed to secrecy among artisans,315 and he espoused the openness of 
the stated norms of the new sciences for the arts.316 But the disclosure he 
sought could be achieved through a patent system.317 Further, the philos-
ophes advocated for attribution rights, which are often protected through 
IP or neighboring rights.318 Diderot also presaged arguments over attribu-
tion for inventions in the arts based on the alternately collaborative, 
competitive, and incremental nature of progress.319 
Regardless of the philosophes’ views on formal IP systems, the intel-
lectual framework and definitions of terms developed in the Ency-
clopédie may clear up many longstanding mysteries of the IP Clause.320 
Nearly every term in the Clause has vexed commentators and courts. I 
adopt the De Wolf/Lutz ‘‘parallel construction’’ view as a starting point.321 
This divides the IP Clause into two parallel grants: (1) ‘‘Congress shall 
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science . . ., by securing for 
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings’’; 
and (2) ‘‘Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of . . . 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Discoveries.’’322 The relevant definitions from the phi-
losophes and the Encyclopédie are: 
1. Progress. Quantifiable advancement in a field of human  
      endeavor.323 
2. Science. Systematic study and/or contemplation of a field.324 
                                                                                                                                         
 313. See Michel-Antoine David, Copyright, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & D'ALEMBERT 
COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (I.M.L. Donaldson trans., 2010) (1755), http://quod. 
lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0001.259?view=text;rgn=main; DENIS DIDEROT, LETTER ON THE 
PUBLISHING TRADE 30 (1767) (‘‘The author is master of his work, or nobody is master of his goods.’’).  
 314. See O’Connor, supra note 3, at 63--64. 
 315. Diderot, Art, supra note 163. 
 316. See Diderot, Encyclopedia, supra note 202. 
 317. See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 
J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132 (2002). 
 318. See D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123; Diderot, supra note 190; Jaucort, supra note 147. 
 319. Diderot, supra note 163. 
 320. See O’Connor, supra note 3, at 1. 
 321. See RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 14--15 (1925); Karl B. Lutz, 
Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U. S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 50, 51--52 (1949). 
 322. Id. Some commentators have sought to keep the preamble (‘‘To Promote the Progress of 
Science and Useful Arts’’) as a unitary purpose for both powers. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern 
‘‘Progress’’: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 114 (1993). 
 323. Fields within both ‘‘science’’ and the ‘‘useful arts’’ were generally quantifiable, while those in 
the Fine Arts were not. See D’ALEMBERT, supra note 123. Some recent scholars have argued for revi-
sionist meanings for ‘‘progress.’’ For example, Malla Pollock argues that progress meant ‘‘diffusion,’’ as 
in ‘‘the fire progressed across the room.’’ She derives this from some newspaper and dictionary usage 
of the time, but ignores the primary Enlightenment usage of educated thinkers given here. Malla Pol-
lack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining ‘‘Progress’’ in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755, 799 (2001). 
 324. See supra Part II. A number of commentators have sought to portray ‘‘science’’ to mean 
‘‘knowledge in any field.’’ See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 393, 396 (1960). But such use is hopelessly unlimited and could admit any kind of content under 
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3. Useful Arts. Any mechanical art, except for fine or decorative 
arts, that manipulates physical materials or forces for practical 
ends.325 
4. Authors. D’Alembert distinguished between authors and writers: 
the former conveying substantive, usually scientific, content, 
while the latter were belletrists concerned primarily with produc-
ing aesthetically appealing verse or text.326 
5. Writings. For authors, these would be limited to books, illustra-
tions, maps, charts, etc. that express the results of scientific in-
quiry (in the sense of systematic study or contemplation, not 
modern ‘‘Science’’).327 
6. Discoveries. The most important inventions, which must be curi-
ous, useful, and/or difficult to find.328 
Plugging these definitions into the IP Clause results in the following 
interpretation: (1) Congress can promote the progress of science by se-
curing exclusive rights, for limited times, in the writings of authors seek-
ing to convey substantive science content; and (2) Congress can promote 
the progress of useful arts by securing exclusive rights, for limited times, 
in the discoveries of inventors.329 
IV. CONFUSION STEMMING FROM SHIFTS BETWEEN ‘‘ART’’ AND 
‘‘SCIENCE’’/‘‘TECHNOLOGY’’ AS THE FOCUS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Early American patent law cases and treatises seemed clear that 
‘‘art’’ was the subject matter of the patent system. Further, the Patent 
Acts of 1790 and 1793 both referred exclusively to the ‘‘useful arts’’ and 
‘‘arts’’-----rather than ‘‘science’’ or ‘‘technology’’-----in their titles and provi-
sions.330 But as the nineteenth century progressed, it became less clear 
                                                                                                                                         
the rubric of ‘‘science.’’ This use might be salvaged to some degree if it were limited to the technical 
definition of ‘‘knowledge’’------‘‘justified true belief’’ (as opposed to belief or opinion)------but there is no 
indication that commentators such as Rich use the term this way. Plus, if knowledge = science, then 
what is ‘‘scientific knowledge’’? 
 325. See supra Part II. 
 326. See Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Writer, Author, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT & 
D’ALEMBERT COLLABORATIVE TRANSLATION PROJECT (Erik Anspach trans., 2011), 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/did2222.0001.683?view=text;rgn=main. For example, d’Alembert clas-
ses Voltaire and Racine as writers, while Descartes and Newton are authors. This accords well with 
Kenrick’s views as well. See supra note 206. Both d’Alembert and Kenrick seem to hold Newton’s 
writing style and skill in quite low regard, even as they obviously respect him deeply as a thinker and 
scientist. 
 327. See id. 
 328. See supra Part II. 
 329. Regardless of the status of literary property for published works, or of exclusive natural or 
common law rights for disclosed inventions, there was general consensus that authors and inventors 
had natural or common law rights to unpublished writings and undisclosed inventions. But this was as 
much based on early notions of privacy or secrecy rights, rooted in the liberty and autonomy of indi-
viduals: i.e., the individual could not be forced to disclose his private thoughts or personal effects. 
Oddly, Diderot appears to be the only thinker of the time suggesting forced disclosure of trade secrets 
in some instances. 
 330. See Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793); Patent Act of Feb. 21, 
1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). 
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whether just the ‘‘useful arts,’’ or a combination of that and ‘‘science,’’ 
were the object of the patent system. Following the profound shifts in the 
terms ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘science’’-----and the rise of ‘‘technology’’-----leading into 
the twentieth century, patent cases and commentary lost ‘‘art’’ as the ob-
ject of the patent system. This Part documents those changes. 
A. Nineteenth Century Cases and Commentary Continue Mechanical 
Arts Sense of ‘‘Useful Arts.’’ 
Thomas Fessenden’s 1810 treatise used a number of key terms in 
line with the times:331 ‘‘authors’’ were the authority under which discover-
ies, inventions, and improvements in the arts were made;332 ‘‘reflection’’ 
and ‘‘philosophical study’’ meant scientific inquiry;333 and, interchangea-
bly, ‘‘useful arts,’’ ‘‘arts,’’ and ‘‘mechanical arts’’ meant the mechanical 
arts minus the fine arts.334 Fessenden suggested that patents be restricted 
to practical applications of scientific principles-----a novel idea that may 
have set the stage for the later technological arts test.335 
Early U.S. patent cases seemed confused as to whether ‘‘science’’ 
and the ‘‘useful arts’’ should be separate or combined subject matter(s) 
for exclusive rights in the IP Clause. Pennock v. Dialogue implied that 
‘‘science and useful arts’’ was a unitary goal that Congress was to pro-
mote.336 But McClurg v. Kingsland ruled that Congress’s power was ple-
nary under the IP Clause, and so it did not matter what constituted ‘‘sci-
ence’’ or the ‘‘useful arts.’’337 In a dissent to the copyright case Wheaton v. 
Peters, Justice Thompson gave what appears to be the first articulation of 
the IP Clause as comprised of two separate powers: one for patents to 
promote useful arts; and the other for copyrights to promote science.338 
Notwithstanding the unitary/distributive/plenary IP Clause preamble de-
bates, no court or commentator was proposing that ‘‘science’’ was the ex-
clusive object of the patent system under the IP Clause; rather the only 
question was whether something in addition to the useful arts was its  
object. 
                                                                                                                                         
 331. See FESSENDEN, supra note 249. 
 332. See, e.g., id. at ix, xxvii. 
 333. See, e.g., id. at xxix. 
 334. See, e.g., id. at ix (‘‘The course of [the Author’s] inquiries led him to observe that the authors 
of the most useful discoveries, inventions, and improvements in the arts, but rarely meet with the re-
ward either of fame or profit, which their industry and ingenuity merit.’’). 
 335. See, e.g., id. at 79. 
 336. 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829). However, the Supreme Court was not consistent on this point. Compare 
Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1082 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585) 
(using the phrase ‘‘to promote the progress of the useful arts’’), with Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 
755,756 (Story, J., Circuit Justice C.C.D. Mass 1833) (No. 326) (using the phrase ‘‘to promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts’’), and Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (Story, Circuit Justice 
C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1518) (using the phrase ‘‘to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts’’). 
 337. 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843). 
 338. 33 U.S. 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting).  
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Later nineteenth century IP treatises maintained the focus on 
‘‘art.’’339 Walker’s 1883 patent law treatise expressly tackled the meaning 
of the terms ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘discovery’’ in the IP Clause. The ‘‘useful arts’’ 
were distinct from both ‘‘science’’ and ‘‘fine arts.’’340 ‘‘Discoveries’’ was 
simply synonymous with ‘‘inventions.’’341 He was ambiguous as to wheth-
er the Clause was unitary or distributive.342 Finally, Walker also followed 
Fessenden in suggesting that scientifically informed advances in the arts 
should be the focus of the patent system without using the term ‘‘tech-
nology.’’343 This again indicates that the new concept of ‘‘technology’’ was 
advancing rapidly, likely because of the impressive results of the nine-
teenth century industrialists. 
Merwin’s treatise of the same year provided an interesting account 
of ‘‘discoveries’’ as a class of inventions establishing practical applications 
of newly discovered scientific principles.344 Like Fessenden and Walker, 
however, he did not use the term ‘‘technology,’’ but rather continued us-
ing ‘‘useful arts’’ or ‘‘arts’’ for the subject matter of patents. ‘‘Invention’’ 
and ‘‘discovery’’ were still treated as synonyms under the Clause.345 As an 
alternative, however, he also gave a definition of ‘‘discovery’’ that echoed 
the Encyclopédie definition (the ‘‘most important inventions’’), even as 
he seemed unaware of the exact origins.346 
Robinson’s massive 1890 treatise stood in a class all its own.347 He 
adopted a unitary approach to the IP Clause preamble.348 But he blamed 
                                                                                                                                         
 339. Key treatises included GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
(1847); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (1849) (‘‘If, therefore, the subject of the patent be an art, it 
must be an art actually put in practice and unknown before . . . .’’); HENRY CHILDS MERWIN, THE 
PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS (1883); ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1889). 
 340. In line with centuries of use, Walker used ‘‘art’’ to mean any practical application of natural 
materials or forces for human benefit. See WALKER, supra note 339, at 2--4. 
 341. His argument seemed to be that when ‘‘inventors’’ make ‘‘discoveries’’ the latter are simply 
‘‘inventions’’ or newly created things. When others make ‘‘discoveries,’’ the results are uncovered ex-
isting things like new lands or laws of nature. But he does not explain why the Framers would not have 
then used ‘‘inventions.’’ Id. at 2--3. Walker was also trying to address the problem that ‘‘invention’’ 
meant any kind of newly created physical or mental thing, not just mechanical inventions. He also 
sought to advance a standard of ‘‘invention’’ that required genius or non-obviousness and not mere 
novelty, similar to that in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). See Walker, supra note 339 at 
27. 
 342. Compare id. at 1 (‘‘Congress has power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their respective discoveries.’’), with id. at 
62 (‘‘The useful arts are those that Congress is authorized by the Constitution to promote . . . .’’). 
 343. See id. at 2--15. 
 344. MERWIN, supra note 339, at 3--4. 
 345. Id. at 4 n.3. 
 346. ‘‘Sometimes it is said that the difference between discovery and invention is one of degree 
simply; that a discovery is a great advance in the arts, an invention, a slight advance; and therefore, it is 
said, the patent for a discovery includes a great deal, but that for an invention very little.’’ Id. at 8. Ul-
timately, Merwin did not put much stock in the Framers’ choice of words and disregarded the ‘‘impos-
sible proposition that inventions and discoveries are the same.’’ Id. at 4 n.3. 
 347. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS (1890). Robinson 
was the only academic of the nineteenth century IP treatise writers. Like Christopher Columbus 
Langdell at Harvard, he represented the apogee of the ‘‘legal science’’ movement. 
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the Clause for the expectation that patents and copyright should be 
treated as similar doctrines, when they have different historical and theo-
retical foundations.349 He used ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘arts’’ only for the useful arts (or 
as he called them, the ‘‘industrial arts’’) and not the ‘‘fine’’ arts.350 
Through the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court continued 
using the established senses of ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘science.’’ Baker v. Selden, an 
1879 copyright case, provides a great example through its famous quote: 
‘‘Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common 
property of the whole world, any author has the right to express the one, 
or explain and use the other, in his own way.’’351 While this quote is of 
course important for its role in explicating the idea-expression dichotomy 
in copyright law, it reveals the art-science worldview of the Court. 
‘‘Truths of a science’’ suggest the purely contemplative epistemé science 
that was transitioning from Enlightenment ‘‘science’’ to modern basic re-
search natural sciences.352 The focus was on eternally true natural laws, 
like an updated version of Aristotle’s strict epistemé. This was not, then, 
the broad sense of ‘‘science’’ as any systematic study of a field. It seems 
to indicate the narrowing view of ‘‘science’’ to our current capital S ‘‘Sci-
ence.’’353 ‘‘Methods of an art’’-----in this case bookkeeping-----suggests tech-
né art that was practical and could be taught so that others could practice 
                                                                                                                                         
 348. ROBINSON, supra note 347, at 35 (‘‘[T]he progress of science and art is promoted by securing 
to inventors these exclusive privileges . . . .’’). 
 349. Id. At the same time, he acknowledged some similarity in that inventors can be creators (and 
‘‘discoverers’’), and authors can be ‘‘discoverers’’ compiling, abridging, or editing what others created. 
 350. See, e.g., id. at 44. 
 351. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100--01, 105 (1879). The Court also distinguished the useful arts 
from taste-based arts, implicitly referencing the old Aristotelian category of arts of pleasure: ‘‘[T]hese 
observations [that copyrighted matter cannot preclude practice of the underlying system] are not in-
tended to apply to ornamental designs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may 
be said, that their form is their essence, and their object, the production of pleasure in their contempla-
tion.’’ Id. at 103--04. 
 352. Id. at 100. 
 353. In fact, the Baker Court cites Justice Thompson from Clayton v. Stone, 5 Fed. Cas. 999 
(Thompson, Circuit Justice C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872), to underscore its sense of ‘‘science’’ in the 
IP Clause (and Copyright Act) as epistemé science: 
The [Copyright Act] was passed in execution of the [IP Clause] power here given, and the object, 
therefore, was the promotion of science; and it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of 
the sciences to consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as falling within 
any class of them. They are of a more fixed, permanent, and durable character. The term ‘science’ 
cannot, with any propriety, by applied to a work of so fluctuating and fugitive a form as that of a 
newspaper or price-current, the subject-matter of which is daily changing, and is of mere tempo-
rary use. Although great praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in 
publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this way: it must 
seek patronage and protection from its utility to the public, and not a work of science. The title of 
the act of Congress is, ‘for the encouragement of learning,’ and was not intended for the encour-
agement of mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences. . . . We are, accordingly, 
of opinion that the paper in question is not a book the copyright to which can be secured under 
the act of Congress. 
Id. at 105--106 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). ‘‘Utility to the public’’ suggests that a patent 
should have been sought, if any exclusive rights, for the information------although this would have been 
an uphill battle. Equally important, ‘‘work of science’’ comports with the sense that the ‘‘output’’ of 
‘‘science’’ (especially epistemé science) was written works, such as treatises. But Clayton was written in 
1829 under the earlier Copyright Acts that were still limited to maps, books, charts, and engravings------
and not extending to all of the fine arts as system for protection of creative works.  
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it: ‘‘the teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art have 
their final end in application and use.’’ Central to an ‘‘art’’ are its meth-
ods, not any particular artifacts its practice may produce. Emphasizing 
the practical application of contemplative scientific knowledge, the Court 
thus edged towards the concept of technology, without using the term.354 
Codification is an instrumental intermediary in both cases. One 
could have exclusive rights to the particular codification (qua writing) 
under copyright law, but this did not extend to either the underlying ab-
stract propositional statements/knowledge of science or the procedural 
memory (know-how) of practicing an art. From the patent side, an issued 
patent could grant exclusive rights to the practice of a claimed art, but it 
did not grant exclusive rights over the codification of that practice.355 Ex-
pressly adopting Justice Thomson’s earlier distributive interpretation of 
the IP Clause, the Baker Court ruled that copyrights were limited to 
‘‘writings’’ to promote the progress of science.356 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, another copyright case, 
adopted an older traditional definition of ‘‘author’’ as ‘‘he to whom any-
thing owes it origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of sci-
ence or literature.’’357 This may strike us as odd today, but it was the long-
standing definition of the term until the Romantic notion of the author as 
someone engaged in singular creative expression eclipsed it around the 
time of this decision. Thus, the Court also refers to ‘‘authors’’ of ‘‘inven-
tions.’’358 The opinion seems to signal a coming transition in that the 
Court uses ‘‘art’’ in both its mechanical arts and fine arts senses. 
B. The Turning Point: The Supreme Court Seeks to Define ‘‘Fine Art’’ 
The clear transition came in the infamous 1892 case of United States 
v. Perry, in which the Court undertook a much-criticized effort to define 
‘‘fine art.’’359 This may seem wildly ambitious or even foolhardy from a 
modern perspective-----when great minds debate ‘‘what is Art?’’-----but in 
historical context it may have been reasonable to identify that a subclass 
of arts was distinguishable from the rest as solely or predominantly hav-
                                                                                                                                         
 354. ‘‘The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive 
right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain 
them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.’’ Id. at 103. 
 355. ‘‘The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no 
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of 
the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be 
secured at all, by letters-patent.’’ Id. at 105. This issue is still sometimes raised today, through claims 
that the patent document itself, as a writing of the inventor and her attorney, is the subject of copy-
right as well. But this underscores the copyright-patent line: any control of the codification is con-
trolled, if at all, via copyright, not patent. 
 356. Id. (quoting Clayton, 5 Fed. Cas. At 1003). This was effectively the same as his interpretation 
of the IP Clause in his Wheaton dissent. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 684 (1834) (Thompson, J., 
dissenting). 
 357. 111 U.S. 53, 57--58 (1884) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 358. Id. at 60. 
 359. 146 U.S. 71 (1892). 
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ing aesthetic, not utilitarian, ends. After all, aesthetics and value theory 
had only just permeated the popular culture earlier that century.360 Fur-
ther the Perry Court had a very technical, yet pressing, matter to decide: 
whether stained glass imported for churches was a commercial manufac-
ture or a ‘‘work of art’’ for purposes of imposition of tariffs.361 Thus, the 
issue of defining ‘‘art’’ must be laid at Congress’ feet in enacting this 
scheme, which the Court then had to interpret. The Court grappled with 
essentially three levels of ‘‘art:’’ (1) ordinary handicraft that would not 
rise to the level of a ‘‘work of art;’’ (2) artisanal work produced by 
trained craftsmen that would be a ‘‘work of art,’’ but not in the same class 
as that of a ‘‘great master of the art of painting;’’ and (3) masterpiece 
works of art by the likes of Rembrandt and Murillo.362 It sought to classi-
fy works in level (ii) as decorative or industrial arts and not fine arts.363 It 
then created a four-part classification of ‘‘works of art’’: 
(1) The fine arts, properly so called, intended solely for orna-
mental purposes, and including paintings in oil and water, 
upon canvas, plaster, or other materials, and original statuary 
or marble, stone, or bronze. . . . 
(2) Minor objects of art, intended also for ornamental purposes, 
such as statuettes, vases, plaques, drawings, etchings, and the 
thousand and one articles which pass under the general name 
of bric-a-brac, and are susceptible of an indefinite reproduc-
tion from the original. 
(3) Objects of art, which serve primarily an ornamental, and in-
cidentally a useful, purpose, such as painted or stained-glass 
windows, tapestry, paper hangings, etc. 
(4) Objects primarily designed for a useful purpose, but made 
ornamental to please the eye and gratify the taste, such as 
ornamental clocks, the higher grade of carpets, curtains, gas 
fixtures, and household and table furniture.364 
The controversial part was that the Court asserted objects in (1) as those 
‘‘alone recognized as belonging to the domain of high art.’’365 But the 
Court may not have been making a questionable judgment call about 
aesthetic value. Rather, its four-part scheme broke along two main fac-
tors in much discussion at the time: degree of utilitarian function and of 
                                                                                                                                         
 360. See Kristeller, supra note 12, at 496. 
 361. If the former, the tariff applied; if the latter, and based on its importation solely for use in a 
religious institution, the glass was exempted. 146 U.S. at 72--74. As background context, the tariffs 
were said to protect a nascent stained glass artisanal industry in the U.S. Id. The issue was driven in 
part by a provision in the 1874 amendment to the 1870 Copyright Act that required pictorial illustra-
tions such as engravings, cuts, and prints to be ‘‘connected to the fine arts’’ to be eligible for copyright 
protection. 18 Stat. 78, § 3 (1874). 
 362. 146 U.S. at 74. 
 363. Id.  
 364. Id. at 74--75. 
 365. Id. at 75. 
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mass production.366 Things with utilitarian function suggested they might 
be more ‘‘manufactures’’-----and thus best protectable under design pa-
tents specifically established by Congress for this purpose-----than ‘‘works 
of art’’ protectable by copyright. Mass production also suggested classic 
‘‘manufactures,’’ and not individual works of creative expression. In fact, 
this was the very struggle at the heart of the Arts and Crafts movement: 
utilitarian objects can and should also be works of art, but only where 
they were handcrafted by master artisans with equal focus on aesthetics 
and function.367 This provides crucial context for the Court’s taxonomy. 
Ultimately, the Perry Court may not have realized that it was really 
grappling with the changing sense of the term ‘‘art’’ itself, as well as with 
changing perceptions of the Constitutional scope of ‘‘authors’’ and ‘‘writ-
ings’’ and what was being promoted by granting exclusive rights. This, af-
ter all, was essentially the same Court that was still (quite correctly) re-
ferring to patentable inventions as mechanical or useful ‘‘art.’’368 But the 
Court began mentioning ‘‘science’’ as relevant to patentable inventions 
during this period as well.369 Thus, with some poetic justice, the turn of 
the century represented the turning point to our modern sense that pa-
tents are about science and technology while copyrights are about (fine) 
arts. 
The transition accelerated on the copyright side after the turn of the 
century. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Court held that 
lithographed circus advertisement posters were works of (fine) art within 
the subject matter of the pre-1909 Copyright Act.370 It also clarified that it 
was not attempting to make aesthetic value judgments about ‘‘art.’’ But it 
evinced the confusion inherent in now having copyright cover ‘‘art’’ at all 
by extending copyrightable subject matter to include the ‘‘useful arts’’: 
‘‘[w]e shall do no more than mention the suggestion that painting and 
engraving, unless for a mechanical end are not among the useful arts, the 
progress of which Congress is empowered by the Constitution to pro-
mote. The Constitution does not limit the useful to that which satisfies 
immediate bodily needs.’’371 Justice Harlan, dissenting otherwise on the 
basis that a mere advertisement could not have the intrinsic value re-
quired for a work of fine art, agreed that the purpose of copyright law 
under the IP Clause was to promote the progress of the useful arts.372 
                                                                                                                                         
 366. See supra Part II. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See, e.g., United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586 (1899); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 
192, 199--200 (1882). 
 369. See, e.g., Duell, 172 U.S. at 586. 
 370. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 371. Id. at 249.  
 372. Id. at 251--52 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (‘‘‘What we hold is this: That if a chromo, lithograph, or 
other print, engraving, or picture has no other use than that of a mere advertisement, and no value 
aside from this function, it would not be promotive of the useful arts, within the meaning of the consti-
tutional provision, to protect the ‘author’ in the exclusive use thereof . . . .’’’) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1900)). 
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This is all quite curious. The Court and dissent seem aware of the 
sense of ‘‘useful arts’’ as practical artisanal methods and artifacts, but be-
lieves that the compound term does not have to be limited to those. The 
term can also include fine and commercial visual artworks. But given the 
longstanding earlier sense of ‘‘art,’’ why would the Framers have used the 
qualifier ‘‘useful’’ at all? One might suggest, from today’s creative arts 
copyright perspective, that the Court here is using ‘‘useful arts’’ as a way 
of extending copyright coverage from the fine arts to commercial arts 
(with the latter commercially ‘‘useful’’ in a way that fine arts might not 
be). But the Court’s reference to ‘‘bodily needs’’ points away from this. 
Or, at the very least, if ‘‘useful arts’’ is construed to include both mechan-
ical and commercial arts, where do the fine arts come in then? In what 
sense are they ‘‘useful,’’ given the convention that useful meant ‘‘practi-
cal’’? Or would they have to then come under ‘‘science’’ (an equally du-
bious proposition)? The likely account is that the Court has had the 
ground shifted out from under it by the changed senses of ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘sci-
ence’’ and is now trying to make sense of the only place the word ‘‘art’’ 
appears in the IP Clause. Thus began one of the modern IP Clause inter-
pretation trends to simply read out or gloss over the qualifier ‘‘useful.’’ 
Ultimately the Court rejected any value call between ‘‘low’’ and 
‘‘high’’ art by those ‘‘trained only to the law,’’ and instead made the dis-
tinction rely on the intended use of the work.373 They quoted Arts and 
Crafts leader John Ruskin for their reluctance to make a value judgment 
on whether something was ‘‘high’’ or ‘‘low’’ art:  
If any young person, after being taught what is, in polite circles, 
called ‘‘drawing,’’ will try to copy the commonest piece of real 
work,-----suppose a lithograph on the title page of a new opera air, or 
a woodcut in the cheapest illustrated newspaper of the day-----they 
will find themselves entirely beaten.374 
Following Perry in part, however, the Bleistein Court ruled that some 
utilitarian function of the work did not disqualify it from protection, ra-
ther the test was whether the ‘‘work’’ was part of an article of manufac-
ture and served merely an ornamental or identifying (as in branding) 
function for an otherwise purely functional object.375 
C. Three Waves of IP Clause Interpretation Affecting ‘‘Art,’’ ‘‘Science,’’ 
and the Patent System 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, courts and commentators 
sought more comprehensive interpretations of the IP Clause than those 
attempted in the nineteenth century. These interpretations can be divid-
ed into three chronological waves, stimulated by particular legislation or 
                                                                                                                                         
 373. Id. at 250--52 (‘‘The antithesis to ‘illustrations or works connected with the fine arts’ [in the 
Copyright Act] is not works of little merit or humble degree, or illustrations addressed to the less edu-
cated classes; it is ‘prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.’’’). 
 374. Id. at 250. 
 375. Id. at 251. 
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Supreme Court cases. This Section provides a brief overview of the three 
waves to show the continued evolution of ‘‘art,’’ ‘‘science,’’ ‘‘technology,’’ 
and the patent system.376 
Setting the stage in the first decade of the twentieth were Continen-
tal Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., and the 1909 Copyright Act. 
In Continental Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court considered whether 
the intentional nonuse of a patent promoted the progress of (science 
and) useful arts.377 The Court seemed indeterminate as to whether the IP 
Clause preamble was unitary or distributed.378 But it also showed the in-
creasing trend to read out the term useful: ‘‘a number of cases which 
bring out clearly the services rendered by an inventor to the arts and sci-
ences.’’379 The House Report on the 1909 Copyright Act treated the IP 
Clause preamble as unitary-----even as the subject matter of copyright was 
much of the fine arts, with no mention of ‘‘science’’-----and thus as limiting 
Congress’ power to acts which promoted both the progress of science 
and useful arts.380 This further confused things, although it might work in 
the sense that copyrights should cover both scientific and (useful) artistic 
writings, while patents might then cover both scientific and (useful) artis-
tic processes and products. One can imagine some problems with this in 
practice, however. 
1. The First Wave 
The first wave of IP Clause literature is marked by a series of arti-
cles, mainly written by IP practitioners, that sought to create a sorely 
lacking history of IP generally, and the meaning and impact of the IP 
Clause specifically. George Ramsey introduced the ‘‘Pinckney Thesis,’’ 
giving Pinckney equal credit with Madison for the various proposals that 
led to the IP Clause.381 Richard De Wolf then introduced the term ‘‘bal-
anced sentence’’ for the distributive interpretation of the Clause.382 
‘‘Writings’’ were supposed to be ‘‘important’’ works ‘‘worthy of protec-
                                                                                                                                         
 376. This Section is summarized from Sean M. O’Connor, An Intellectual History of IP Clause 
Interpretations (on file with author). 
 377. 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
 378. Compare id. at 422 (‘‘[E]xecuting the purpose of the [IP Clause] to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive rights to their respective 
discoveries . . . .’’) (emphasis added), with id. at 423 (‘‘[I]t is urged the non-use of an invention . . . is 
not to promote the progress of the useful arts . . . .’’) (emphasis added). 
 379. Id. at 424 (emphasis added). 
 380. H. REPT. NO. 60-2222, at 6--7, 14 (1909). ‘‘Writings’’ and ‘‘authors’’ were as defined in Bur-
row-Giles, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Id. at 2--3. 
 381. George Ramsey, Scope of United States Patent Protection, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 371, 375--78 
(1919). It is not clear whether Ramsey was familiar with Judge Nott’s book on Pinckney that had been 
published a decade earlier. Ramsey was familiar with Nott’s related views as expressed in McKeever. 
See George Ramsey, Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 17--18 (1936). He 
adopted the pre-existing rights view of ‘‘securing’’ in the IP Clause, despite Wheaton, and treated the 
preamble as unitary. 
 382. Explaining it as a form of grammatical parallel construction ‘‘so much used in the days of the 
colonial worthies,’’ he broke it out as the two intertwined grants we think of today. DE WOLF, supra 
note 277, at 15. But he provided no support for his claim of its popularity in colonial times. 
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tion,’’ even as he acknowledged that courts had failed to do this.383 He 
nicely captured the changing senses of ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘science,’’ but intro-
duced the over-inclusive historical claim that the latter simply meant 
‘‘learning in general.’’384 Karl Fenning published the first article exclusive-
ly dedicated to the history and analysis of the IP Clause.385 P.J. Federico 
established acknowledged Continental precedents for patents generally, 
but focused on the British system as the only formal antecedent for the 
U.S. system.386 
Also part of the first wave, Frank Prager produced a number of rig-
orous IP history articles in the 1940s and 50s. He cited French philosophe 
and Encyclopédie editor Denis Diderot as a staunch supporter of literary 
property rights,387 and linked the preambles in four of the pre-
Constitution state copyright statutes to Diderot’s statement in the Letter 
on the Book Trade.388 Unwittingly, Prager also showed the transition 
from ‘‘art’’ to ‘‘technology’’ in the patent literature as he used the terms 
interchangeably with no explication of either.389 Zimmerman had used 
the neologism ‘‘technology’’ the same year the Constitution was drafted, 
and Bigelow had been pushing for its widespread adoption since the ear-
ly nineteenth century, but it had made little headway at first in the pub-
                                                                                                                                         
 383. Id. at 2, 24--26 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)). 
For the Framers, De Wolf believed that the sole category was books of a scientific nature. 
 384. De Wolf described it thus: 
Lawyers, textbook writers and even judges sometimes seem to have the impression that the prop-
osition is the other way about------that science is to be promoted through patent protection and use-
ful arts through copyright. But when the Constitution was adopted, the word science did not have 
the specific meaning which it has today------that of natural science. It meant learning in general. 
And on the other hand, the word art was not so closely associated as it now is with the fine arts. 
One occasionally finds references to the useful arts as being within the scope of copyright protec-
tion on account of their having been mentioned in the Constitutional provision referred to. It is 
doubtful, however, whether the framers of the Constitution had any such idea. 
Id. at 15--16. 
 385. Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 11 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 438 (1929). He also produced a history of copyright before the Constitution that intro-
duced robust primary source historical research to the IP literature. Karl Fenning, Copyright Before 
the Constitution, PUBLISHER’S WEEKLY, Sep. 29, 1928, reprinted in 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 379 (1935). 
 386. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, supra note 294, at 295. He noted that ‘‘inven-
tion’’ had a broader meaning in the colonial period, but did not specify what that was. P. J. Federico, 
The First Patent Act, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237 (1932). 
 387. Id. at 732--33. Reprinting a translation of Diderot’s Letter on the Book Trade, Prager praised 
it as a key turning point in IP history. Diderot’s success, according to Prager, was to establish IP rights 
within the other Enlightenment rights of man necessary for a free and just society. Prager also cited 
Quesnay, Turgot, and the Physiocrats as friends of IP because they were also attacking mercantilism. 
Id. at 733--34. 
 388. Prager restated it as ‘‘that no one is so clearly the master of his goods as a man is the master 
of the products of the labor of his mind.’’ Id. at 738. The Massachusetts statute is typical: ‘‘there being 
no property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labor of his mind.’’ Id. at 
758 (reprinting Massachusetts copyright statute). But this actually seems to more directly flow from 
the Encyclopédie entry Copyright, written by Michel-Antoine David, one of the Paris publishers of the 
Encyclopédie: ‘‘If there is on earth any state of freedom it is assuredly that of men of letters: if Nature 
contains anything whose ownership cannot be disputed with those who possess it, it must be these 
products of the mind.’’ David, supra note 313. Both Diderot’s Letter and David’s Copyright entry were 
published well before the state copyright statutes: 1767 for the Letter and 1755 for Copyright; whereas 
the relevant state statutes were enacted from 1783--86. 
 389. See, e.g., id. at 713, 714, 720 (using ‘‘art’’ for mechanical arts in the first two cited pages, but 
using ‘‘technology’’ in the latter one). 
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lic. Even after the public started using it in the late nineteenth century, 
the term was disfavored by patent law judges, practitioners, and academ-
ics until well into the twentieth century. This could be because the older 
sense of ‘‘art’’ was so well entrenched-----and well functioning-----for the pa-
tent community’s purposes. 
In mid-century, courts and commentators confronted the question 
of a Constitutional ‘‘standard of invention’’ that required more than mere 
novelty for patentability.390 To counter this, and the concomitant chal-
lenge that science was in fact the object of patents (rather than the useful 
arts), Karl Lutz cemented the ‘‘balanced sentence’’ and ‘‘science as learn-
ing in general’’ interpretations in the modern patent literature.391 Follow-
ing Prager, he now expressly defined ‘‘useful arts’’ as ‘‘technology.’’392 At 
the opposite extreme, Justices Douglas and Black gave a bizarre reading 
of the IP Clause in their concurrence in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.393 They interpreted the IP Clause to 
restrict patents to those inventions that ‘‘push back the frontiers of chem-
istry, physics, and the like’’ and that made ‘‘a distinctive contribution to 
scientific knowledge.’’394 This misunderstood the sense of ‘‘science’’ at the 
time of the Framers. Compounding this, and missing the useful arts ori-
gins of patents, they further (incorrectly) explained that ‘‘The Constitu-
tion never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets.’’395 Around the same time, 
E. Burke Inlow published an oft-cited book that focused on the devel-
opment of patents as economic policies.396 While most of it reiterated es-
tablished colonial and state IP history, as well as IP Clause history, it 
contributed an argument that ‘‘inventions’’ meant ‘‘manufactures,’’ and 
                                                                                                                                         
 390. See, e.g., Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 88--91 (1941) (institut-
ing ‘‘flash of creative genius’’ test). 
 391. Lutz, supra note 321, at 51--52. In either a typo or an oddly anachronistic sense of the history 
of IP Clause, Lutz paraphrased DeWolf as claiming that the balanced sentence structure was ‘‘much 
used by sixteenth century writers’’, i.e. those in the 1500s. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). Even if he meant 
the 1600s, this would still be a century off. While giving more detail by linking ‘‘science’’ back to the 
Latin ‘‘scire,’’ (meaning ‘‘to know’’), Lutz still failed to give adequate context for this Latin term. Id. 
His only support was a quote from Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to Elbridge Gerry. But Jefferson was 
using ‘‘science’’ in the way that philosophers had for centuries: to mean the contemplative, systematic 
study of field (as distinct from the ‘‘art’’ of practicing in a field). Id. at 52. 
 392. Id. at 54. Of note, he treated the term ‘‘technology’’ as unusual or formal by using it in brack-
et quotes and relied on its definition in Webster’s New International Dictionary. Id. But, he gave no 
explanation for why the ‘‘useful arts’’ was simply ‘‘technology.’’ While he adopted the Anglo-centric 
account of the IP Clause, he claimed that ‘‘useful arts’’ was used as a means to broaden out the British 
restriction to ‘‘manufactures’’ under the Statute of Monopolies to allow method patents. Id. In some 
tension to all of this, he made the unsupported claim that ‘‘the Convention intended to have patents 
stick pretty closely to their traditional field as included in the phrase ‘useful arts.’’’ Id. 
 393. 340 U.S. 147, 154--55 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring). The majority had not mentioned the 
IP Clause in rejecting the combination patent at issue for failing to meet the invention standard. 
 394. Id. at 154. 
 395. Id. at 155. 
 396. E. BURKE INLOW, THE PATENT GRANT (1950). Some of the influential patent scholars have 
heavily criticized the book, pointing out numerous errors. See Edward C. Walterscheid, ‘‘Within the 
Limits of the Constitutional Grant’’: Constitutional Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 291, 298 (2002).   
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thus the Clause was supposed to promote the advancement of manufac-
ture.397 
Also in mid-century, courts continued to grapple with the copyright 
subject matter challenge raised by mass-produced decorative objects. 
Mazer v. Stein abandoned the full balanced sentence interpretation in 
order to allow such works under some penumbral reading of ‘‘science 
and useful arts.’’398 The Court solidified the practice of reading the word 
‘‘useful’’ out of ‘‘useful arts’’ and reversing the objects of patents and 
copyrights such that ‘‘science’’ would now go with patents and ‘‘(useful) 
arts’’ would go with copyright.399 Justices Douglas and Black dissented on 
the basis that these objects did not seem to be ‘‘writings’’ under the IP 
Clause.400 
Congress sought to address the standard of invention question as 
part of its 1952 overhaul of the Patent Act. Section 103 added a statutory 
standard of ‘‘nonobviousness’’ and Section 101 replaced ‘‘art’’ with ‘‘pro-
cess’’ for patentable subject matter.401 I view the latter as a most unfortu-
nate development as it formally eliminated ‘‘art’’ from the Patent Act, 
even as it would have the effect of narrowing this rich historical term to 
simple ‘‘processes.’’ The sense of techné art would be lost, as well as the 
sense that an art was a set of methods used as tools by the master crafts-
man to produce certain objects or outcomes. Thus, the art of glassblow-
ing is not one process, but many. And it is not just about mastering the 
individual techniques as it is about having the wisdom and judgment to 
choose which to deploy for any particular production. Going back to the 
historical origins of patents in both Venice and Britain, the intent was 
not to import or encourage practice and commercialization of a single 
technique, but the full art of, say, soapmaking or glassblowing. The his-
torical context is also important because these patent systems predated 
                                                                                                                                         
 397. INLOW, supra note 396, at 36--58, 133--37. Without evidence, he also suggested that Jefferson 
drafted the first version of what became the 1790 Patent Act, thus helping to erroneously enshrine 
Jefferson as an architect of the American patent system. 
 398. 347 U.S. 201, 201--19 (1954). 
 399. While ostensibly denying the need to review the constitutional power for Congress to create 
copyright statues under the IP Clause, the Court gave an extended such review in a footnote. Id. at 206 
n.5. 
 400. Similar to their clear disdain for ‘‘gadgets’’ in The Great A. & P., Douglas and Black evinced 
equal condescension for commercial or popular art as ‘‘writings’’ under the IP Clause: ‘‘The Copyright 
Office has supplied us with a long list of [works of art] which have been copyrighted------statuettes, book 
ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and 
pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays. Perhaps these are all ‘writings’ in the constitu-
tional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obviously so.’’ Id. at 220--21 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 401. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1952). The change was curious though as it set different meanings for 
‘‘art’’ in different parts of the statute. As explained in the House and Senate Reports: 
‘‘Art’’ in [§ 101] has a different meaning than the words ‘‘useful art’’ in the Constitution, and a dif-
ferent meaning than the use of the word ‘‘art’’ in other places in the statutes, and it is interpreted 
by the courts to be practically synonymous with process or method. The word ‘‘process’’ has been 
used to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word ‘‘art’’ as used in this place means ‘‘process 
or method,’’ and that it does not mean the same thing as the word ‘‘art’’ in other places. 
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952). This is fine as far as it goes------
Congress has the right to be its own lexicographer------but then what does ‘‘useful arts’’ in the Constitu-
tion mean? And what about ‘‘art’’ in different parts of the statute?  
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the specialized labor factory systems of Adam Smith and the later indus-
trialists. The art in question then was the complete ability to produce the 
specified glass, soap, machine, etc., not a single technique. But it is true 
that the Industrial Revolution, as well as advances in natural sciences 
that made possible broader, abstract inventions such as the steam engine 
that could be applied across a range of manufacturing arts, had trans-
formed the old patents of importation mindset into one based on stand-
alone ‘‘inventions.’’ And yet, patent systems such as that in the United 
States still required a patent to fit into a certain class of ‘‘art.’’ 
The House and Senate reports on the new patent law were essen-
tially identical in their coverage of the IP Clause, hewing closely to the 
more historically accurate account.402 Thus, both expressly adopted the 
balanced sentence interpretation and the object of patents as promoting 
the progress of the useful arts.403 ‘‘Science’’ was learning in general, and 
its promotion was the object of copyrights. Both reports recited the fact 
that Madison and Pinckney each submitted drafts of the IP Clause, with-
out going into detail, and (inaccurately) gave significant credit to  
Jefferson for his role in development of the patent system. 
That same year, Robert Coulter published a sprawling three-part ar-
ticle with the deceptively straightforward goal to argue that methods that 
included ‘‘mental steps’’ were part of the ‘‘useful arts’’ and should not be 
patent ineligible just because pure mental step processes were not eligi-
ble.404 But while trying to cabin ‘‘science’’ to copyrights and ‘‘useful arts’’ 
to patents, he acknowledged blurred boundaries: books and illustrations 
could advance the useful arts by providing instructive material; similarly, 
patented inventions could advance science (even in its narrow sense) by 
providing instruments for experimentation and observation.405 He 
seemed aware of the challenges of copyright promoting ‘‘science’’ when it 
also covered entertainment and fine arts. Likewise, the modern sense of 
‘‘art’’ contained more than the mechanical/practical/useful arts.406 Follow-
ing Prager and Lutz, he therefore equated the ‘‘useful arts’’ with ‘‘tech-
nology’’ (or the ‘‘technological arts’’).407 
Giles Rich, one of the architects of the 1952 Act, defined ‘‘science,’’ 
‘‘discoveries,’’ and ‘‘inventions’’ in the patent literature as part of an ef-
fort to correct misunderstandings of the new ‘‘unobviousness’’ standard 
of § 103.408 He used the term ‘‘useful arts’’ as if everyone knew what it 
                                                                                                                                         
 402. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3 (1952). 
 403. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 at 4; S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 3. 
 404. Robert. I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part I, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 417, 
417 (1952) [hereinafter ‘‘Field of the Statutory Useful Arts I’’]; Robert. I. Coulter, The Field of the 
Statutory Useful Arts, Part II, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 487, 490--92 (1952) [hereinafter ‘‘Field of the Statu-
tory Useful Arts II’’]; Robert. I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part III, 34 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 718, 718 (1952) [hereinafter ‘‘Field of the Statutory Useful Arts III’’].  
 405. Field of the Statutory Useful Arts II, supra note 404 at 492. 
 406. Id. at 494, 498--500; Field of the Statutory Useful Arts I, supra note 404, at 417, 428. 
 407. Field of the Statutory Useful Arts II, supra note 404, at 498. 
 408. Rich, supra note 324, at 402--07. 
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meant (while using ‘‘technology’’ only once).409 At the same time, he used 
the term ‘‘art’’ in its fine arts sense, without explaining (or perhaps ex-
pressly realizing) the complicated connection. He criticized courts and 
commentators who adopted the unitary approach to the IP Clause pre-
amble, favoring the De Wolf/Lutz balance sentence interpretation in-
stead.410 Also following De Wolf, he subscribed to the ‘‘learning in gen-
eral’’ definition of ‘‘science,’’ quoting Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary for 
support.411 ‘‘Invention’’ and ‘‘discovery’’ were used interchangeably, Rich 
claimed (without any support), but he then proceeded to read out ‘‘dis-
covery’’ altogether.412 
Capping the first wave of scholarship was Arthur Seidel’s effort to 
analyze all terms in the IP Clause.413 Like Lutz and Rich, Seidel’s focus 
was the heightened ‘‘invention’’ standard, which was still being used de-
spite enactment of § 103.414 Adopting the balanced sentence interpreta-
tion, he nonetheless held the preamble to be simply the ‘‘overall objec-
tive’’ of the power, and not a means or limit on that power.415 He did not 
directly define ‘‘useful arts,’’ but rather juxtaposed Johnson’s Dictionary 
definitions for ‘‘useful’’ and ‘‘arts.’’416 Like many others, he subscribed to 
the ‘‘learning in general’’ definition of ‘‘science.’’ In an interesting twist, 
he used Johnson’s definition of ‘‘inventors’’ as the basis for the novelty-
only patentability standard he advocated: ‘‘inventors’’ create something 
new, but not necessarily important or genius.417 Seidel paraphrased  
Johnson to define ‘‘discoveries’’ as ‘‘to find anything hidden or to reveal a 
                                                                                                                                         
 409. Rich used the terms ‘‘art’’ or ‘‘useful art’’ everywhere else. Id. at 402. Yet he also used the 
term ‘‘art’’ in its fine arts sense, without appearing to notice the ambiguity of the term. Id. at 401. 
 410. Rich makes an odd statement that ‘‘If the promotion of both ‘Science and useful Arts’ be 
ascribed as the object of the patent system, then the copyright system would have no stated object.’’ Id. 
at 397. But no one was saying that. Rather, under the unitary preamble view, both patents and copy-
rights had as their object the promotion of science and useful arts.  
 411. Id. at 396--97. Rich claimed that the natural sciences we think of as ‘‘science’’ today were in-
stead part of natural philosophy at the time of the Constitution. This is not quite accurate. Natural 
philosophy was different from the mathematized, experimental ‘‘new sciences’’ of Bacon, Galileo, et al 
that more directly led to modern physical or natural sciences. See Dear, supra note 38, at 401--02. 
 412. Rich, supra note 324, at 403. Rich formalized the syllogism that continues to be used to read 
‘‘discoveries’’ out of the IP Clause: (1) ‘‘discoveries’’ are the subject matter of exclusive rights in the IP 
Clause; (2) ‘‘discoveries’’ equal ‘‘inventions’’; (3) ‘‘patents’’ equal ‘‘exclusive rights’’; therefore (4) ‘‘in-
ventions’’ are the subject matter of statutory patent rights. Id. at 393--407. 
 413. Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 
9--15 (1966). 
 414. Id. at 5--6. There was also concern that the Supreme Court might hold that the heightened 
invention standard was a Constitutional requirement, thus reinstating it in addition to, or in place of, 
Section 103’s nonobviousness requirement. See id. at 5--8. 
 415. Id. at 9--10. Seidel cited the Reddendo Singula Singulis common law rule of construction for 
balanced sentences. Id. at 9 n.10 (citing 53 C. J. 662). Using Johnson, he ‘‘translates’’ the preamble for 
the patent power as ‘‘to advance or forward the course or procession of the helpful trades.’’ Id. at 10. 
Seidel argued that if a novelty or invention standard were found in the preamble, it would need to 
equally apply to copyright, yet no court had called for a high standard for copyright. Id. at 16. This 
argument is flawed because the progress of science would not be the same thing as the progress of use-
ful arts. 
 416. Id. at 10 n.11. This suggests that, against Coulter, he did not view the ‘‘useful arts’’ as a uni-
tary categorical term. Rather, they were any arts that happened to have practical uses. 
 417. Id. at 13--14. Inventors can also make ‘‘discoveries’’ as a subclass of the new things they cre-
ate.  
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secret.’’418 Because this did not directly connect with ‘‘inventions,’’ he 
took the unsupported step that ‘‘It was commonly said that inventors 
make discoveries, and this included both the creation of something new, 
and the finding out of something that previously existed.’’419 But even if 
this all were true, why would the Framers have used the ambiguous ‘‘dis-
coveries’’ when they could have used the unambiguous ‘‘inventions’’? 
The first wave of IP Clause interpretation seemed to wind down 
with the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.420 
The Court decisively ruled for the balanced sentence structure (with 
‘‘useful arts’’ as the subject matter of the patent system) and § 103’s non-
obviousness as the Constitutional standard of ‘‘invention.’’421 There was 
minimal criticism of the decision, as it was in line with most commenta-
tors’ expectations.422 The IP Clause was found to be ‘‘both a grant of 
power and a limitation,’’ that limited Congress to acts that promoted ad-
vances in the ‘‘useful arts.’’423 However, the Court did not define ‘‘useful 
arts.’’ 
                                                                                                                                         
 418. Id. at 15. 
 419. Id. In this way, he tracked Rich’s syllogism to equate ‘‘discoveries’’ (at least in part) with ‘‘in-
ventions,’’ allowing both of them to substitute ‘‘inventions’’ for ‘‘discoveries’’ in the IP Clause. Seidel 
also used modern dictionary definitions to show that one sense of ‘‘invention’’ was ‘‘discovery.’’ Id. 
Seidel made clear that the ‘‘uncovering’’ sense of ‘‘discovery’’ did not lead to patentable inventions, for 
example, principles of nature. Id. 
 420. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 421. Id. at 5--6, 17--18, 37. 
 422. There were, unsurprisingly, at least a few critiques. See, e.g., Albert B. Kimball, Jr., An Anal-
ysis of Recent Supreme Court Assertions Regarding a Constitutional Standard of Invention, 1 AM. PAT. 
L. ASS’N Q.J. 204, 206, 209 (1973) (criticizing the Court for confusing a ‘‘statement of purpose’’ (goal, 
objective) with a ‘‘restraint’’ in construing the IP Clause preamble); Note, The 1966 Patent Cases: Crea-
tion of a Constitutional Standard, 54 GEO. L.J. 1320, 1331--32 (1966) (criticizing the Court for its use of 
Jefferson’s views on the patent system with regard to the IP Clause and early patent acts when Jeffer-
son not only played no direct role in incorporating the patent power into the Constitution, but was also 
effectively rebuffed by the Framers and first Congress). Some commentators were generally favorable 
to Graham. See Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the ‘‘Invention’’ Requirement, 1 AM. PAT. L. ASS’N 
Q.J. 26, 27, 37--38, 40 (1972) (favoring Graham’s interpretation of § 103 and assessment that the consti-
tutional standard of invention was coextensive with it). One article, on the other hand, represents a 
minority view favoring Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermar-
ket Equipment Co., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). See Joel Rosenblatt, The Constitutional Standard for ‘‘Ordi-
nary Skill in the Art,’’ 54 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 435, 439 (1972) (mistakenly asserting that Graham adopt-
ed Douglas’s concurrence in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. as ‘‘the’’ constitutional standard of 
invention). In an indeterminate middle ground was Irons and Sears’s article supporting Graham’s af-
firmance of a constitutional standard of invention, but rejecting the balanced sentence interpretation 
of the IP Clause (and supporting Douglas’s and others’ high standard of patentability). Edward S. 
Irons & Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention------The Touchstone for Patent Re-
form, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653, 653 n.1, 656. Of note, Irons and Sears refer to traditional mechanical 
arts from the Middle Ages as ‘‘technology,’’ showing its continuing displacement of ‘‘arts.’’ With the 
exception of Rich’s article, the foregoing have rarely been cited in the second wave literature and ap-
pear to have dropped out of sight quickly. Burchfiel cited them in his article that inspired  
Walterscheid. Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the ‘‘Original’’ Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in Constitu-
tional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 163 n.49, 165 n.55 (1989). But even Burchfiel’s article 
had minimal impact beyond Walterscheid. 
 423. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5. 
O'CONNOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 9:25 AM 
1462 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
2. The Second Wave 
As interest in the patent side of the IP Clause wound down in the 
aftermath of Graham, there was new interest in the copyright side as 
Congress began the first major overhaul of the Copyright Act since 1909. 
The second wave of IP Clause interpretation thus commenced with a dif-
ferent set of commentators. Two major IP history books in the late 1960s 
set the stage: Bruce Bugbee’s Genesis of American Patent and Copyright 
Law,424 and Lyman Patterson’s Copyright in Historical Perspective.425 Nei-
ther however broke notable new ground for interpretations of key terms 
such as ‘‘(useful) art’’ or ‘‘science.’’ 
In the early 1970s, Goldstein v. California ruled that states had not 
relinquished all power to grant exclusive rights to authors under the 
Constitution and found no impediment to state and federal copyrights.426 
The Court adopted a unitary reading of the IP Clause preamble that un-
derscored the changed popular sense of ‘‘art’’ and the reversed roles of 
‘‘science’’ and ‘‘useful arts.’’427 Adopting Burrow-Giles’ definitions of ‘‘au-
thor’’ and ‘‘writings,’’ it suggested-----without deciding-----that ‘‘recordings 
of artistic performances’’ are within the scope of the IP Clause.428 The 
Copyright Act of 1976,429 however, expressly preempted the field for state 
copyright statutes, effectively mooting Goldstein in this regard.430  
In the 1980s, two major Supreme Court cases discussed the IP 
Clause. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. considered 
the IP Clause in the context of a contributory infringement claim based 
on the sale of home videotape recorders that facilitated unauthorized re-
cordings of copyrighted broadcasts.431 Limiting its interpretation to the IP 
Clause’s grant of power, it found that Congress could create ‘‘monopoly 
privileges’’ only for general public benefit, and not for the private benefit 
of authors or publishers.432 Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation En-
terprises acknowledged Sony’s ‘‘public purpose’’ interpretation of the IP 
Clause, but reemphasized the critical role that the ‘‘monopoly’’ grant to 
                                                                                                                                         
 424. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW iii, v (1967). 
 425. PATTERSON, supra note 110, at v. 
 426. See 412 U.S. 546, 556--67 (1973). This went directly against Patterson’s claims that the IP 
Clause and Congress’ legislation under it had completely pre-empted the field. 
 427. Id. at 555 (‘‘The objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts.’’) (emphasis 
added). 
 428. Id. at 561--62. 
 429. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101--805 
(2012)). 
 430. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130--31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746, 5747. 
However, the question of whether the text of § 301 in the Act truly did preempt all state common law 
with regard to literary, musical, or creative property is an open one. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND 
ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS, § 1.01[B] (1963). Similarly, the attempt to ex-
pressly preempt indicates that Congress accepted Goldstein’s interpretation of the IP Clause on this 
point. 
 431. 464 U.S. 416 (1984). 
 432. Id. at 429. 
O'CONNOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 9:25 AM 
No. 4] THE LOST ART OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 1463 
authors served in generating the material in the first place.433 Of note, the 
dissenting opinion seemed to reveal the near invisibility of the qualifier 
‘‘useful’’ in the IP Clause by this time. In one place, it says ‘‘[t]he progress 
of arts and sciences,’’434 while in another it says ‘‘[t]he ‘promotion of sci-
ence and the useful arts,’’’435 before flipping back yet again later to say 
‘‘[t]o ensure the progress of arts and sciences.’’436 When actually quoting 
the IP Clause, the term ‘‘useful’’ is of course included, but when para-
phrasing it, the term is dropped. This suggests that it was effectively be-
ing read out of the IP Clause. 
Rounding out the Second Wave, a few articles from the turn of the 
decade proved influential to third wave scholars. Kenneth Burchfiel pub-
lished a belated yet scathing critique of the Graham Court’s ‘‘revisionist 
history’’ in 1989.437 In particular, he exposed the misplaced reliance by the 
Court on Jefferson’s views to interpret both the IP Clause and early  
Patent Acts.438 While Burchfiel is seldom cited today, he had a profound 
impact on Walterscheid, who would become a giant in IP Clause his-
tory.439 
Jane Ginsburg showed that the practical focus of both early French 
and American copyright systems was on works of public instruction 
(whether styled as ‘‘knowledge’’ or ‘‘science’’).440 Intriguingly, while the 
first French copyright act expressly covered the fine arts (which the U.S. 
Act did not), the types of works actually protected in France were similar 
to the ‘‘public instruction’’ works in America.441 
Margaret Chon gave a postmodernist critique of standard accounts 
of the IP Clause in 1993, advocating a public domain oriented ‘‘progress 
project’’ on behalf of Madison and Jefferson.442 Arguing that the fine arts 
had effectively been folded into the useful arts (even based on an ‘‘ap-
plied science’’ or ‘‘technology’’ interpretation), she adopted a unitary 
reading of the IP Clause preamble that sought solely to ‘‘promote the 
                                                                                                                                         
 433. 471 U.S. 539, 545--46 (1985).  
 434. Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 435. Id. at 582. 
 436. Id. at 589. 
 437. Burchfiel, supra note 422, at 209--217. 
 438. See id. at 162--63, 166--67, 178--85.f 
 439. Walterscheid’s written attributions of Burchfiel’s effect on his thinking reminds me of Kant’s 
references to Hume’s writings as waking Kant from his ‘‘dogmatic slumbers.’’ Walterscheid appears to 
have held fairly conventional views of the patent system and of the reliability of courts to produce ac-
curate and objective versions of facts and history before reading Burchfiel.  
 440. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and 
America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 996 (1990). For example, her analysis of the works registered in the first 
ten years of U.S. copyright law showed that they were predominantly ‘‘socially useful, instructive 
works.’’ See id. at 1001--1005, 1013--1016. She also quoted Jefferson as stating, ‘‘‘[a] great obstacle to 
good education is the inordinate passion prevalent for novels, and the time lost in that reading which 
should be instructively employed.’’’ Id. at 1003 (quoting 15 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 166 (1903)). 
 441. See id. at 1015--1022. However, the French may have viewed some fine art works, novels, and 
plays as instructive for the Revolution, Enlightenment values, and general moral instruction. Id. at 
1015--1016. 
 442. Chon, supra note 322, at 98--103, 134--44. 
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progress of knowledge.’’443 She also cited Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken,444 and Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,445 
to show that the Supreme Court now interpreted ‘‘science’’ and ‘‘(useful) 
arts’’ in the their modern popular senses. 
3. The Third Wave 
Edward Walterscheid began the third wave in the mid-1990s. He 
dominated the IP Clause literature throughout the turn of the century 
with numerous articles and books. Affirming and deepening Burchfiel’s 
position, he opened up a number of interesting avenues of research.446 He 
posited that the terms ‘‘patents’’ did not appear in the IP Clause because 
it had only taken on its modern meaning around the time of the  
Constitutional Convention.447 ‘‘Useful arts’’ were entire industries, and 
not specific craft.448 He recounted the earlier system of patents for impor-
tation of craft from foreign markets and claimed that ‘‘invention’’ and 
‘‘discovery’’ were originally interchangeable terms for such importation. 
But later, ‘‘discovery’’ came to have the modern meaning of ‘‘invention’’ 
(creating something new) while ‘‘invention’’ itself retained a dual mean-
ing of importation along with the addition of the modern sense of creat-
ing something new. His explanation for why the Convention committee 
substituted ‘‘science’’ for ‘‘knowledge’’ in the proposals for the IP Clause 
did not make a lot of sense: the former was both ‘‘shorter’’ (better with 
‘‘useful arts’’) and more ‘‘aesthetically pleasing’’ for the balanced sen-
tence structure.449 Walterscheid unearthed an intriguing alternative usage 
of ‘‘discovery’’ from the proceedings of the first Congress in the sense of 
‘‘to disclose to another’’: ‘‘‘if an Inventor discovers [i.e., discloses] his Se-
cret to any second Person, it is the power of him [i.e., the second person] 
to prevent a Patent issuing by entering a Caveat in the Attorney Gen-
                                                                                                                                         
 443. Id. at 115 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)). See id. 
at 119--22, 134--44. 
 444. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
 445. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 446. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN 
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787-1836 (1998). 
 447. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Anteced-
ents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 700 (1994) [hereinafter Antecedents Part 1]; 
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part 
I), 78 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615, 616 n.4 (1996) [hereinafter Antecedents 5 Part I]; Ed-
ward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 
HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 84 (1995) [hereinafter Inherent or Created Rights]. 
 448. Walterscheid, Antecedents Part 1, supra note 447, at 706 n.30. 
 449. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 446 at 50--51; Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress 
of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 38--39 (1998). But, ‘‘science’’ is only two letters shorter than 
‘‘knowledge.’’ And ‘‘useful arts’’ is already longer than ‘‘knowledge.’’ So the substitution of ‘‘science’’ 
for ‘‘knowledge’’ actually puts the two terms used in the final IP Clause at greater odds with each oth-
er. As to ‘‘aesthetically pleasing,’’ who knows what to make of that? 
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eral’s Office, when if two Persons appear to have discovered the same 
thing, it is held not to be new within the meaning of the Statute.’’’450 
Malla Pollack argued for a new sense of ‘‘progress’’ in the IP Clause 
that meant dissemination/diffusion of knowledge, rather than advances 
or increases in it.451 For example, the fire progressed across the room.452 
Additionally, she argued that the Framers intentionally omitted the 
terms ‘‘patents’’ and ‘‘copyrights’’ so as not to tie Congress to the tech-
nical meanings of those terms at the time. 
Historian of science I. Bernard Cohen interpreted the IP Clause as 
promoting the progress of ‘‘those theoretical or general principles of 
practice that are associated directly with useful inventions or that lead to 
economic benefits or financial rewards.’’453 He had no explanation for 
what copyright could have to do with either science or the useful arts, 
which is surprising given the importance of publication to the scientists 
he studied.454 The two powers he located in the IP Clause were different 
from any that others had discussed in the literature.455 He equated ‘‘dis-
coveries’’ with patentable inventions, but cited Chamber’s Encyclopedia 
and Johnson’s Dictionary, not Diderot’s Encyclopédie.456 He collapsed 
‘‘discoveries’’ into ‘‘inventions’’ based on Latin roots to show that both 
authors and inventors are producing the former, but this leaves no role 
                                                                                                                                         
 450. Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty in Historical Perspective (Part I), 75 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 703 n.67 (1993) (quoting S. Rep. of the Comm. on the Bill for the Promo-
tion of Useful Arts (Mar. 29, 1790) (alterations in original)). However, he does not suggest this as the 
meaning of ‘‘discover’’ in the IP Clause. Instead it was part of the old caveat practice, and the quote 
itself uses the term in two different ways. 
 451. See generally Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellec-
tual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 270--99 (1995) [hereinafter Pollack, Unconstitutional Incon-
testability]; Pollack, supra note 323. ‘‘Limited times’’ should also act as a constraint on using other 
clauses in the Constitution (such as the Commerce Clause) to create unlimited IP-type rights. 
 452. She relied on contemporaneous newspapers and dictionaries to support this usage with ex-
amples including ‘‘the ‘progress of a fire’ when a modern newspaper would report its ‘spread.’’’ Pol-
lack, supra note 323, at 799. 
 453. I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON, 308 (1995); see id. at 237--43. 
 454. Id. at 240--41. Accordingly, he is then at a loss to find any advances in ‘‘science’’ (written 
broadly or narrowly) that could be patentable. 
 455. Cohen disaggregates the preamble from the rest of the Clause: Congress has the powers 1) to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, and 2) to secure for limited times to authors and in-
ventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The 
first ‘‘power’’ leads Cohen into an interesting discussion of the failure of the federal government to 
provide significant research funding until after World War II. COHEN, supra note 453, at 241. While 
intriguing, and later echoed to some degree by Walterscheid, this reading makes no sense grammati-
cally as it ignores the connecting term ‘‘by.’’ Curiously, Cohen also repeatedly misquotes the IP Clause 
by always using the singular ‘‘Time’’ in his quotes rather than ‘‘Times.’’ See id. at 238 (‘‘Here the power 
is explicitly assigned ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Time 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’’’). 
 456. Id. at 306. He claims Chambers’s Cyclopedia as ‘‘the foremost scientific dictionary in English 
at the time of the Constitution,’’ which may be technically true, but only based on the qualifier ‘‘in 
English.’’ It is also a missed opportunity for Cohen as the French Encyclopédie entry on ‘‘Discoveries’’ 
of course supports an argument he makes that ‘‘discoveries’’ are a class of particularly important in-
ventions (really the principles of practice associated with an invention). 
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for ‘‘writings.’’457 But, he was effective at (re)establishing the broader, 
older senses of ‘‘science’’ and ‘‘art.’’458 He astutely pointed out that the 
Framers ‘‘introduced ‘practical [useful] arts’ rather than simply ‘arts’’’ so 
as to stress the practice (versus theoretical) nature of what they had in 
mind.459 
John Thomas reacted to the Federal Circuit’s 1998 decision finding 
no ‘‘business method exception’’ to patent eligibility, in State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,460 by seeking to limit pa-
tentable subject matter to the ‘‘useful arts,’’ which he, like others. equat-
ed with the ‘‘technological arts.’’461 Pollack likewise sought to exclude 
business methods based on her notion of ‘‘progress’’ and claims that they 
were historically disfavored.462 But her finding of some business method 
patents undercut her argument that they were forbidden. At the same 
time, she helped resurrect the notion of art as skills and/or rules to ma-
nipulate physical materials.463 
As 2003 opened, the Supreme Court dashed the hopes of those who 
opposed the Copyright Term Extension Act (‘‘CTEA’’), by ruling that 
Congress had acted within the scope of its powers under the IP Clause in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft.464 For present purposes, the Court seemed to accept 
once again that the Constitutional goal expressed by the copyright sys-
tem was to promote the progress of science. But it did not commit to 
whether this acted as a constraint on Congress and, even if it did,  
Congress could have rationally believed that the CTEA promoted the 
progress of science. 
Over the next few years, Dotan Oliar provided persuasive argu-
ments supporting the interpretation that the IP Clause preamble limits 
                                                                                                                                         
 457. Id. at 241. ‘‘Inventor’’ is itself a Latin term meaning ‘‘‘one who finds out, a contriver, author, 
discoverer.’’’ Id. ‘‘Inventor’’ the Latin noun is derived from ‘‘invenio’’ the Latin verb which means, in 
its strictest sense, ‘‘‘I come upon,’ ‘I find,’ ‘I discover.’’’ Id. 
 458. See id. at 307--08. ‘‘Science’’ could include any systematic treatment of the knowledge or 
skills related to a field of human endeavor. ‘‘Art’’ could include the ability to do any task requiring 
skill and, perhaps, training. 
 459. Id. at 308. 
 460. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 461. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1140--41 
(1999). 
 462. See Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common 
Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
61, 62 (2002). She presented four arguments: First, ‘‘common sense’’ should show that business method 
patents do not promote progress; second, Congress did not consider whether business method patent 
protection promotes the progress of the useful arts (and it must do so, she claimed); third, the histori-
cal record showed few patents for business methods and the ‘‘useful arts’’ did not include ‘‘commerce;’’ 
and fourth, given the alleged anti-monopoly fervor during the Convention period, it would be remark-
able for the IP Clause to have authorized Congress to create monopolies with no debates in the Con-
vention or ratification process. Id. at 75--119. 
 463. Id. at 86--87 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1828). Unfortunately, she also said that the mechanical arts were co-extensive with the ‘‘technological 
arts,’’ limiting the full range of useful arts. Id. at 90. 
 464. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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the remainder of the Clause.465 Under his reading, the preamble and the 
body of the IP Clause each act as a grant of power and a limitation on the 
other. For present purposes, he anachronistically relied on a modern def-
inition of ‘‘discoveries.’’466 His version of the ‘‘science as learn-
ing/knowledge’’ thesis nonetheless limited this category to writings that 
‘‘lean more towards ‘useful’ knowledge and away from more abstract 
types of knowledge.’’467 Without adequate justification, Oliar bluntly re-
jected the balanced sentence interpretation as ‘‘dubious,’’ and the dis-
junctive preamble version of it as ‘‘especially indefensible.’’468 Oliar ap-
plied his results to argue against categorical exclusions, based on the IP 
Clause alone, for business method patents,469 the product of nature ex-
                                                                                                                                         
 465. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as 
a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1779 (2006) [hereinafter 
Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause]; Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention 
on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA. L. REV. 421, 445 (2009) [hereinafter Oliar, The (Constitutional) 
Convention on IP]. 
 466. See Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause, supra note 465, at 1798. Oliar 
claimed that it cannot be connected to ‘‘useful arts’’ as Walterscheid asserted. Id. at 1809. But he did 
not link it to authors and writings either. So there seem to be no protectable things linked to the useful 
arts, and inventors have no output except for writings and (scientific) discoveries. At the same time, he 
argued that once the Framers decided not to authorize payments from the government (by rejecting 
the encouragements proposals), then ‘‘useful arts’’ entered as something that could have market value 
to make the exclusive rights approach work. Id. This hopelessly mixes up terms in the preamble from 
the body and, at any rate, means that ‘‘discoveries’’ should not have appeared anywhere in the IP 
Clause (or, perhaps, in the preamble). Further, he claimed that the terms ‘‘science’’ and the ‘‘arts’’ 
(without the qualifier ‘‘useful’’) come from Pinckney’s education proposal. Id. at 1810. But Pinckney’s 
‘‘arts and sciences’’ in the education context is really not the same as ‘‘science and useful arts’’ as used 
in the exclusive rights context of the IP Clause. Oliar also took the sometimes blurred boundaries be-
tween ‘‘sciences’’ and ‘‘art’’ to claim that ‘‘there was not dichotomous distinction between ‘science’ and 
‘useful arts’ in 1787, just as there is none today.’’ Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP, supra 
note 465, at 466. But this is a common misunderstanding of the reasonably clear historical relationship 
between ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘science’’ outlined in Part II. See supra Part II. 
 467. Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause, supra note 465, at 1809. This leads to 
another odd error: ‘‘The Copyright Act of 1790 . . . listed maps as copyrightable subject matter, alt-
hough to the extent that they are factual works they would not be protected today.’’ Id. at 1809 n.188. 
This is an incorrect statement of current copyright law. But it is driven by his other perplexing com-
ment that ‘‘useful knowledge at the time of the Framing does not seem to have been limited to what is 
currently engulfed by copyrightable expression.’’ Id. at 1809. 
 468. Id. at 1823. The only evidence he gave was a novel combinatorial approach that claimed the 
IP Clause could be read in 27 different permutations, as a formal grammatical matter. Oliar, The 
(Constitutional) Convention on IP, supra note 465, at 464. There are three parts of the Clause that 
each have two corollary terms that could be used individually or jointly with that part meaning there 
are 33 (27) different formal combinations. But his claims that many of these are more than just formal 
possibilities rests again with his obsession with the multiple proposals of Madison and Pinckney. Many 
of the combinations are arguably expressed in one or more of the proposals. The problem is that all 
but the patent and copyright powers (and possibly a derivative of the encouragement proposals for the 
preamble) were rejected. Accordingly, they do not follow through to be meanings of the IP Clause. 
 469. Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP, supra note 465, at 453. He used as ‘‘contempo-
raneous evidence’’ a statement in the 1792 Congress that he reframes as ‘‘intellectual property rights 
are to be given to encourage ‘fine arts, . . . commerce, . . . manufactures, and agriculture.’’’ Id. at 454 
(quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 393--94 (1792) (statement of Mr. Page)). But Nard and Morriss had al-
ready explained that the statement was actually about the reasons why Congress was not authorized to 
give monetary or land bounties/prizes/premiums to encourage these ends by the time Oliar argued 
this. Further, Oliar justified business method patents under the IP Clause because of his unitary read-
ing, which means that they do not have to be viewed as ‘‘useful arts.’’ Id. at 453. But this leaves only 
‘‘science,’’ which seems even less plausible as a category. 
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ception in patent eligibility,470 and database protection.471 He also argued 
that the Framers intended agriculture and commerce to be protectable 
because they were part of Pinckney’s encouragements proposal.472 He 
gave examples of the term ‘‘author’’ being used for ‘‘inventor,’’ but it is 
unclear how this advances his theory. Arguably, this actually undercuts 
his position: if ‘‘author’’ included ‘‘inventor,’’473 then why were both terms 
used? The IP Clause could simply read, ‘‘To promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors the exclu-
sive right to their writings and discoveries.’’ 
Alina Ng’s 2011 book, Copyright Law and the Progress of Science 
and the Useful Arts, presented a confused take on the IP Clause. 474 She 
offered that ‘‘[w]hile the colonial usage of the term ‘useful arts’ referred 
to scientific inventions that were to be protected by patent laws requiring 
proof of novelty, the word ‘science’ was taken to mean an organised sys-
tem of knowledge that was the product of authorship and was to be pro-
tected by copyright laws.’’475 However, ‘‘useful arts’’ has been most com-
monly equated with ‘‘technological arts,’’ not ‘‘scientific inventions.’’476 
Her definition of ‘‘science’’ is preferable to the ‘‘learning in general’’ one, 
but it is inadequately supported. Both of these definitions actually point 
away, though, from the aesthetic socio-cultural productions in the (fine) 
arts that she sought to advance through copyright. Ultimately, Ng fol-
lowed many modern courts and commentators to read out the word ‘‘use-
ful’’ so that the preamble simply matches today’s senses of ‘‘science and 
the arts.’’477 
In 2013, the Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed the full balanced 
sentence interpretation in Golan v. Holder, adding that ‘‘perhaps coun-
ter-intuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress copyright authority 
is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority to the progress of 
useful arts.’’478 Justices Breyer and Alito dissented on grounds that the IP 
Clause focused only on incentives to create and the Uruguay Round 
                                                                                                                                         
 470. Id. at 455--63. He argued that his unitary reading of the Clause allows patents on naturally 
occurring objects as ‘‘scientific discoveries.’’ Id. at 458--60. He did not seem to realize that this would 
allow basic scientific principles or laws------in the modern sense------to be patented. Such an outcome 
would have been anathema to Enlightenment values. A copyright on the book explaining the phe-
nomena and laws of nature underlying electricity would be fine. And patents on practical applications 
in the useful arts. But not patents on a law of nature. How does one patent a law of nature anyway? 
 471. Id. at 462--63. 
 472. Id. at 453. 
 473. Which indeed is a historical usage of ‘‘author.’’ Id. at 469. 
 474. ALINA NG, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS 
(2011). 
 475. Id. at 24--25. 
 476. She might mean inventions influenced or informed by science, in which case that would bet-
ter match the ‘‘technology’’ or ‘‘technological arts’’ segment of the literature hinted at as early as 
Fessenden. 
 477. See, e.g., id. at 38 (‘‘In general terms, the progress of science and the arts can be taken to mean 
the advancement of culture and society.’’) (emphasis added). It is true that Ng sometimes toggles back 
to ‘‘science and useful arts,’’ but it is clear from the context that she still means ‘‘science and the arts.’’ 
See, e.g., id. at 55. 
 475. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
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Agreements Act would not lead to the creation of even one new work.479 
However, they agreed with the majority on balanced sentence interpreta-
tion, with copyright aligned with ‘‘science.’’ 
In the most recent addition to the literature relative to ‘‘useful arts,’’ 
Emily Michiko Morris begins from the unexamined statement that ‘‘Pa-
tent protection is limited to ‘technology,’ . . . .’’480 While she acknowledges 
that the courts have rejected technological arts tests, she nonetheless 
seems resigned to accept the mid-twentieth century shift by commenta-
tors such as Coulter and Rich to ‘‘translate’’ the ‘‘useful arts’’ of the IP 
Clause into ‘‘technology’’ or the ‘‘technological arts.’’481 This, again, is in 
some ways a trend going all the way back to Fessenden’s suggestion that 
science-based innovation be the main or even exclusive subject matter 
for patents. But courts and Congress have explicitly and implicitly reject-
ed this.482 At the same time, Morris is on the right track, because her def-
inition of technology (for patent eligible subject matter purposes) is ‘‘ar-
tifice plus action.’’483 There is a lot to like in this. ‘‘Artifice’’ is used to 
capture the human agency component.484 ‘‘Action’’ qualifies ‘‘artifice’’ to 
limit the scope of patent eligible subject matter to works of human agen-
cy that also represent an ‘‘new operation or activity.’’485 However, this 
does not provide a good boundary between ‘‘technology’’ and many 
works of modern fine art that employ active components such that ‘‘new 
operations or activit[ies]’’ result.486 
Morris is careful to position her ‘‘artifice plus action’’ as more of a 
unifying principle than a test or bright line rule.487 But the limits she sets 
out for it miss the fundamental problem-----not her fault-----that we are 
stuck in an age where ‘‘technology’’ has supplanted ‘‘art’’ for essentially 
all human manipulations of natural materials and forces except those we 
somehow intuit are works of fine art (which we now simply call ‘‘art,’’ 
with or without a capital A). For example, anthropologists often now re-
fer to any practical methods or objects devised by humans going all the 
way back to prehistoric times as ‘‘technology.’’488 Useful artisanal meth-
                                                                                                                                         
 479. Id. at 899--903 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 480. Emily Michiko Morris, What is ‘‘Technology’’?, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 24, 24 (2014) In 
another formulation, she says ‘‘The patent system is designed to encourage the ‘useful Arts’--or what 
modern language would refer to as the ‘technological arts.’’’ Id. at 24--25. 
 481. Id. at 27. 
 482. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 483. Morris, supra note 480, at 24. 
 484. While Morris does not go beyond some dictionary definitions for this, it is entirely consonant 
with the historical development of the term as demonstrated above in Part II. 
 485. Her ‘‘action’’ requirement is ‘‘roughly defined as new operation or activity through human 
intervention.’’ Id. at 25.  
 486. See, e.g., James Coupe & Juan Pampin, Sanctum, HENRY ART GALLERY, https://henryart. 
org/exhibitions/sanctum (‘‘An interactive art installation, Sanctum employs surveillance systems to 
generate cinematic narratives with social media content that matches the demographic profile of pass-
ers-by.’’). 
 487. Morris, supra note 480, at 2. 
 488. See, e.g., John Noble Wilford, Lucy’s Kin Carved Up a Meaty Meal, Scientists Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/science/12tools.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(quoting paleoanthropologists’ description of the implications of new findings about tool use by mem-
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ods and artifacts are now ‘‘technology.’’ But, so many of these are neither 
part of the systematic study of techné (techné + ology) nor the application 
of ‘‘scientific’’ principles to artisanal innovation. That this is not some 
technical semantic point with little practical relevance is the object of 
Part V. 
V. FINDING THE LOST ‘‘ART’’ OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
A. Early Patent Systems 
As we saw in Part III, patent systems arose historically to promote 
artisanal competition. In fully regulated economic systems, such as those 
in medieval guild cities, only guild members were allowed to practice in 
the regulated field of art. Master builder-architects such as Brunelleschi, 
who could oversee complex building projects, were expected to join the 
various relevant guilds. While the effect of these guild systems on innova-
tion is contested, the government of fifteenth century Venice seems to 
have been dissatisfied with the amount of innovation in her guilds. Non-
exclusive licenses were then issued just to enable nonguild artisans who 
had innovative ideas to practice the art and sell their goods or services. 
But such nonexclusive rights may have been inadequate against the eco-
nomic and social control of the guilds, meaning that even a right to prac-
tice would not allow the non-guild artisan to gain a foothold in the mar-
ket. Accordingly, Ted Sichelman and I have argued elsewhere that 
exclusive rights-----later called ‘‘patents’’ in the British system-----were add-
ed to give the non-guild artisans a better position from which to intro-
duce their innovations and compete with the guilds.489 
Alternately, other early patent systems were designed to establish 
foreign arts into the domestic market. While Venice had many expert 
craftsmen and arts already established when she created her patent sys-
tem, other places in Europe did not.490 Accordingly, while a patent system 
directed primarily at empowering nonguild innovators (whether domestic 
or foreign) against the powerful guilds was sufficient in Venice, other 
principalities needed to recruit foreign artisans (often from Venice!) or 
encourage domestic artisans to master and bring back a foreign art.491 
Thus, these systems often focused on so-called patents of importation 
that gave exclusive rights simply for the artisan to establish the existing 
foreign art in the domestic economy, regardless of whether he invented 
the art.492 The fact of local novelty meant an art established elsewhere 
was still an important kind of innovation in the domestic economy. 
                                                                                                                                         
bers of Australopithecus afarensisin as that it should ‘‘improve our understanding of how this type of 
behavior originated and developed into later, well-recognized stone tool production technologies.’’) 
(emphasis added). 
 489. See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 74, at 1268--69. 
 490. Id. at 1268--70. 
 491. Id. at 1278. 
 492. Id. 
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The major patent systems in Venice, Britain, and the Netherlands 
all emerged before the so-called Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth 
century.493 While there were some educated artisans in the medieval pe-
riod, and increasingly so in the Renaissance, many artisans remained il-
literate and untutored in either the basic liberal arts (including the ‘‘sci-
entific’’ subjects of the Quadrivium) or natural philosophy.494 Amongst 
the educated, the vast majority likely had only the basic liberal arts edu-
cation of the cathedral school-----whose efficacy and accuracy has been 
questioned by historians.495 A small segment, including da Vinci and  
Michelangelo, had some university training.496 But given the limits of the 
natural philosophy, and more importantly, the practical applicability of 
scholastic Aristotelianism that dominated the universities at that time, it 
was unlikely that even university-educated artisans were engaged in any-
thing like ‘‘technology’’ in the sense of science-based invention. At most, 
advances in mathematics seemed to have helped da Vinci and Michelan-
gelo in developing various innovations such as linear perspective in the 
visual arts.497 Alternately, however, a kind of proto-technology in the 
sense of systematic study of techné may well have been at work here. But 
notwithstanding the etymological accuracy of this sense of ‘‘technology,’’ 
it is the furthest from the modern popular sense of the term. Fundamen-
tally, though, nothing about the early patent systems suggested, much 
less required, any kind of ‘‘scientific’’ or natural philosophical explana-
tion, justification, or description of an invention for it to be patentable.498 
B. The Scientific Revolution 
The Scientific Revolution certainly had an impact on inventors and 
patent systems, or perhaps the other way around. Recent historical work 
paints a more integrated development of the ‘‘new sciences’’ between ar-
tisans and educated intellectuals than was previously thought.499 But this 
research underscores how much of the new sciences seem to have been 
driven by advances in practical engineering and artisanal techniques, and 
not the other way around from theoretical or conceptual advances as one 
thought. In fact, the educated inventors of the time-----da Vinci and later 
                                                                                                                                         
 493. Id. at 1268. 
 494. EDWIN S. HUNT & JAMES MURRAY, A HISTORY OF BUSINESS IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE, 1200-
1550, at 50 (1997). 
 495. GRANT, supra note 53, at 19-20. 
 496. See supra Part II. 
 497. See id. Despite da Vinci’s modern popularity in science, technology, and art circles, recent 
historians argue that he was in one important way not a proto-scientist at all: he never published or 
even seemed to disclose ideas from his ‘‘scientific’’ writings. HANNAM, supra note 53, at 7. Whether he 
used his training in mathematics and natural philosophy to inform his invention is important in under-
standing his genius and skill today, but it likely played little role in the decisions of those who hired 
him to design and build things. Those patrons were primarily concerned only with whether he would 
invent and reduce to practice for their benefit ingenious machines, buildings, or fortifications. 
 498. The Venetian system did employ a ‘‘test’’ sometimes termed experientia, and other times 
rendered as experiment. But this was simply a practical demonstration that the invention worked ac-
cording to the claims of the inventor. See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 74, at 1277. 
 499. See generally LONG, supra note 122. 
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even Galileo himself with his telescope and patented water pump500-----do 
seem to have used new mechanical inventions they or others developed 
to suggest new theories and approaches to natural philosophy that would 
ripen over time into the ‘‘new sciences.’’ 
Thus, in the earliest part of the Scientific Revolution, there was still 
neither capital S ‘‘Science’’ nor ‘‘technology’’ in its application of scien-
tific knowledge to practical problems sense. At most, there was ‘‘tech-
nology’’ in its sense of systematic study of various techné (which however 
were not called techné but rather arts). Again, Bacon, one of the premi-
ere architects of the so-called Scientific Revolution, is as focused on ad-
vancing the arts (in the sense of mechanical arts) as he is on developing 
new forms of natural philosophy as the ‘‘new sciences.’’501 He also en-
gaged in the Querelle and thus can be assumed to be aware of the con-
tours of its intellectual debates, as well as the issue of the migration of 
the visual arts away from the mechanical arts and into either their own 
new category of beaux arts or possibly all the way into the liberal arts.502 
His resolute focus on practical and useful arts and his tripartite scheme of 
Memory, Reason, and Imagination (followed with some changes by the 
Encyclopédists) laid the groundwork for the category of ‘‘useful arts’’ as 
those workings of natural materials for practical (i.e., physical well-
being) ends, separate from arts with purely taste or sentiment ends.503 
But Bacon may also represent a different kind of turning point to-
wards the ‘‘application of scientific knowledge’’ sense of ‘‘technology’’ as 
he moved from using mechanical innovations as impetus to develop new 
theories to using those new theories to develop new mechanical inven-
tions. This practical application of new ‘‘scientific’’ knowledge was part of 
his meta-theory of the new sciences that their correctness could-----and 
should-----be demonstrated by their ability to be successfully applied to 
solve difficult practical problems. At the same time, this imported a not 
entirely welcome pragmatic justification for the new sciences, largely ab-
sent from Greek epistemé and later medieval natural philosophy.504 Sci-
ence would become valuable-----and fundable-----only to the extent that it 
led to practical applications. This debate continues to the present day.505 
That said, there appear to have been no immediate major change to 
the various patent systems during the early days of the Scientific Revolu-
tion. For example, the seminal British Statute of Monopolies in 1623/4, 
passed after the 1620 publication of Bacon’s equally seminal Novum Or-
ganum, did not restrict patents to science-based inventions, but only to 
new ‘‘manufactures.’’506 There was still no requirement of ‘‘scientific’’ 
                                                                                                                                         
 500. See Federico, Galileo’s Patent, supra note 122, at 578--80.  
 501. See supra notes 120--23 and accompanying text. 
 502. See supra note 124--30 and accompanying text. 
 503. See supra notes 140--42 and accompanying text. 
 504. See LONG, supra note 122, at 1. 
 505. See, e.g., Research Funding: Should Public Money Finance Applied Research?, THE 
ECONOMIST (July 26, 2012), http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/867. 
 506. Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 74, at 1280. 
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knowledge or basis for patentable manufactures and they could be in-
vented (and patented) by either the educated or the completely illiterate. 
Throughout the later seventeenth century, the most major change to pa-
tent systems due to the Scientific Revolution were periods during which 
royal scientific academies were charged with reviewing patent applica-
tions for novelty and feasibility (especially in France).507 But this did not 
mean that inventions had to represent an advance in the ‘‘sciences’’ to be 
patentable. To the contrary, they were still very much limited to advanc-
es in the (useful) arts, and patents of importation (based on local novelty 
only) were still being granted. ‘‘Technology’’ as a term and concept was 
still not in any relevant use.508 
C. Post-Scientific Revolution Debate 
The eighteenth century saw the complications of introducing sci-
ence-based inventions into the patent systems. Questions of the line be-
tween a principle or law of nature and its application arose. Given the 
broad applicability of many of the emerging scientific laws and relation-
ships, plus the economic value of a broader patent grant, it must have be-
come tempting to push for more abstract patents that captured as much 
of the practical application of such a law or principle as imaginable. At 
the same time, the new scientific orientation towards abstract, general, or 
even universal natural laws or principles may have influenced the patent 
systems themselves to consider ‘‘inventions’’ of a broader scope. Further, 
the relatively easy semantic switch between describing something as a 
‘‘process’’ rather than a ‘‘principle’’ may also have lured inventors and 
their advocates into broad patent applications trying to capture the total-
ity of a new scientific law or principle.509 Famous cases such as Boulton v. 
Bull resulted.510 
Famous eighteenth and nineteenth century science-based patented 
inventions, and cases arising from them, receive the most attention from 
historians of science, technology, and law (respectively); but that does 
not mean the patent systems of the times were limited to such inventions. 
Further, even with the interest in science-based inventions at the time-----
as suggested by nineteenth century patent treatise writers-----the language 
of patents was still very much that of ‘‘arts.’’ As demonstrated in Part IV 
above, it took until well into the twentieth century for ‘‘technology’’ to 
                                                                                                                                         
 507. Prager, supra note 81, at 725--26. 
 508. The OED gives the earliest usages of the word ‘‘technology’’ as actually describing written 
works, especially treatises. These could be about an art, but were used as much for liberal arts subjects 
such as grammar as for any mechanical arts. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2014). In the 
mid-seventeenth century, the French introduced technologie as the technical nomenclature or termi-
nology of a particular art or subject. Id. It would not be until the late eighteenth century that the mod-
ern senses of technology as systematic study of techné art fields such as mechanics, or as the application 
of scientific principles to practical applications, would emerge. Id.  
 509. Compare ‘‘the steam produced from boiling liquid water expands with great force’’ with ‘‘use 
the expansive force of steam from boiling water to move a mechanical apparatus.’’  
 510. Boulton & Watt v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651; 2 H. Bl. 463. 
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even begin to displace ‘‘art’’ in cases and commentary. Most importantly, 
there were still no statutory requirements for patentable inventions to be 
science or technology-based (even after the latter term came into popu-
lar use in the late nineteenth century). The adroit tradesman, artisan, or 
even amateur who invents a novel and useful process, manufacture, ma-
chine, or composition of matter-----by trial or error or other non-scientific 
basis-----is just as entitled to his patent as the science-educated inventor. 
Nor does the invention need to be something ‘‘technical,’’ ‘‘technologi-
cal,’’ or ‘‘scientific’’ in its nature. 
At the same time, patent systems were long based on the premise 
that the invention be at least locally novel, and ideally represent an ‘‘ad-
vance’’ in the art.511 Measuring an ‘‘advance’’ in an art that is already be-
ing practiced locally suggests the Querelle distinction between ‘‘progress’’ 
fields that can be measured quantitatively and ‘‘taste’’ or ‘‘sentiment’’ 
fields that can only be measured qualitatively. Quantitative measures are 
of course mathematical, which further suggests ‘‘technical’’ or even ‘‘sci-
entific.’’ But the products of a field can be measured quantitatively with-
out the artisans practicing in it knowing much more than basic mathe-
matics and the skills of their art. In other words, a skilled metallurgist 
before the Scientific Revolution could produce a metal quantitatively 
stronger than existing ones-----as measured by its ability to withstand more 
force in the form of weight placed on it-----without having any knowledge 
of science. At the same time, an artisan or even amateur can develop an 
entirely new art that is not measurable directly against existing arts, but 
can still be quantitatively shown to address practical needs faster, cheap-
er, more effectively, etc. Thus, even adding in a requirement that an in-
vention ‘‘advance’’ an art, need not entail a requirement that inventions 
be science-based to be patentable. 
D. The Danger in Substituting Terms 
The move to a ‘‘technology’’ orientation (or even worse, ‘‘science’’ 
orientation) for patents risks the exclusion of perfectly valuable and use-
ful advances in various mechanical arts. A ‘‘technological arts’’ test sends 
us down a rabbit hole of trying to determine what ‘‘technology’’ is, which 
is frustrated by the fact that popular use of this term is quite vague; 
‘‘technology’’ is some sort of active ‘‘technical’’ or science-based process-
es and the artifacts that result from them. It is the impressive machinery 
that surrounds us in the modern developed world. It is computers, and 
airplanes, and automobiles, and gene therapy, and monoclonal antibod-
ies, and . . . . The only way to get rigorous about the scope of ‘‘technolo-
gy’’ is to limit it back to one of the formal definitions such as the applied 
                                                                                                                                         
 511. This is not universally true across the history of patents of course. The much-criticized prac-
tice of granting patents in the form of legal monopolies which gave exclusive rights to some art already 
practiced by the public to one individual or company------so-called ‘‘odious monopolies’’------has cropped 
up occasionally. This happened most notably during the reigns of Queen Elizabeth and her successors 
in sixteenth and early seventeenth century England resulting in the Statute of Monopolies. 
O'CONNOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 9:25 AM 
No. 4] THE LOST ART OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 1475 
science or systematic study of techné fields senses. But this would unnec-
essarily exclude many valuable traditional (and current) patent eligible 
inventions such as the proverbial better mousetrap. 
Further it is not clear how important it is to have this term/concept 
today anyway. One can imagine its value in the late eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, when those employing the ‘‘scientific method’’ in all 
manner of traditional mechanical arts might want to distinguish what 
they did from what traditional artisans did. And from the reverse, the 
Arts and Crafts leaders may have been proud to distinguish themselves 
as just those traditional artisans rejecting the industrializing ‘‘technolo-
gy.’’ But it is now well understood that much innovation comes from 
those trained in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics).512 The language of invention is often that of the STEM 
fields. But it need not be exclusively. And there is not great value in dis-
tinguishing inventors who take a ‘‘technological’’ approach from those 
who take any other sort of productive approach. In other words, since 
‘‘technology’’ is, in its proper usages, a descriptor of approaches to arti-
sanal fields and problem-solving, it is not really about the subject matter 
of anything, much less that of patentable inventions. 
Conversely, the linkage of ‘‘science’’ and patents-----directly or 
through the medium of ‘‘technology’’-----generates a risk of increased ‘‘up-
stream patenting’’ on scientific principles or information. Such risk is es-
sentially what was debated in recent major patentable subject matter 
cases including Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabo-
lite Laboratories, Inc.,513 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus La-
boratories, Inc.,514 and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.515 In particular, these cases turned on questions regarding 
the scope of the three traditional exclusions from patent eligibility under 
Anglo-U.S. patent law for (1) laws of science/nature, (2) naturally occur-
ring physical phenomena, and (3) abstract ideas. While the cases each 
played out slightly differently as to which exclusions were invoked, the 
unifying theme of those opposed to the various patents in suit was that 
such patents improperly covered building blocks or principles of science 
and not practical applications thereof. Reserving judgment here on the 
correctness of the various particular holdings, it is enough to say that the 
Pasteur’s Quadrant approach to bridging basic and applied sci-
ence/technology research (use-based rather than curiosity or pure re-
search), combined with the sense that ‘‘technology’’ is the object of the 
patent system, may be contributing to the confusion and controversy 
here. The confusion at the heart of this is amplified by commentators 
who seek to limit the scope of patent eligible subject matter so that it 
                                                                                                                                         
 512. Although the most recent trend is to emphasize ‘‘STEAM’’ fields instead, STEM plus ‘‘arts’’ 
for ‘‘creativity’’ and ‘‘sensitivity’’ (essentially a continuation of the unfortunate limiting of art as fuzzy, 
intuitive aspects of the fine or entertainment arts). 
 513. 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
 514. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 515. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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does not include ‘‘science,’’ but rely on a misguided sense of science as an 
applied discipline or at least with practical goals.516 
E. A Better Way Forward 
The key to restoring some order to the scope of patent eligible sub-
ject matter is to revive the concept of ‘‘useful arts.’’ Building from the 
Map of Human Knowledge in the Encyclopédie, we can focus on ‘‘uses of 
x,’’ where x is some natural material or force. We can then limit patent 
eligible subject matter to those inventions that progress or advance the 
use of natural materials or forces for practical (useful) ends. In practice, 
this should keep in the vast majority of what we already consider to be 
patent eligible subject matter, while giving a principled way to exclude 
things we generally already believe should not be patent eligible. For ex-
ample, the boundaries of these Encyclopédie useful arts also already ex-
clude laws of nature, naturally occurring physical phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas, and so no ad hoc judicial exceptions would be needed for 
them. 
As Michael Risch has pointed out, the utility doctrine is ‘‘surprising-
ly useful,’’517 but its current diluted interpretation (anything that does  
anything likely has substantial utility) may stem from its separation from 
the underlying art. In other words, ‘‘useful’’ probably does not just modi-
fy ‘‘arts’’ in the IP Clause-----as some commentators have argued-----but ra-
ther ‘‘useful arts’’ should be seen as a conceptual category. It is neither an 
exclusive nor originalist category frozen in time. Instead it is simply any 
and all arts that involve the use of natural materials or forces for practi-
cal ends. This is quite different from any art that happens to be ‘‘useful’’ 
in some undefined-----or too broadly defined-----way.518 The historical con-
text in which the neologism ‘‘useful arts’’ arose must be taken into ac-
count, as well as the understanding that ‘‘useful arts’’ indeed was a neolo-
gism at the time and not simply the grammatical juxtaposition of two 
ordinary words. Again, its importance was to signify the new category of 
mechanical arts remaining after the visual arts were moved to the then 
new category of the beaux arts (fine arts).519 Because the visual arts had 
been included in the mechanical arts (alternately manual, vulgar, or vis-
ceral arts) for literally millennia, any use of these established terms in the 
IP Clause could have misleadingly suggested that Congress could create 
exclusive rights for discoveries in the visual arts as well as all the other 
mechanical arts. 
                                                                                                                                         
 516. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 153 (2009) (‘‘Much of science is 
dedicated to manipulating nature, whether the subject is resisting cancer or resisting gravity.’’). 
 517. Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011). 
 518. The fine arts could satisfy the ‘‘art that happens to be useful’’ test, broadly construed, as they 
are useful for aesthetic purposes. Likewise, the liberal arts can be useful for all the various ends they 
encompass.  
 519. See supra Part II. 
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A more difficult problem I will take up elsewhere is that the early 
importance of using patents to encourage development of useful arts was 
based on the intent to produce artisans actually skilled in the art, in the 
sense of tacit ‘‘muscle memory’’ or procedural knowledge. Essentially, 
the focus was as much or more on uncodifiable knowledge as on that 
which could be transmitted through text and images. In fact, one could 
imagine that patents of importation would have been unnecessary if all 
they sought was codifiable knowledge. The sovereign seeking such 
knowledge could simply offer payment for a codified version of the 
knowledge (formula, recipe, etc.). The importance of developing actual 
artisanal skill or craft is underscored by the facts that: (1) a number of 
early British and some American colonial grants expressly required the 
training of local artisans,520 and (2) up until the eighteenth century no ex-
tensive disclosure of the invention was required in the patent document. 
Together, these facts also suggest that disclosure of codifiable knowledge 
was not a main objective of early patent systems. But the switch to re-
quired specifications of codified knowledge is in some ways directly at 
odds with a patent system set up to develop actual (uncodifiable) arti-
sanal skill or craft in local artisans. 
Finally, the question of ‘‘advances’’ or ‘‘progress’’ in the useful arts 
brings us back to the issue of how to measure or otherwise demonstrate 
the same. As suggested above, following from the Querelle and my ar-
guments that ‘‘progress fields’’ are those whose outputs can be quantita-
tively measured, progress must be shown quantitatively. But more guid-
ance can be gleaned from the Encyclopédie’s definition of ‘‘discovery,’’ as 
a likely inspiration for the use of this term in the IP Clause (rather than 
the more straightforward ‘‘invention’’).521 In particular, d’Alembert’s ex-
planation that these ‘‘most important inventions’’ were those that were 
‘‘curious, useful, and difficult to find, . . .’’522 underscores the utility re-
quirement while adding a kind of non-obviousness: things that are curi-
ous are usually those that are unexpected, while those that are difficult to 
find are generally not obvious. It also adds diligence or reduction to prac-
tice: something that was difficult to find, generally entails significant ef-
fort, or lots of good luck. While non-obviousness starts as a mid-
nineteenth century American judicial doctrine, it was not supposed to be 
an entirely new creation or requirement, as by definition the court are 
only supposed to be interpreting the patent statute. Thus, the sentiment 
of curiosity or unexpectedness as an important factor in the deserving-
ness of an invention for a patent may have much earlier roots. Reduction 
to practice and diligence are much easier to trace all the way back to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 520. Some commentators have speculated that this is where the early patent terms of 14 and 21 
years come from. As multiples of seven, which was the number of years of a standard apprenticeship, 
the period of exclusivity would last through at least two generations of apprentices. This would both 
keep the master’s apprentices from competing with him too soon (limiting the value of his patent 
grant) and keep the master training successive generations of apprentices in order to keep his grant. 
 521. See supra text accompanying notes 145--50. 
 522. d’Alembert, supra note 166. 
O'CONNOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 9:25 AM 
1478 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
original Venetian patent system. Further, while d’Alembert set out the 
three concepts in conjunctive form, he indicated later in the entry that 
these are factors that can be weighed in a more disjunctive manner. Thus, 
for example, a high level of curiosity might tilt toward calling something 
a ‘‘discovery’’ even if it was not so difficult to find. Accordingly, these 
factors could be used as heuristic devices in interpreting existing doc-
trines of patentability-----utility, nonobviousness, and enablement-----that 
are all aimed at ensuring that an invention is enough of an advance in its 
art to warrant a patent grant. 
In sum, using the constructs of ‘‘useful arts’’ and ‘‘discovery’’ from 
the Encyclopédie, we can recover the lost ‘‘art’’ of the patent system. Do-
ing so will help us keep patents out of the realm of science, while not un-
fairly prejudicing the system against non-technological inventions. By 
contrast, continuing the relatively recent trend to replace ‘‘art’’ with 
‘‘technology’’ (or even worse, ‘‘science’’) as the object of the patent sys-
tem will only further confuse the functioning of the system and create 
further conflict with activities that traditionally have been outside of it. 
Finally, nothing about this revival of ‘‘useful art’’ (or ‘‘discovery’’) should 
jeopardize the patent eligibility of ‘‘technology’’-based inventions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the patent system has largely lost the ‘‘art’’ it was 
founded around. This mirrors the loss of the mechanical arts sense of 
‘‘art’’ in the general public and the literature. But the central importance 
of this sense of ‘‘art’’ for all manner of activities means that a void was 
created. ‘‘Technology’’ has filled that void, but it brings along a ‘‘science’’ 
component that is outside of many mechanical arts, past and present. 
‘‘Science’’ itself is increasingly brought into areas that is does not really 
belong in, and increases the confusion that ‘‘science’’ should be about 
creating (and monetizing) practical applications for human needs. This 
can be fixed by reviving the concepts of ‘‘useful arts’’ and ‘‘discoveries’’ 
that appear in the IP Clause. 
 
